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ABSTRACT 
 
In Part 1, we study the impact of bond exchange listing in the US publicly traded 
corporate bond market.  Overall, we find that listed corporate bonds have lower bid-ask spreads 
than unlisted corporate bonds.  We specifically show that listed bond spreads are $0.14 lower 
than unlisted bond spreads.  We find that execution venue matters for listed bonds, and that listed 
bond trades that execute on the NYSE have higher trading costs than listed bond trades that 
execute off-NYSE.  We show that listed bonds are more volatile than unlisted bonds.  Lastly, we 
study bond trading around earnings announcements.  We find no evidence that listing influences 
institutional (or large trading) activity in bonds.  In Part 2, we study municipal bond market 
activity before, during, and after natural disasters (tornados, wildfires, and hurricanes/tropical 
storms).  Using a sample of municipal bond trades from 2010 to 2013, we find that natural 
disasters influence municipal bond trading.  Specifically, we show that spreads are lower on both 
tornado and wildfire event days and during following five trading days than during the preceding 
five trading days.  While we do not document a relation between hurricane events and spreads, 
we show that spreads fall during the five days following the hurricane compared to the five 
trading days before the event.  Generally, we document an increase in dollar volume in the five 
trading days following all three types of natural disasters.  We also determine that linkages exist 
between the bonds affected by natural disasters and related bonds.  In Part 3, we study municipal 
bond trading activity before, during, and after announcements of government officials’ 
misconduct.  Using a sample of over 39,000,000 trades in nearly 500,000 bonds, we find that 
spreads are higher on news, indictment announcement, and trial verdict announcement days than 
other trading days.  Spreads remain elevated through the five trading days following the 
announcement.  We also find that large bond trades account for the majority of price discovery 
on event days.  Overall, our results establish a link between government officials, their 
misconduct, and municipal bond markets. 
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PART 1:  THE VALUE OF BOND LISTING 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the United States bond market, firms can list publicly traded bonds on the New York 
Stock Exchange or publicly traded bonds can be unlisted with no exchange affiliation.  The 
trades that bond dealers report to the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) execute 
on trading platforms across the United States, but do not include trades in listed bonds that 
execute on the New York Stock Exchange.  The NYSE Automated Bond System operates as an 
electronic limit order book that executes trades in listed bonds on a price-time priority basis.  
Listed bond trades can execute on the NYSE or any of the TRACE bond trading platforms, while 
unlisted bonds can trade only on TRACE bond trading platforms.  
 Previous research documents two main advantages for securities listing on a national 
exchange:  investor recognition and improved liquidity.  Merton (1987) uses the capital asset 
pricing model to show theoretically that listing on an exchange is one way the firm can increase 
investor recognition, and Kadlec and McConnell (1994) show empirically that listing on the 
NYSE leads to a 27% increase in institutional shareholders for the firm. Research also 
documents a market quality advantage for NYSE stocks and for NYSE trades.  For example, 
Huang and Stoll (1996) and Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) compare NYSE and NASDAQ 
listed stocks using data from the early 1990s, when markets were more consolidated and listing 
potentially had a different value than it may in today’s fragmented trading environment.  Both 
Huang and Stoll and Bessembinder and Kaufman find that a sample of NYSE stocks has lower 
trading costs than a matched sample of NASDAQ stocks.  Bennett and Wei (2006) find that 
lower trading costs occur for firms that switch their listing exchange from NASDAQ to the 
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NYSE.  The above mentioned research focuses only on equity markets.  Analyzing the benefits 
of listing using bonds provides valuable research contributions for multiple reasons.   
 First, most of the research on listing focuses on highly liquid assets.  Bonds are illiquid, 
with the average corporate bond trading just over two times per day (Edwards, Harris, and 
Piwowar, 2007).  Bennet and Wei (2006) show that listing on the NYSE is particularly valuable 
for illiquid stocks.  However, even the most liquid bonds will likely be less liquid than illiquid 
stocks, thus leaving unanswered questions about the importance of listing for illiquid assets.  
Bonds are more expensive to trade than equities, both for institutions and individual traders, so 
documenting differences in trading costs between listed and unlisted bonds could be beneficial 
for bond traders.  Determining what market quality advantages, if any, listing provides to bond 
traders sheds light on why firms choose to list their publicly traded debt.   
Second, it is possible that listing a bond serves as a signal or stamp of approval to 
investors, much like paying dividends and beating earnings expectations can serve as a signal to 
stakeholders (Bhattacharya, 1979; Nissim and Ziv, 2001; and Fuller and Goldstein, 2011).  
Bonds may be listed on one venue – the NYSE— whereas firms can choose from multiple 
exchanges for equity listing (for example, the NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX).  Choosing to list a 
bond may provide information to the market as to the quality of the bond.  The bond market as a 
whole is less informationally efficient than the stock market (Kwan, 1996; Downing, 
Underwood, and Xing, 2009), and traders (both institutions and retail) may be able to better 
garner information based on a bond’s listing status.  Third, the bond market is economically 
large.  According to Ederington and Yang (2013), US firms issued $6.6 trillion in corporate 
bonds from 2005 to 2011, compared to just $1.3 trillion in common stock offerings over the 
same time period. 
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RELATED LITERATURE 
Merton (1987) provides theoretical reasoning for the firm’s decision to list on a national 
exchange.  Merton utilizes the original capital asset pricing model in his theory of listing, but 
makes one change to the model’s assumptions.  Merton relaxes the assumption that all investors 
share equal information sets and develops a model in which expected returns decrease with the 
size of the firm’s investor base.  He shows an increase in the investor base (i.e., an increase in 
investor recognition) leads to lower expected returns and a higher market value for the firm.  He 
goes on to detail that one way a firm increases its investor base is to list on a national exchange.  
Sanger and McConnell (1986) detail that listing provides a liquidity advantage, and also that an 
organized exchange can provide investors with a better quality of trading.   Baruch and Saar 
(2009) propose that, in addition to investor recognition and liquidity, firm commonality plays a 
role in the firm’s decision to list on an exchange.  Specifically, Baruch and Saar show that a 
stock is more liquid when it is listed on a market along with similar securities; the liquidity 
advantage arises because market makers are able to ascertain information about the firm using 
the order flow of other stocks listed on the exchange, thus improving the efficiency of prices.   
Many of the studies that show a market quality or liquidity improvement for listing study 
a time when markets were more consolidated, and a time when the home listing exchange 
executed the majority of trades in listed securities.  For example, Huang and Stoll (1996) 
compare trading costs of large capitalization NASDAQ stocks to the trading costs of a matched 
sample of NYSE stocks using trade data from 1991, a time when markets were consolidated.  
The authors find that NYSE stocks have lower trading costs than the matched sample of 
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NASDAQ stocks.  Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) expand the work by Huang and Stoll and 
compare the execution costs of NASDAQ and NYSE listed stocks using small, medium, and 
large capitalization stocks and find similar results.  However, the study again uses a time period 
from the early 1990s (1994) when markets were more consolidated, and the advantages of the 
listing exchange were perhaps different.   
After markets began to experience increased fragmentation in trading, listing continued to 
have value.   Bessembinder (2003) studies a sample of NYSE stocks using trade data from June 
2000 and makes comparison among seven markets that compete for order flow in large 
capitalization NYSE stocks.  Bessembinder finds the NYSE is the most competitive market for 
NYSE listed stocks, despite the fragmented trading opportunities.  Bennett and Wei (2006) 
examine a sample of 39 firms that switch from NASDAQ to the NYSE in 2002 and 2003.  
Stocks have lower quoted spreads, effective spreads, and price volatility following the switch to 
the NYSE.  In addition, price efficiency improves after the firms switch to the NYSE.  Bennet 
and Wei use Dash-5 data to show the improvement in market quality is driven by a reduction in 
order flow fragmentation.  Empirically, there is strong support for NYSE equity listing and 
NYSE equity trades providing investors with better market quality.     
The majority of research that relates to the advantages of listing on a national exchange 
focuses on equities and does not reach a definitive conclusion as to whether an exchange 
environment or a dealer environment is better.  Now that trading in many securities markets is 
fragmented and listing bonds means simply that bonds can trade on the NYSE as well as other 
venues, is listing valuable?  If so, is it valuable because only listed bonds can trade on the 
NYSE?  We seek to determine the value of listing for bonds. 
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HYPOTHESES 
First, we focus on the differences in listed and unlisted bonds.  Previous work shows that 
bonds are more expensive to trade than equities.1  It is not clear, however, if listed bonds offer 
better execution costs than unlisted bonds.  Empirically, Huang and Stoll (1996) and Bennet and 
Wei (2006) show trading costs are lower for NYSE listed stocks.  In addition, Bessembinder and 
Kaufman (1997) detail that trading costs are higher for off-NYSE stock trades in NYSE stocks.  
We form the following two hypotheses:   
H1:  Listed bonds have lower spreads than unlisted bonds. 
H2:  Listed bond transactions that execute on the NYSE have lower trading costs than listed 
bond trades that execute off the NYSE. 
Second, we focus on price efficiency.  Listing also affects price efficiency, as is indicated 
in Heidle and Huang (2002) and Baruch and Saar (2009).  Three measures of price efficiency 
include return volatility, the variance ratio (O’Hara and Ye, 2011), and price volatility (Downing 
and Zhang, 2004).   Bennet and Wei (2006) show empirically that volatility falls for stocks that 
switch their listing to the NYSE, and Baruch and Saar (2009) detail that a firm’s choice to list on 
an exchange with similar firms can lead to more efficient information processing by market 
makers.  We present the following hypothesis: 
H3:  Price efficiency is positively related to a bond being listed. 
 
                                                          
1 See Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007), Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2006), Harris and 
Piwowar (2006), and Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007) for further evidence. 
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Third, we focus on the relation between listing and a firm’s investor base.  Theoretical 
work by Merton (1987) and empirical work by Kadlec and McConnell (1994) indicate that 
listing serves as a way to expand a firm’s investor base.  Specifically, Kadlec and McConnell 
(1994) show that NYSE listing leads to a 27% increase in the number of institutional 
shareholders a firm has on record.  However, the question of whether or not listing leads to more 
institutional trading in bonds remains.  Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009) details 
that institutions have a prevalent role in the bond market.  Ronen and Zhou (2013) detail that 
trade size is a reliable way to measure institutional trading in bonds and show that trades greater 
than $500,000 in size are institutional trades.2  We question if bond listing matters for 
institutional trading activity and form the following hypothesis: 
H4:  Listed bonds have a larger amount of institutional trading than unlisted bonds. 
  
                                                          
2 We follow Ronen and Zhou (2013) and classify bond trades as institutional if the trade value exceeds $500,000.  
Earlier bond papers, such as Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007) classify trades as institutional if the trade size is 
greater than $100,000.  In preliminary work, we use both trade sizes, $100,000 and $500,000, in all tests, to label 
institutional trades.  We find that the results are qualitatively similar, and therefore we follow the more recent Ronen 
and Zhou paper. 
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SAMPLE AND DATA 
We use bond transaction level data for the year 2013.  Our bond trade data is from two 
sources:  TRACE and the NYSE.  We follow Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2006) 
in making data deletions.  We delete trades flagged as cancelled (135,437 observations), 
corrected (136,572 observations), reported after-market hours (48,170 observations), reported 
late (241,588 observations), and after-market trades reported late (8,132 observations).  We 
delete 1,678,597 trades in bonds issued by private companies, and we also delete 754 trades with 
missing CUSIP identification.  We delete any bond trading at less than 25% of par (15,662).  We 
require the bond to trade at least ten times during our sample period (Edwards, Harris, and 
Piwowar, 2007).  We obtain daily shares outstanding and daily stock prices from CRSP to 
calculate the firm’s daily market capitalization.   
In our study, we make comparisons between two types of bonds (listed and unlisted), and 
also between different trading venues (the NYSE and other bond trading platforms).  The NYSE 
bond market and TRACE have different trading hours.  The NYSE offers three bond trading 
sessions during the day:  4:00 am - 9:30 am EST (Early Trading); 9:30 am – 4:00 pm EST (Core 
Trading); and 4:00 pm – 8:00 pm EST (Late Trading).  TRACE reporting is allowed from 8:00 
am – 6:30 pm EST.  To provide a clean comparison, we use an overlapping time between 
TRACE reporting hours and NYSE trading hours.  As a result, we use trades that execute 
between 8:00 am to 6:30 pm EST.  Following all data deletions, we have 6,841,030 bond trades 
in 12,633 bonds for the 2013 calendar year (our full sample period).   
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Appendix 1 provides a general overview of our sample.  For the sample of trades, 73.3% 
involve an investment grade bond.  81.53% of trades involve a bond with less than ten years to 
maturity.  Top bonds make up the majority of trades, accounting for 52.12% of all transactions.  
In regards to trade size, trades greater than $25,000 account for 47.36% of trades, while trades 
greater than $500,000 (institutional trades) account for only 13.44% of trades.  Substantially 
more trades occur in bonds priced above par value (76.23%) than bonds priced below par value 
(23.13%).  
 Appendix 1 also shows summary statistics for listed and unlisted bonds.  Unlisted bond 
trades are split fairly evenly between investment grade and high yield bonds, while listed bond 
trades are dominated by investment grade bonds.  Investment grade bonds account for 81.07% of 
listed bond trades, while high yield bonds account for just 18.93% of listed bond trades.  
Roughly 40% of bond trading in both listed and unlisted bonds occurs in bonds with less than 
five years to maturity, while over 80% of trades in both listed and unlisted bonds occur in bonds 
with less than ten years to maturity.  The percentage of institutional trades (trades greater than 
$500,000) is 16.22% for unlisted bonds, while 12.30% for listed bonds.  Trades greater than 
$1,000,000 make up similar portions of listed and unlisted bonds (6.54% compared to 5.08%).  
For both listed and unlisted bond trades, over 70% of trades involve a bond priced above its par 
value.   
 Appendix 2 provides summary statistics for the full sample of bonds.  Panel A includes 
all bonds in the sample.  The sample includes 12,633 bonds that trade during the 2013 calendar 
year.  On average, the bonds in the sample trade at 105.49% of par.  The average bid-ask spread 
for the full sample of bonds is $1.34.  The average bond trades 4.73 times each day and transacts 
over $1,500,000 in daily dollar volume with an average trade size of roughly $380,000.  Panel B 
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details the summary statistics for listed bonds, and Panel C details the summary statistics for 
unlisted bonds.  The average listed bond trades at 109.44% of par, while the average unlisted 
bond trades at 102.73% of par.  Overall, listed bonds appear to trade more times than unlisted 
bonds.  The average listed bond trades nearly six times each day, while the average unlisted bond 
trades about four times each day.  Listed bonds have an average daily dollar volume of over 
$2,000,000, while unlisted bonds execute an average of $1,000,000 in daily dollar volume.  
Listed bonds appear to have lower spreads than unlisted bonds.  Listed bonds have an average 
spread of $1.17, while unlisted bonds have an average spread of $1.45.  Volatility appears 
similar between the listed and unlisted bonds.  However, we do not test for differences between 
listed and unlisted bonds in Appendix 2.  We test for differences between listed and unlisted 
bonds using the matched sample later in the paper.        
 We also provide summary statistics for the top bonds in the sample.  A bond is 
designated as the firm’s top bond if the bond has the most institutional trading out of all the 
firm’s bonds on a given day.  We classify a trade as institutional if it is greater than $500,000 
(Ronen and Zhou, 2013).  Throughout the sample period, 8,375 bonds are classified as the firm’s 
top bond.  Panel A details all top bonds in our sample.  Top bonds trade, on average, at 107% of 
par and transact nearly $4,500,000 in average daily volume.  Top bonds trade an average of 
nearly 7 times per day and have an average daily trade size of over $1,100,000.  The average top 
bond trade has a bid-ask spread of $0.87.   
 In Panel B and C, we split the top bonds into listed and unlisted bonds.  Overall, listed 
top bonds trade at 109% of par and transact almost $5,000,000 in daily volume. Listed top bonds 
trade about seven times each day, on average, and have an average trade size of over $1,200,000.  
The average spread for listed top bonds is $0.90.  Unlisted top bonds trade above par as well, 
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trading at 104% of par.  Unlisted top bonds appear to conduct slightly less average daily volume 
than listed top bonds, but not by much.  Unlisted top bonds have an average daily dollar volume 
of over $4,000,000 and an average trade size of over $1,000,000.  The average spread for 
unlisted top bonds is $0.83.   
   We further explore our sample by highlighting aspects of the bond market’s intraday 
trading activity.3  We show the number of average bond trades during thirty minute increments 
from 8:00 am to 6:30 pm in Figure 1.  We utilize 8:00 am – 6:30 pm because it is the overlapping 
time between TRACE reporting hours and the NYSE bond market’s hours.  The average number 
of bond trades increases gradually during the day, and spike around 4:00 pm, which is when 
NYSE core trading ends.  In Figure 1, we also show the average number of trades by listed 
versus unlisted bonds.  Listed bonds seem to trade, on average, more often than unlisted bonds 
trade during the trading day.  Both types of bonds appear to have a trading spike around 4:00 pm, 
but the increase seems more drastic for unlisted bonds.  It is interesting to note that unlisted 
bonds, which do not trade on the NYSE platform, experience a spike in trading at the close of 
NYSE core trading.  The average number of trades drops after 4:30 pm, almost reaching zero as 
TRACE reporting concludes at 6:30 pm.   
 We continue our analysis of the bond trading day in Figure 2.  Figure 2 details the 
average intraday bond trade size.  We again focus on 8:00 am to 6:30 pm because of the 
overlapping hours between TRACE and the NYSE.  Figure 2 shows that the average trade size is 
fairly consistent during the trading day, but increases leading up to 5:00 pm.  The average trade 
size for listed and unlisted bonds begins to increase between 3:01 pm and 3:30 pm.  Prior to the 
                                                          
3 Reference Chan, Christie, and Schultz (1995), Chung, Van Ness, and Van Ness (1999), Lee, Mucklow, and Ready 
(1993), and Wood, McInish, and Ord (1985) for more information on intraday market behavior in the equities 
market. 
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increase, the average trade size for listed bonds is just under $500,000, and the average trade size 
for unlisted bonds is just under $300,000. After 5:00 pm, the average trade size declines.  From 
4:31 pm to 5:00 pm, listed bonds have an average trade size of $800,000, whereas unlisted bonds 
have an average trade size of $500,000 during the same period.  In Figure 3, we focus on the 
average intraday dollar volume.  Throughout the course of the day, the average dollar volume 
appears to stay at consistent levels before spiking between 4:01 pm to 4:30 pm for listed and 
unlisted bonds.  Following the spike in volume, the average volume level falls to nearly zero as 
TRACE reporting concludes. 
  
13 
 
RESULTS 
Listed bonds can trade on the NYSE or through the various bond trading platforms that 
report trades to TRACE.  However, there is potential for execution quality and liquidity 
differences to exist among the trading venues.  Previous research on equities documents 
substantial differences between trading venues.  For example, Huang and Stoll (1996) find that 
execution costs are larger for a sample of NASDAQ stocks than for a sample of NYSE stocks; 
Bessembinder (1999, 2003) shows that NASDAQ stocks have higher trading costs than NYSE 
stocks following both tick size reductions and changes in order handling rules.  We compare a 
sample of listed bonds that trade on both the NYSE and TRACE venues during our time period.  
 Appendix 3 Panel A provides statistics on the sample of listed bonds.  Overall, there is a 
slight statistical difference in the prices of listed bond trades on the NYSE and listed bond trades 
on the TRACE venues.  However, the difference is minimal ($0.32), which is not overly 
surprising; any difference in price between the trading venues indicates an arbitrage opportunity 
for listed bonds.  On average, listed bond trades on the NYSE are less frequent, have a lower 
trade size, and hence, have a lower daily dollar volume than TRACE venue trades.  NYSE trades 
are also more volatile than TRACE trades, but the difference in volatility is small (0.18) and 
significant only at the ten percent level.  Listed bond trades on a TRACE venue have lower 
spreads than listed bond trades on the NYSE.  NYSE trades have an average spread of $1.23, 
while TRACE trades have an average spread of $1.04.  The difference in the spreads is 
significant at the one percent level.  The spread differential could be driven by many factors.  For 
one, TRACE may offer better execution quality and liquidity for bond traders.  Or, the 
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differential in spread could simply be driven by the fact that larger trades execute via TRACE, 
and there is an inverse relation between bond trade size and trading cost.  Edwards, Harris, and 
Piwowar (2007), Harris and Piwowar (2006), and Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007) 
document an inverse relation between trade size and trading cost in the bond market. 
Appendix 3 Panel B provides statistics on the listed top bonds.  The top bonds are the 
bonds with the most institutional dollar volume for each firm (Ronen and Zhou, 2013).  There is 
no difference in the price of top bond trades on the NYSE and TRACE venues.  Top bonds trade 
more times each day, have higher daily dollar volume, and have larger average trade sizes on the 
TRACE venues than top bond trades on the NYSE.  TRACE trades in top bonds have lower 
spreads than NYSE trades in top bonds.  NYSE top bond trades have an average bid-ask spread 
of $1.13, while TRACE top bond trades have an average spread of $0.92.  The $0.21 difference 
is significant at the one percent level.   
An important aspect of market quality is the bid-ask spread.  In this section, we focus on 
the spread.  We note in the last section that listed bond trades appear to have lower spreads and 
that TRACE spreads are lower for listed bonds than NYSE spreads.  Model 1 utilizes the full 
sample of bond trades, whereas Model 2 (Model 3) utilizes listed (unlisted) bond trades.  We 
estimate the following spread regression model: 
Bid Ask Spread =  β0 + β1Dollar Volume +  β2Number of Trades + β3Trade Size + 
 β4Volatility +  β5Top Bond +  β6Years to Maturity +  β7Firm Size +  β8Investment Grade
+  β9TRACE Execution +  β10Listed + ε 
Appendix 4 provides bid-ask spread regression results.  Our main variable of interest in 
the bid-ask spread regressions is the Listed variable.  The Listed variable is equal to one if a bond 
is listed.  We find a negative relation between bond listing and the bid-ask spread.  The 
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magnitude of the coefficient indicates that listed bond spreads are $0.14 lower than unlisted bond 
spreads.  The negative relation between bond listing and spread provides evidence that bond 
listing provides some value, in the form of reduced trading costs, to bond traders.      
In addition to bond listing variable, we are also interested in the Top Bond variable in 
Models 1, 2, and 3.  Focusing on the Top Bond variable allows us to see the relation between 
institutional trading activity and the bond bid-ask spread, given that top bonds are the bonds with 
the most institutional trading volume.  We follow Ronen and Zhou (2013) in designating the top 
bond as the bond with the most institutional trading dollar volume for each firm, with 
institutional trading measured as trades exceeding $500,000.  The Top Bond variable is equal to 
one if the bond has the most institutional trading for each firm’s bonds on a given day.   
The Top Bond coefficient is negative in all three regression models.  For the full sample 
of bonds, top bonds spreads are $0.42 lower than the spreads of other bonds.  For listed bonds 
(Model 2), top bonds have spreads that are $0.33 lower than other bonds, and unlisted top bonds 
(Model 3) have spreads that are $0.59 lower than other bonds.  Although we do not test for 
differences in the coefficients here, it appears that being the firm’s top bond has more value for 
unlisted bonds, given the magnitude of the coefficient.  The control variables in the regressions 
conform to general expectations.  Similar to Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007), the 
regression models show that bonds with more time to maturity have larger spreads.  The larger 
spread for bonds with longer maturities is likely driven by potential interest rate risk.  
Additionally, we find that investment grade bonds have lower bid-ask spreads.  Edwards, Harris, 
and Piwowar (2007) also document a negative relation between bond spread and credit quality.       
We estimate the bid-ask spread regressions for the top bonds in our sample to shed 
further light on the relation between institutional trading and spread since top bonds, by design, 
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are the bonds with the most institutional trading.  While we document a negative relation 
between bond listing and the bid-ask spread in the full sample of bonds, we find the opposite in 
the top bond sample.  Listed top bond trades have spreads that are $0.08 larger than unlisted top 
bond trades.  Otherwise, the control variables in the top bond regressions yield coefficients 
similar to the full sample bid-ask spread regressions.  We find that volatility and time to maturity 
have a positive relation with the bid-ask spread, while investment grade has a negative relation 
with the spread.  
We are also interested in the intraday pattern of the bond bid-ask spread.  The U-shaped 
intraday spread pattern in equities is well documented (see McInish and Wood, 1992), but less is 
known about the intraday pattern of bond spreads.  In Figure 4, we show the average bond spread 
throughout the trading day.  Like previous figures, we utilize 8:00 am to 6:30 pm because it is 
the overlapping time between the NYSE trading hours and TRACE reporting hours.  The Figure 
shows that spreads steadily increase during the morning trading hours, before leveling off 
between 10:01 am to 10:30 am.  Spreads appear to increase between 3:31 pm to 4:00 pm before 
peaking in the following half hour.  The spike in spreads seems the most drastic for unlisted 
bonds.  However, following the increase, spreads fall sharply leading up to the end of TRACE 
reporting at 6:30 pm.   
Previous research documents an inverse relation between bond trade size and bond spread 
(Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar, 2007).  We see if this relation holds for both listed and unlisted 
bonds in Appendix 5.  In Panel A, we detail the average spread by trade size for the full sample 
of bonds, for listed bonds, and for unlisted bonds.  Our findings are similar to previous work by 
Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007).4  We find a consistent negative relation between trade 
                                                          
4 Other research documents the inverse relation between bond trade size and bid-ask spread, including Edwards, 
Harris, and Piwowar (2007) and Harris and Piwowar (2006). 
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size and bond spread for the full sample of bonds, for listed bonds, and for unlisted bonds.  
While we test for differences between listed and unlisted bonds using the matched sample later 
in the paper, it appears in Appendix 5 that listed bonds have lower spreads than unlisted bonds, 
on average, for the full sample, small sized trades, and medium trades.   
In Panel B, Quartile 1 includes the most active bonds in our sample, and Quartile 4 
includes the least active bonds in our sample.  Panel B shows that bond spread and trading 
activity have an inverse relation.  The most active bonds appear to have lower spreads ($0.99) 
than the least active bonds ($1.56).  The same relation holds for listed and unlisted bonds.  The 
most active listed bonds have an average spread of $0.95, and the least active listed bonds have 
an average spread of $1.80.  The range of spread from the most active to the least active is not as 
drastic for unlisted bonds, however.  The most active listed bonds have an average spread of 
$1.07, and the least active unlisted bonds have an average spread of $1.51.   
We also examine whether listing influences the price efficiency of bonds.  O’Hara and 
Ye (2011) utilize volatility as a measure of price efficiency in equities, and Bennet and Wei 
(2006) show that volatility decreases for stocks that change their listing venue from NASDAQ to 
the NYSE.  We measure volatility following Downing and Zhang (2004) using the following 
equation:  
100
Pricet
(Pricet
Max − Pricet
Min) 
We use the following regression model to estimate volatility: 
Volatility =  β0 + β1Dollar Volume +  β2Number of Trades + β3Trade Size + β4Top Bond 
+ β5Years to Maturity +  β6Firm Size + β7Investment Grade +  β8TRACE Execution 
+ β9Listed + ε 
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We present our bond volatility regression results in Appendix 6.  Our main variable of 
interest is the Listed variable.  The Listed variable is equal to one if a bond is listed.  We find that 
listed bonds are more volatile than unlisted bonds and document a positive relation between bond 
listing and volatility in Model 1.  The Listed coefficient is significant at the one percent level.  
The positive relation between bond listing and volatility conflicts with our expectations, given 
the predictions that exchange listing positively influences price efficiency.  There are two 
possible explanations for the positive relation between bond listing and volatility.  One 
explanation is trading activity.  We document earlier that listed bonds trade more than unlisted 
bonds, and more trading activity leads to higher volatility.  The second explanation is simply the 
structure of the bond market.  The bond market is fragmented, and we know that fragmentation 
positively influences volatility (O’Hara and Ye, 2011).   
The top bond variable is equal to one if a bond has the most institutional trading for each 
firm on a given trading day; following Ronen and Zhou (2013), a trade is classified as 
institutional if it is greater than $500,000.  The Top Bond indicator variable is also of interest 
because it helps detail the relation between bond volatility and institutional trading activity since 
the top bond is the bond with the most institutional trading activity.  We find (weak) evidence 
that top bonds are more volatile than non-top bonds.  We document a weak positive relation 
between top bond status and volatility for the full sample of bonds and the sample of unlisted 
bonds.  However, we find no relation between top bond status and volatility for the sample of 
listed bonds.  The control variables in the volatility regressions conform to expectations.  We 
find that bonds with more time to maturity have higher levels of volatility than bonds with less 
time to maturity, and bonds with investment grade ratings have lower levels of volatility that 
non-investment grade bonds. 
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Next, we study volatility for top bonds to further understand the relation between 
institutional trading and volatility.  In Model 4, we find evidence that listed top bonds are more 
volatile than unlisted top bonds.  The positive relation between bond listing and volatility for top 
bonds is somewhat puzzling, given that we find no relation between top bond status and 
volatility for listed bonds in Model 2.  In Figure 5, we further detail intraday bond volatility.  We 
utilize trades that occur between 8:00 am and 6:30 pm.  Generally, the figure shows that 
volatility increases gradually between 8:01 am and 10:00 am before leveling off to a consistent 
level during the majority of the trading day.  Volatility spikes between 4:01 pm and 4:30 pm, and 
then continues to decrease during the remainder of trading. 
 Kadlec and McConnell (1994) find that exchange (NYSE) listing leads to an increase in 
the number of institutional shareholders in a firm.  Specifically, they show that institutional 
holdings increase by 27% for listed firms following earnings announcements.  We study bond 
trading on earnings announcement and non-announcement days.  Appendix 7 presents the 
preliminary results comparing earnings announcement days to non-earnings announcements 
days5.  Panel A includes all bonds in the sample.  Panel B (Panel C) includes listed (unlisted) 
bonds.  For the full sample of bonds, we document a slight increase in price on the earnings 
announcement day.  We also find a corresponding increase in dollar volume and the number of 
trades executed on announcement days.  Dollar volume increases by nearly $200,000 on the 
announcement day, while the number of trades increases only marginally.   
 In Panel B, we focus on listed bonds.  We find that listed bond prices increase on 
announcement day, along with overall listed dollar volume.  The average listed bond is priced at 
                                                          
5 We replicate Appendix 7 for only top bonds, and we find results that are qualitatively similar to those presented in 
Appendix 7. 
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108.70% of par on announcement days, while the average listed bond is priced at 108.51% of par 
on non-announcement days.  Average dollar volume increases by over $150,000 for listed bonds 
on announcement day, but we find no significant change in either trade size or the number of 
trade executions on announcement days (compared to non-announcement days).  Panel C 
provides results for unlisted bonds, and the results are similar to those shown in Panel A.  We 
document significant increases in bond price, dollar volume, and the number of trades for 
unlisted bonds on announcement days. 
 Kadlec and McConnell (1994) focus on the relation between exchange listing and 
institutional shareholders.  We expand their study by focusing on institutional sized bond trading 
activity on earnings announcement and non-announcement days.  We follow Ronen and Zhou 
(2013) and classify a trade as institutional if the trade size is greater than $500,000.  We provide 
the results of our analysis6 in Appendix 8.  We focus on the price, trade size, dollar volume, 
number of trades, percentage dollar volume, and the percentage number of trades in Appendix 8.  
The percentage volume (percentage trades) is the portion of volume (trading activity) for which 
institutional-sized trades account.  For all bonds, we find an increase in the price at which 
institutional-sized trades execute and a slight increase in the average institutional trade size on 
earnings announcements days.  Institutions purchase bonds priced at 106.90% of par on 
announcement days, compared to 106.63% of par on non-announcement days.  The average trade 
size increases by nearly $40,000 on announcement days.   
 We find that institutional dollar volume declines by over $1,000,000 on announcement 
days, along with the number of institutional sized trades.  Perhaps the most striking results in 
Panel A, however, involve the percentage volume and the percentage number of trades for 
                                                          
6 We replicate Appendix 8 for only top bonds, and we find results qualitatively similar to those presented in 
Appendix 8. 
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institutional sized trades.  On non-announcement days, institutions account for 78.31% of dollar 
volume.  On announcement days, this percentage falls to just 43.84%.  The results are similar for 
the percentage of trades, only not as drastic.  On non-announcement days, institution sized trades 
account for nearly 30% of all trades.  Yet, these large trades make up only 21% of trades on 
announcement days.  The results in Panel A could indicate one of two things.  First, the results 
may simply mean that institutions pull back from the market (and from possible informed 
trading) on earnings announcements days.  Or, it is possible that institutions trade prior to the 
announcement. 
 We further divide the sample into listed bonds (Panel B) and unlisted bonds (Panel C).  
According to listing theory and Kadlec and McConnell (1994), the level of institutional activity 
should increase with an earnings announcement.  We find the opposite in terms of activity, 
however.  We find lower levels of institutional dollar volume and fewer institutional sized trades 
on earnings announcements days.  We also document a substantial drop in the percentage dollar 
volume and percentage number of trades for large, institution sized trades.  Institutions account 
for 86.45% of dollar volume on non-announcement days, but only 47.64% of volume on 
announcement days.  The same is true for the percentage of trades; institution sized trades 
account for 9.9% fewer trades on announcement days than they do on non-announcement days.  
The results for unlisted bonds are similar to those shown in Panel A. 
 In Appendix 8, we focus on institutional-sized trading activity.  We provide results for 
our study of smaller, retail sized trades in Appendix 9.  Panel A includes all bonds in the sample.  
Panel B (Panel C) includes listed (unlisted) bonds7.  Overall, retail sized trades have lower dollar 
                                                          
7 We replicate Appendix 9 for only top bonds, and we find results that are qualitatively similar to those presented in 
Appendix 9. 
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volume on announcement days than on non-announcement days.  In contrast to institutional-
sized trades, though, retail trades account for both a larger percentage of volume and a larger 
percentage of trades on announcement days than on non-announcement days.  Retail trades 
account for just 21.69% of dollar volume on non-announcement days, but increase their portion 
of volume to 56.16% on announcement days.  The increase in the percentage number of trades is 
less dramatic, but still significant.  Retail trades account for 70.39% of trades on non-
announcement days, increasing to 78.94% on announcement days.   
 We divide the sample into listed and unlisted bonds in Panels B and C.  We find 
(generally) the same results for listed and unlisted bonds.  The most striking results are, again, 
the differences in percentage volume and percentage number of trades on earnings and non-
earnings announcement days.  For listed bonds, retail trades account for only 13.55% of volume 
on non-earnings announcement days.  However, retail trades account for over 50% of volume on 
announcement days.  The same is true for the unlisted bonds.  Retail trades make up 33.54% of 
volume on non-announcement days, but make up over 60% of volume on announcement days.  
For listed (unlisted) bonds, retail traders execute 9.9% (6.61%) more trades on announcement 
days than non-announcement days.  Overall, we find no (strong) evidence that institutional 
activity increases due to a bond’s listing status. 
We repeat the previous analysis for a matched sample of listed and unlisted bonds.  Our 
matching procedure closely follows Boehmer (2005)8.  We match each listed bond to an unlisted 
bond using four bond specific characteristics and one firm specific characteristic.  We use the 
following bond characteristics to match the sample: price, daily dollar volume, investment 
                                                          
8 We match on a one-to-one basis like Boehmer (2005).  However, our matching procedure does differ slightly from 
his.  He matches the sample used the time period preceding his analysis, while we match our sample based on the 
bond average price, daily dollar volume, investment quality, years to maturity, and firm market capitalization during 
our 2013 time period.  For an in-depth description of the propensity score matching procedure, see Boehmer (2005). 
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quality, and years to maturity.  The firm specific characteristic is daily market capitalization.  We 
then calculate a propensity score based on the matching characteristics, and we delete matches 
with propensity score differences greater than 0.019.  The final results of the match yield 2,086 
pairs of bonds with 2,706,274 bond trades.  Appendix 10 provides summary statistics on the 
matching properties of the sample.  Panel A shows summary statistics of the matched sample.  
Overall, bonds in the matched sample trade at 106% of par and transact nearly $2,000,000 each 
day in average dollar volume.  The bonds in the matched sample have, on average, eight and a 
half years to maturity.  Panel B provides differences between the listed bond sample and the 
unlisted bond sample.  Overall, we find no significant differences between the listed sample and 
the unlisted sample, and interpret the lack of difference as evidence of a well-matched sample.  
To compare NYSE and TRACE trades in listed bonds, we utilize the listed bond portion 
of our matched sample.  The results are presented in Appendix 11.  Panel A provides differences 
for the full matched sample, and Panel B provides differences for the sample of top bonds.  A 
bond is the firm’s top bond if it has the most institutional trading (measured as the number of 
trades greater than $500,000) for the firm on a given trading day.  For the matched sample, there 
is little price difference between trades on the NYSE and TRACE.  We document differences in 
the average daily dollar volume, the average number of trades, the average trade size, the average 
volatility, and the average bid-ask spread, however, for trades that execute on the NYSE and 
trades that )execute on the TRACE reporting venues.  We find that TRACE trades typically have 
a larger average trade size, a larger number of trades, and larger average daily dollar volume than 
NYSE trades.  We also find that listed bond trades that execute on the NYSE have larger spreads 
                                                          
9 Boehmer (2005) refers to matching differences as “matching errors.”  Pairwise propensity score differences are 
calculated using the following equation: D𝑥𝑦 = |
Price𝑥
Pricey
| + |
DollVol𝑥
DollVol𝑦
| + |
Grade𝑥
Grade𝑦
| + |
Mat𝑥
Mat𝑦
| + |
MktCap𝑥
MktCap𝑦
|.  
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than listed bond trades that execute via TRACE ($1.43 compared to $1.18).  Lastly, we find that 
NYSE trades have greater volatility than TRACE trades. 
In Panel B, we focus on top bonds.  Similar to the results in Panel A, we find no 
difference in bond price for trades that execute on the NYSE and trades that execute via TRACE.  
However, we document differences in the average daily dollar volume, the average number of 
trades, the average trade size, the average volatility, and the average bid-ask spread.  
Specifically, top bond trades that execute via the NYSE have lower daily dollar volume, fewer 
daily trades, and smaller trade size than top bond trades that execute via TRACE venues.  We 
also find that NYSE trades in top bonds are more volatile than TRACE trades in top bonds, and 
that NYSE top bond trades have larger spreads ($1.36) than TRACE top bond trades ($1.07). 
 We replicate the bond bid-ask spread analysis for the matched sample.  Appendix 12 
provides spread regression results.  Model 1 includes the matched sample, and Model 2 (Model 
3) breaks the matched sample into listed and unlisted bonds.  The p-value is for the difference in 
the listed and unlisted coefficients.  Similar to the full sample, our main variable of interest is the 
Listed variable.  The Listed variable is equal to one if the bond is listed.  In Model 1, we 
document a negative relation between bond listing and the bid-ask spread (we also document a 
negative relation between bond listing and spread in the full sample).  Consistent with the full 
sample of bonds, we find that top bonds have lower spreads than non-top bonds in the matched 
sample.  The negative relation holds for the full matched sample, and for both listed and unlisted 
bonds.  The control variables are as expected (and similar to our findings in the full sample and 
also to Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar, (2007)).  Specifically, we find that investment grade 
bonds have lower spreads than non-investment grade bonds, and bonds with more time to 
maturity have higher spreads than bonds that are closer to maturity.  Next, we focus on the bid-
25 
 
ask spread for top bonds in the matched sample.  Model 4 provides results for the top bonds 
included in the matched sample, and Models 5 and 6 are for listed and unlisted bonds.  Our main 
variable of interest is the Listed variable in Model 4.  We find a positive relation between bond 
listing and the top bond bid-ask spread.  Specifically, listed top bond spreads are $0.11 more than 
unlisted top bond spreads. 
 To further our study of the bond bid-ask spread, we also focus on the relation between 
spread and trade size.  Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007) find a negative relation between 
trade size and the bid-ask spread.  To see if the inverse relation between spread and trade size 
holds in our sample, we break the sample into small, medium, and large sized trades in Appendix 
13.  Appendix 13 Panel A presents the results regarding bond trade size and the bid-ask spread.   
Consistent with prior literature, we document an inverse relation between trade size and bond 
bid-ask spread.  Listed bonds have lower spreads than unlisted bonds for small and medium sized 
trades, while unlisted bonds have lower spreads for large trades.  The difference between the 
listed and unlisted bond spread is significant for all trade categories. 
In Panel B, we focus on the relation between trading activity and the bond bid-ask spread.  
Quartile 1 consists of the most active bonds over the course of the sample period, and Quartile 4 
consists of the least active bonds over the course of the sample period.  For listed bonds, we find 
that the most active bonds have the lowest bid-ask spread at $0.98 (Quartile 1) and $0.95 
(Quartile 2), and the least active bonds have the largest bid-ask spread at $1.47.  We find a direct 
relation between trading activity and bond spread for unlisted bonds, with the most active 
unlisted bonds having lower spreads than the least active unlisted bonds.  We also compare the 
spreads of listed and unlisted bonds.  Overall, we find a significant difference in listed and 
unlisted bond spreads in Quartile 2, but not for any of the other quartiles.   
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Lastly, we follow O’Hara and Ye (2011) and focus on bond volatility as a measure of 
price efficiency.  Appendix 14 provides results for bond volatility regressions for the matched 
sample of bonds.  The p-value is for the difference between listed and unlisted bond regression 
coefficients.  Our main variable of interest is the Listed variable, which is equal to one if the 
bond is listed.  We find a positive relation between bond listing and volatility, which is consistent 
with our findings in the full sample.  We are also interested in the top bond variable.  We find a 
significant and positive relation between top bond status and volatility for the full matched 
sample, and for the listed bonds in the matched sample.  However, we do not find a significant 
relation between top bond status and volatility for the unlisted bonds.  We further explore the 
relation between top bonds and volatility in regression Models 4, 5, and 6.  In Model 4, we 
document a positive relation between bond listing and volatility for the top bonds included in the 
matched sample. 
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CONCLUSION 
We study the impact of bond listing in the corporate bond market.  Previous theoretical 
research by Merton (1987) documents an advantage to exchange listing in the equities market; 
specifically, Merton details that exchange listing in the equities market can lead to an increase in 
investor recognition and improved liquidity for the firm.  Kadlec and McConnell (1994) show 
empirically that listing leads to an increase in institutional shareholders for the firm, while much 
research documents improved liquidity for NYSE stocks and NYSE trades (Huang and Stoll, 1996; 
Bennet and Wei, 2006; and Bessembinder and Kaufman, 1997).   
While the above mentioned research focuses on equities, we focus on the bond market in 
our research.  Studying the impact of exchange listing in the bond market is valuable for several 
reasons.  First, much of the research on listing focuses on stocks, which are highly liquid assets, 
especially when compared to the bond market.  In our sample, the average corporate bond trades 
just 5 times, which is substantially less than the average stock in the equity market.  Bonds are also 
costly to trade.  Documenting a market quality or trading advantage for listed (or unlisted) bonds 
is beneficial for traders.  It is also possible that bond listing serves a signal to bond traders, similar 
to the firm paying dividends or beating earnings.  Given the well-documented informational 
inefficiencies in the bond market (Kwan, 1996; Downing, Underwood, and Xing, 2009), it could 
be important for investors to obtain information based on bond listing.   
First, we document the qualities of listed bonds.  Our findings show that listed bonds tend 
to have lower spreads and a greater number of trades than unlisted bonds.  We also find that 
listed bonds have greater volatility than unlisted bonds.  Second, we focus on the bond bid-ask 
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spread.  We show that listed bonds have lower spreads than unlisted bonds.  Listed bond spreads 
are $0.14 lower than unlisted bond spreads.  Additionally, listed top bond spreads are $0.33 
lower than the spreads of other bonds.  However, we also find that NYSE bond trades in listed 
bonds have larger bid-ask spreads than TRACE trades in listed bonds.  We find that listed top 
bond trades have larger spreads than unlisted top bond trades.  Third, we focus on volatility and 
price efficiency for listed and unlisted bonds.  We find that listed bonds are more volatile than 
unlisted bonds.  Overall, there appears to be a market quality advantage to bond listing. 
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Appendix 1:  Trade Level Sample Statistics 
Appendix 1 provides a trade-level description of the sample. The sample includes 6,841,030 bond trades during 
the year 2013.  Bond trades in the sample occur from 8:00 am – 6:30 pm EST.     
 % of Total 
Trades 
% of Listed Bond 
Trades 
% of Unlisted Bond 
Trades 
% investment grade bond trades 
% high yield bond trades 
% trades, less than 1 year to maturity 
% trades, less than 5 years to maturity 
% trades, less than 10 years to mat. 
% top bond trades  
% trades greater than $25,000 
% trades greater than $50,000 
% trades greater than $100,000 
% trades greater than $500,000 
% trades greater than $1,000,000 
% trades of premium bonds 
% trades of discount bonds 
% trades at par 
73.30% 
26.70% 
5.19% 
44.09% 
81.53% 
52.12% 
47.36% 
34.71% 
26.23% 
13.44% 
6.11% 
76.23% 
23.13% 
0.64% 
81.07% 
18.93% 
3.08% 
44.15% 
81.92% 
53.96% 
46.12% 
33.23% 
24.69% 
12.30% 
6.54% 
77.90% 
21.77% 
0.32% 
54.32% 
45.68% 
10.35% 
43.94% 
80.57% 
47.62% 
50.38% 
38.30% 
29.99% 
16.22% 
5.08% 
72.14% 
26.45% 
1.41% 
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Appendix 2:  Sample Summary Statistics, Bond Level 
Appendix 2 provides summary statistics for the sample.   The sample includes 6,841,030 bond trades during the year 2013. Bond trades in the sample occur from 
8:00 am – 6:30 pm EST. The top bond is the bond with the most daily institutional trading using a $500,000 trade size (Ronen and Zhou, 2013). Price is the 
percentage of par.  Dollar volume is the daily dollar volume for each bond, and the number of trades is the daily number of trades for each bond. Trade size is the 
average daily dollar trade size.  Volatility is calculated as 
100
Pricet
(Pricet
Max − Pricet
Min) (Downing and Zhang, 2004).  The bid-ask spread is calculated as the 
difference between the weekly average seller reported trades and the weekly average buyer reported trades. 
 All Bonds Top Bonds 
 N Mean Minimum Maximum N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Price 
$Vol 
Trades 
TSize 
Volatility 
Spread 
12,633 
12,633 
12,633 
12,633 
12,633 
12,633 
$105.49 
$1,559,216.10 
4.73 
$381,336.29 
2.15 
$1.34 
$25.16 
$2,000.00 
1.09 
$1,000.00 
0.00 
0.00 
$276.92 
$82,374,604.17 
80.00 
$5,000,000.00 
20.21 
$9.66 
8,375 
8,375 
8,375 
8,375 
8,375 
8,375 
$107.46 
$4,464,537.46 
6.93 
$1,176,863.39 
1.99 
$0.87 
$25.00 
$502,000.00 
1.00 
$38,148.15 
0.00 
$0.00 
$288.81 
$55,385,555.56 
241.00 
$5,000,000.00 
19.77 
$9.31 
Panel B:  Listed Bonds 
Price 
$Vol 
Trades 
TSize 
Volatility 
Spread 
5,199 
5,199 
5,199 
5,199 
5,199 
5,199 
$109.44 
$2,192,225.57 
5.71 
$488,023.17 
2.17 
$1.17 
$47.83 
$8,400.00 
1.14 
$2,733.33 
0.01 
$0.01 
$263.62 
$82,374,604.17 
69.47 
$4,666,666.67 
20.21 
$9.66 
4,725 
4,725 
4,725 
4,725 
4,725 
4,725 
$109.37 
$4,819,489.08 
7.16 
$1,231,376.63 
2.08 
$0.90 
$48.68 
$538,000.00 
1.00 
$47,727.37 
0.04 
$0.00 
$263.62 
$84,113,106.38 
109.33 
$5,000,000.00 
31.32 
$7.60 
Panel C:  Unlisted Bonds 
Price 
$Vol 
Trades 
TSize 
Volatility 
Spread 
7,434 
7,434 
7,434 
7,434 
7,434 
7,434 
$102.73 
$1,116,518.19 
4.04 
$306,724.36 
2.14 
$1.45 
$25.16 
$2,000.00 
1.09 
$1,000.00 
0.00 
0.00 
$276.92 
$55,385,555.56 
80.00 
$5,000,000.00 
15.22 
$9.63 
3,650 
3,650 
3,650 
3,650 
3,650 
3,650 
$104.98 
$4,005,045.29 
6.64 
$1,106,294.87 
1.88 
$0.83 
$25.00 
$502,000.00 
1.00 
$38,148.15 
0.00 
$0.00 
$288.81 
$55,385,555.56 
241.00 
$5,000,000.00 
19.77 
$9.31 
3
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Appendix 3:  A Comparison of NYSE and TRACE Trades 
Appendix 3 compares the average summary statistics for listed bond trades that execute on the NYSE and listed 
bond trades that execute on TRACE.  The top bond is the bond with the most institutional trading each day using 
a $500,000 trade size (Ronen and Zhou, 2013). Price is the percentage of par.  Dollar volume is the daily dollar 
volume for each bond on each trading venue (TRACE and the NYSE), and the number of trades is the daily 
number of trades for each bond on each trading venue (TRACE and the NYSE). Trade size is the average daily 
dollar trade size on each venue (TRACE and the NYSE).  Volatility is calculated as 
100
Pricet
(Pricet
Max − Pricet
Min) 
(Downing and Zhang, 2004).  The bid-ask spread is calculated as the difference between the weekly average 
seller reported trades and the weekly average buyer reported trades.   Significance is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels by ***, **, and *. 
 NYSE Trace Difference T-Stat 
Panel A:  All Bonds 
Price 
$Vol 
Trades 
TSize 
Volatility 
Spread 
$105.84 
$10,094.86 
1.27 
$8,113.32 
3.51 
$1.23 
$105.52 
$4,090,728.88 
13.66 
$386,042.66 
3.33 
$1.04 
$0.32* 
-$4,080,634.02*** 
-12.40*** 
-$377,929.34*** 
0.18* 
$0.19*** 
1.87 
-17.87 
-22.21 
-25.50 
1.85 
4.66 
Panel B:  Top Bonds  
Price 
$Vol 
Trades 
TSize 
Volatility 
Spread 
$105.08 
$12,028.33 
1.27 
$9,587.53 
4.01 
$1.13 
$104.93 
$7,106,201.08 
18.15 
$611,423.91 
3.59 
$0.92 
$0.16 
-$7,094,172.76*** 
-16.88*** 
-$601,836.38*** 
0.42*** 
$0.21*** 
0.73 
-21.91 
-20.14 
-25.83 
3.05 
4.24 
 
  
40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 4:  BOND SPREAD REGRESSIONS 
  
  
Appendix 4:  Bond Spread Regressions 
Models 1, 2, and 3 are estimated for all bonds.  Models 4, 5, and 6 are estimated for top bonds.   The top bond is designated as the bond with the 
most daily institutional trading using a $500,000 trade size (Ronen and Zhou, 2013).  The bid-ask spread is calculated as the difference between 
the weekly average seller reported trades and the weekly average buyer reported trades.  Dollar volume is the daily bond dollar volume, and the 
number of trades is the daily number of trades per bond.  Trade size is the dollar amount of each trade.  Volatility is calculated as  
100
Pricet
(Pricet
Max − Pricet
Min) (Downing and Zhang, 2004).  The Top Bond variable is equal to one for the bond with the most institutional trading 
each day.  A trade is categorized as institutional if it is greater than $500,000.  Years to maturity is the number of years to maturity as of the trade 
date.  Firm size is the daily stock price multiplied times daily shares outstanding.  Investment Grade is equal to one for an investment grade bond, 
as designated in the TRACE master file.  TRACE Execution is equal to one if a trade occurs on a TRACE reporting venue.  Listed is equal to one 
if the bond is listed.   T stats are in parentheses, and significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *.   Standard errors 
are clustered at the bond level. 
 All Bonds Top Bonds 
Model All Bonds 
(1) 
Listed Bonds 
(2) 
Unlisted Bonds 
 (3) 
All Top Bonds 
(4) 
Listed Top Bonds 
(5) 
Unlisted Top Bonds 
(6) 
Intercept 
 
$Vol 
 
Trades 
 
TSize 
 
Volatility 
 
Top Bond  
 
Maturity 
 
Firm Size 
 
InvGrade  
 
TRACE  
 
Listed 
 
R-Squared 
F-Stat 
0.8186*** 
(13.88) 
-0.0000*** 
(-6.32) 
0.0001 
(0.69) 
-0.0000*** 
(-12.43) 
0.1243*** 
(10.58) 
-0.4164*** 
(-34.17) 
0.0399*** 
(18.97) 
-0.0000*** 
(-7.92) 
-0.1071*** 
(-4.47) 
0.0302 
(0.69) 
-0.1355*** 
(-7.32) 
40.62% 
614.94*** 
0.8069*** 
(12.83) 
-0.0000*** 
(-4.58) 
0.0003 
(1.03) 
-0.0000*** 
(-9.86) 
0.1063*** 
(7.54) 
-0.3252*** 
(-23.31) 
0.0386*** 
(15.33) 
-0.0000*** 
(-11.78) 
-0.2183*** 
(-6.83) 
0.0463 
(1.10) 
 
 
42.57% 
374.03*** 
0.7143*** 
(14.24) 
-0.0000*** 
(-8.89) 
0.0002 
(0.82) 
-0.0000*** 
(-10.09) 
0.1597*** 
(10.34) 
-0.5878*** 
(-28.90) 
0.0397*** 
(12.11) 
0.0000 
(0.77) 
-0.0070 
(-0.22) 
 
 
 
 
41.16% 
394.66*** 
0.5707*** 
(9.68) 
-0.0000*** 
(-7.11) 
0.0010*** 
(3.88) 
-0.0000*** 
(-11.78) 
0.0814*** 
(8.44) 
 
 
0.0299*** 
(14.86) 
-0.0000*** 
(-10.77) 
-0.1884*** 
(-7.40) 
-0.0155 
(-0.35) 
0.0769*** 
(3.91) 
40.32% 
252.20*** 
0.7002*** 
(10.69) 
-0.0000*** 
(-5.38) 
0.0012*** 
(3.64) 
-0.0000*** 
(-9.58) 
0.0745*** 
(6.02) 
 
 
0.0312*** 
(12.51) 
-0.0000*** 
(-9.50) 
-0.2482*** 
(-7.29) 
-0.0142 
(-0.32) 
 
 
43.38% 
210.13*** 
0.5081*** 
(12.98) 
-0.0000*** 
(-8.75) 
0.0009** 
(2.10) 
-0.0000*** 
(-9.55) 
0.0948*** 
(8.56) 
 
 
0.0255*** 
(8.57) 
-0.0000*** 
(-5.17) 
-0.0913*** 
(-2.74) 
 
 
 
 
34.91% 
111.39*** 
4
1
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Appendix 5:  Bond Spread by Trade Size and Trading Activity 
Appendix 5 provides a comparison of trading costs for listed and unlisted bonds. The most active 
bonds in the sample are in Quartile 1, and the least active bonds in the sample are in Quartile 4.  The 
bid-ask spread is calculated as the difference between the weekly average seller reported trades and the 
weekly average buyer reported trades. 
 All Bonds Listed Bonds Unlisted Bonds 
Panel A:  Dollar Spreads by Trade Size 
All Trade Sizes 
Less than $100,000 
$100,000 - $999,999 
Greater than $1,000,000 
$1.34 
$1.42 
$1.17 
$0.82 
$1.17 
$1.25 
$1.04 
$0.88 
$1.45 
$1.54 
$1.31 
$0.76 
Panel B:  Dollar Spreads by Trading Activity 
Q1 (most active) 
Q2 
Q3 
Q4 (least active) 
$0.99 
$1.29 
$1.52 
$1.56 
$0.95 
$1.12 
$1.44 
$1.80 
$1.07 
$1.45 
$1.54 
$1.51 
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Appendix 6:  Bond Volatility Regressions 
Appendix 6 presents bond volatility regressions.  Volatility is calculated as  
100
Pricet
(Pricet
Max − Pricet
Min) (Downing and Zhang, 2004).  
Models 1, 2, and 3 estimate volatility for the full sample of bonds, listed bonds, and TRACE bonds.  Models 4, 5, and 6 estimate volatility 
for all top bonds, listed top bonds, and unlisted top bonds.  Dollar volume is the daily bond dollar volume, and the number of trades is the 
daily number of trades per bond.  Trade size is the dollar amount of each trade.  The Top Bond is equal to one for the bond with the most 
institutional trading each day.  A trade is categorized as institutional if it is greater than $500,000 (Ronen and Zhou 2013).  Years to maturity 
is the number of years to maturity as of the trade date.  Firm size is the daily stock price multiplied times daily shares outstanding.  
Investment Grade is equal to one for an investment grade bond, as designated in the TRACE master file.  TRACE Execution is equal to one 
if a trade occurs on a TRACE reporting venue.  Listed is equal to one if the bond is listed.  T stats are in parentheses, and significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *.  Standard errors are clustered at the bond level. 
 All Bonds Top Bonds 
Model Full Sample 
(1) 
Listed Bonds 
(2) 
Unlisted Bonds 
 (3) 
All Top Bonds 
(4) 
Listed Top Bonds 
(5) 
Unlisted Top Bonds 
(6) 
Intercept 
 
$Vol 
 
Trades 
 
TSize 
 
Top Bond 
 
Maturity 
 
Firm Size 
 
InvtGrade  
 
TRACE  
 
Listed  
 
RSquared 
F-Stat 
3.0355*** 
(16.64) 
0.0000* 
(1.95) 
0.0144*** 
(6.50) 
-0.0000*** 
(-13.63) 
0.0908* 
(1.83) 
0.1208*** 
(25.09) 
-0.0000*** 
(-4.31) 
-1.5569*** 
(-11.85) 
-0.0423 
(-0.27) 
0.3402*** 
(3.72) 
20.00% 
166.46*** 
3.3894*** 
(14.36) 
0.0000 
(1.28) 
0.0190*** 
(6.69) 
-0.0000*** 
(-9.94) 
0.0616 
(0.98) 
0.1191*** 
(20.51) 
-0.0000*** 
(-3.24) 
-1.6970*** 
(-8.58) 
-0.0286 
(-0.18) 
 
 
23.00% 
169.44*** 
3.0082*** 
(21.98) 
0.0000*** 
(3.29) 
0.0069*** 
(2.82) 
-0.0000*** 
(-11.71) 
0.1294* 
(1.72) 
0.1210*** 
(10.80) 
-0.0000*** 
(-4.04) 
-1.3399*** 
(-10.37) 
 
 
 
 
15.10% 
51.79*** 
3.4985*** 
(15.08) 
0.0000** 
(2.38) 
0.0120*** 
(5.82) 
-0.0000*** 
(-14.20) 
 
 
0.1190*** 
(15.75) 
-0.0000*** 
(-3.20) 
-1.7403*** 
(-9.89) 
-0.3296* 
(-1.74) 
0.4979*** 
(3.41) 
18.76% 
129.20*** 
3.9290*** 
(13.36) 
0.0000 
(1.52) 
0.0165*** 
(6.27) 
-0.0000*** 
(-10.69) 
 
 
0.1194*** 
(15.06) 
-0.0000* 
(-1.82) 
-1.8428*** 
(-7.24) 
-0.3529* 
(-1.87) 
 
 
21.57% 
144.97*** 
3.2946*** 
(14.86) 
0.0000*** 
(3.82) 
0.0058** 
(2.36) 
-0.0000*** 
(-12.70) 
 
 
0.1168*** 
(5.35) 
-0.0000*** 
(-3.24) 
-1.5319*** 
(-8.06) 
 
 
 
 
14.31% 
39.50*** 
4
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Appendix 7:  Earnings Announcement vs. Non-Earnings Announcement Days 
Appendix 7 provides results a comparison of trading activity on earnings announcement days and non-
earnings announcement days.  Price is the average daily bond price, and trade size is the average daily 
trade size.  Dollar volume is the average daily dollar volume, and the number of trades is the average 
daily number of trades.  All variables are averaged at the bond level.  We provide averages for the 
announcement day and the non-announcement day.  We also provide the difference between the two 
days.  The t-statistic is presented to denote significance.  ***,**,*  indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels. 
 Ann. Day Non-Ann. Day Difference T-Stat 
Panel A:  All Bonds 
Price 
Trade Size 
Dollar Volume 
Number of Trades 
$107.31 
$418,804.73 
$2,212,530.93 
6.08 
$107.04 
$407,640.34 
$2,020,380.72 
5.92 
$0.27*** 
$11,164.39 
$192,150.21*** 
0.16** 
8.04 
1.48 
4.21 
2.53 
Panel B:  Listed Bonds 
Price 
Trade Size 
Dollar Volume 
Number of Trades 
$108.70 
$436,105.08 
$2,448,079.56 
6.80 
$108.51 
$424,602.25 
$2,295,620.87 
6.70 
$0.19*** 
$11,502.83 
$152,458.69** 
0.09 
5.09 
1.14 
2.46 
1.14 
Panel C:  Unlisted Bonds 
Price 
Trade Size 
Dollar Volume 
Number of Trades 
$105.29 
$393,646.85 
$1,870,000.05 
5.04 
$104.92 
$382,974.62 
$1,620,131.10 
4.79 
$0.37*** 
$10,672.23 
$249,868.95*** 
0.25*** 
6.24 
0.94 
3.75 
2.66 
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Appendix 8:  Earnings Announcement vs. Non-Earnings Announcement Days, Institutional 
Sized Trading 
Appendix 8 provides results a comparison of institutional trading activity on earnings announcement days and 
non-earnings announcement days.  Price is the average daily institutional bond price, and trade size is the average 
daily institutional trade size.  Dollar volume is the average daily institutional dollar volume, and the number of 
trades is the average daily institutional number of trades.  The percentage institutional dollar volume is the 
percentage of total volume for which institutions account.  The percentage institutional number of trades is the 
portion of all trades for which institution sized trades account. All variables are averaged at the bond level.  We 
provide averages for the announcement day and the non-announcement day.  We also provide the difference 
between the two days.  The t-statistic is presented to denote significance.  ***,**,*  indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 Ann. Day Non-Ann. Day Difference T-Stat 
Panel A:  All Bonds 
Institutional Price 
Institutional Trade Size 
Institutional Dollar Volume 
Institutional Number of Trades 
% Institutional Dollar Volume 
% Institutional Number of Trades 
$106.90 
$1,933,736.19 
$2,516,509.75 
1.27 
43.84% 
21.06% 
$106.63 
$1,895,475.25 
$3,584,444.83 
1.90 
78.31% 
29.61% 
$0.27*** 
$38,260.94* 
-$1,067,935.08*** 
-0.63*** 
-34.47%*** 
-8.55%*** 
4.94 
1.92 
-19.18 
-25.69 
-60.68 
-26.05 
Panel B:  Listed Bonds 
Institutional Price 
Institutional Trade Size 
Institutional Dollar Volume 
Institutional Number of Trades 
% Institutional Dollar Volume 
% Institutional Number of Trades 
$107.03 
$2,064,328.39 
$2,872,678.72 
1.32 
47.64% 
20.74% 
$106.84 
$2,031,984.99 
$4,162,325.85 
2.03 
86.45% 
30.64% 
$0.19*** 
$32,343.40 
-$1,289,647.13*** 
-0.71*** 
-38.81%*** 
-9.90%*** 
3.08 
1.23 
-16.55 
-22.25 
-51.76 
-23.70 
Panel C:  Unlisted Bonds 
Institutional Price 
Institutional Trade Size 
Institutional Dollar Volume 
Institutional Number of Trades 
% Institutional Dollar Volume 
% Institutional Number of Trades 
$106.68 
$1,696,437.68 
$1,998,574.79 
1.20 
38.31% 
21.52% 
$106.24 
$1,647,424.01 
$2,744,099.93 
1.71 
66.46% 
28.13% 
$0.44*** 
$49,013.67* 
-$745,525.14*** 
-0.51*** 
-28.15%*** 
-6.61%*** 
3.91 
1.66 
-9.82 
-13.41 
-33.00 
-12.52 
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Appendix 9:  Earnings Announcement vs. Non-Earnings Announcement Days, Retail Sized 
Trading 
Appendix 9 provides results a comparison of retail trading activity on earnings announcement days and non-
earnings announcement days.  Price is the average daily retail bond price, and trade size is the average daily retail 
trade size.  Dollar volume is the average daily retail dollar volume, and the number of trades is the average daily 
retail number of trades.  The percentage institutional dollar volume is the percentage of total volume for which 
institutions account.  The percentage retail number of trades is the portion of all trades for which retail sized 
trades account. All variables are averaged at the bond level.  We provide averages for the announcement day and 
the non-announcement day.  We also provide the difference between the two days.  The t-statistic is presented to 
denote significance.  ***,**,* indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 Ann. Day Non-Ann. Day Difference T-Stat 
Panel A:  All Bonds 
Retail Price 
Retail Trade Size 
Retail Dollar Volume 
Retail Number of Trades 
% Retail Dollar Volume 
% Retail Number of Trades 
$107.22 
$81,253.56 
$338,559.83 
5.22 
56.16% 
78.94% 
$106.97 
$82,118.31 
$353,524.31 
5.30 
21.69% 
70.39% 
$0.25*** 
-$864.75 
-$14,964.48*** 
-0.08 
34.47%*** 
8.55%*** 
7.52 
-0.87 
-3.24 
-1.35 
60.68 
26.05 
Panel B:  Listed Bonds 
Retail Price 
Retail Trade Size 
Retail Dollar Volume 
Retail Number of Trades 
% Retail Dollar Volume 
% Retail Number of Trades 
$108.66 
$80,019.82 
$366,479.57 
5.93 
52.36% 
79.26% 
$108.49 
$80,551.45 
$380,366.53 
6.01 
13.55% 
69.36% 
$0.17*** 
-$531.64 
-$13,886.96** 
-0.08 
38.81%*** 
9.90%*** 
4.45 
-0.43 
-2.49 
-1.06 
51.76 
23.70 
Panel C:  Unlisted Bonds 
Retail Price 
Retail Trade Size 
Retail Dollar Volume 
Retail Number of Trades 
% Retail Dollar Volume 
% Retail Number of Trades 
$105.07 
$83,099.13 
$297,959.41 
4.19 
61.69% 
78.48% 
$104.70 
$84,462.19 
$314,490.79 
4.26 
33.54% 
71.87% 
$0.37*** 
-$1,363.07 
-$16,531.38** 
-0.07 
28.15%*** 
6.61%*** 
6.17 
-0.81 
-2.08 
-0.84 
33.00 
12.52 
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Appendix 10:  Matched Sample Summary Statistics 
We construct a matched sample using bond price, dollar volume, market capitalization, bond investment grade, and bond years to 
maturity as our matching criteria.   The sample is matched at the bond level.  The matched sample includes 2,706,274 trades.  Summary 
statistics are calculated at the bond level.   Price is the percentage of par.  Dollar volume is the daily dollar volume for each bond.  The 
investment grade variable is equal to one if a bond is investment grade quality.   Market Capitalization is the daily stock price multiplied 
times daily shares outstanding.  Significance is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels with ***, **, and *.   
 Panel A: All Bonds 
 N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Max 
Price 
Dollar Volume 
Market Cap 
Investment Grade 
Years to Maturity 
4,172 
4,172 
4,172 
4,172 
4,172 
$106.08 
$1,822,735.71 
$53,376,174.28 
0.76 
8.49 
$11.71 
$2,962,901.53 
$72,256,984.34 
0.43 
7.58 
$42.85 
$2,416.67 
$11,523.30 
0.00 
0.02 
$272.60 
$82,357,435.86 
$438,712,329.00 
1.00 
29.97 
 Panel B: Listed Bond vs. Unlisted Bond 
 N Listed Bond Mean Unlisted Bond Mean Difference T Stat 
Price 
Dollar Volume 
Market Cap 
Investment Grade 
Years to Maturity 
2,086 
2,086 
2,086 
2,086 
2,086 
$106.72 
$1,857,091.51 
$54,837,257.40 
0.73 
8.47 
$105.44 
$1,788,379.90 
$51,915,091.16 
0.79 
8.50 
$1.28 
$68,711.62 
$2,922,166.24 
-0.06 
-0.03 
0.47 
0.97 
1.32 
0.98 
-0.15 
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APPENDIX 11:  MATCHED SAMPLE COMPARISON OF NYSE AND TRACE TRADES 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 11:  Matched Sample Comparison of NYSE and TRACE Trades 
We compare listed bond trades that execute on the NYSE and listed bond trades that execute on TRACE using the matched sample.  The 
bond with the most institutional trading each day is designated as the top bond for that firm.  A trade is classified as institutional if the trade 
size is greater than $500,000 (Ronen and Zhou, 2013).  Price is the percentage of par.  Dollar volume is the daily dollar volume, and the 
number of trades is the average daily number of trades.  Trade size is the average daily dollar trade size.  Volatility is calculated as  
100
Pricet
(Pricet
Max − Pricet
Min) (Downing and Zhang, 2004).  The bid-ask spread is calculated as the difference between the weekly average 
seller reported trades and the weekly average buyer reported trades.  Significance is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, 
and *. 
 NYSE TRACE Difference T-Stat 
 Panel A:  All Bonds 
Price 
Dollar Volume 
Trades 
Trade Size 
Volatility 
Spread 
$102.95 
$8,329.97 
1.28 
$6,772.10 
3.89 
$1.43 
$103.03 
$3,276,823.39 
11.88 
$335,195.87 
3.59 
$1.18 
-$0.08 
-$3,268,493.42*** 
-10.60*** 
-$328,423.77*** 
0.30** 
$0.25*** 
-0.31 
-9.51 
-14.84 
-16.89 
2.14 
4.45 
Panel B:  Top Bonds 
Price 
Dollar Volume 
Trades 
Trade Size 
Volatility 
Spread 
$102.03 
$9,400.49 
1.31 
$7,400.29 
4.54 
$1.36 
$102.22 
$6,149,843.11 
16.50 
$575,750.71 
4.05 
$1.07 
-$0.19 
-$6,140,442.62*** 
-15.20*** 
-$568,350.42*** 
0.49** 
$0.29*** 
-0.53 
-11.33 
-12.76 
-15.90 
2.21 
3.91 
5
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Appendix 12:  Matched Sample Bond Spread Regressions 
Models 1, 2, and 3 are for matched sample bonds. Models 4, 5, and 6 are estimated for matched sample top bonds. The top bond has the most daily 
institutional trading using a $500,000 trade size (Ronen and Zhou, 2013).  The bid-ask spread is calculated as the difference between the weekly 
average seller reported trades and the weekly average buyer reported trades.  Dollar volume is the daily bond dollar volume, and the number of 
trades is the daily number of trades per bond.  Trade size is the dollar amount of each trade.  Volatility is calculated as 
100
Pricet
(Pricet
Max − Pricet
Min) 
(Downing and Zhang, 2004).  Years to maturity is the number of years to maturity as of the trade date.  Firm size is the daily stock price times daily 
shares outstanding.  Investment Grade is equal to one for an investment grade bond, as designated in the TRACE master file.  TRACE Execution is 
equal to one if a trade occurs on a TRACE reporting venue.  Listed is equal to one if the bond is listed.   T stats are in parentheses, and significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *.  Standard errors are clustered at the bond level. 
 Matched Sample of Bonds  Matched Sample of Top Bonds 
Model Matched  
(1) 
Listed  
(2) 
Unlisted  
(3) 
P Value   Matched  
(4) 
Listed  
(5) 
Unlisted  
(6) 
P Value 
Intercept 
 
$Vol 
 
Trades 
 
Trade Size 
 
Volatility 
 
Top Bond  
 
Maturity 
 
Firm Size 
 
InvTGrade  
 
TRACE  
 
Listed 
 
R-Squared 
F Statistic 
0.9081*** 
(9.53) 
-0.0000*** 
(-4.34) 
0.0000. 
(0.07) 
-0.0000*** 
(-8.98) 
0.1084*** 
(5.76) 
-0.3889*** 
(-21.00) 
0.0401*** 
(12.04) 
-0.0000*** 
(-5.60) 
-0.1967*** 
(-5.43) 
0.0043 
(0.06) 
-0.0626** 
(-2.21) 
41.47% 
258.00*** 
0.9085*** 
(9.91) 
-0.0000*** 
(-2.66) 
-0.0001 
(-0.27) 
-0.0000*** 
(-7.41) 
0.0931*** 
(4.98) 
-0.3179*** 
(-15.29) 
0.0404*** 
(10.91) 
-0.0000*** 
(-7.14) 
-0.2460*** 
(-5.84) 
0.0160 
(0.24) 
 
 
43.90% 
190.29*** 
0.6033*** 
(10.26) 
-0.0000*** 
(-7.43) 
0.0013** 
(1.97) 
-0.0000*** 
(-4.66) 
0.1956*** 
(14.12) 
-0.5946*** 
(-19.13) 
0.0334*** 
(9.10) 
0.0000 
(0.90) 
-0.0190 
(-0.40) 
 
 
 
 
43.81% 
159.39*** 
0.2690 
 
0.3773 
 
0.4173 
 
0.9637 
 
0.3819 
 
0.1960 
 
0.2911 
 
0.2235 
 
0.3159 
 0.6224*** 
(6.32) 
-0.0000*** 
(-4.60) 
0.0010** 
(2.47) 
-0.0000*** 
(-8.43) 
0.0722*** 
(4.60) 
 
 
0.0306*** 
(9.97) 
-0.0000*** 
(-6.70) 
-0.2064*** 
(-5.52) 
-0.0258 
(-0.35) 
0.1146*** 
(3.95) 
42.01% 
145.99*** 
0.7745*** 
(7.94) 
-0.0000*** 
(-2.94) 
0.0008* 
(1.87) 
-0.0000*** 
(-7.66) 
0.0645*** 
(4.03) 
 
 
0.0329*** 
(9.42) 
-0.0000*** 
(-6.88) 
-0.2470*** 
(-5.56) 
-0.0178 
(-0.24) 
 
 
44.48% 
154.00*** 
0.3787*** 
(7.05) 
-0.0000*** 
(-5.57) 
0.0017* 
(1.81) 
-0.0000*** 
(-4.34) 
0.1224*** 
(12.76) 
 
 
0.0218*** 
(4.95) 
-0.0000*** 
(-4.75) 
-0.0452 
(-0.95) 
 
 
 
 
36.01% 
44.14*** 
0.8397 
 
0.0823 
 
0.2035 
 
0.2249 
 
0.2901 
 
 
 
0.7765 
 
0.3893 
 
0.3175 
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ACTIVITY 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 13:  Matched Sample Bond Spread by Trade Size and Trading Activity 
The most active bonds in the sample are in Quartile 1, and the least active bonds in the sample are in Quartile 4.  The bid-ask 
spread is calculated as the difference between the weekly average seller reported trades and the weekly average buyer reported 
trades.  The difference column represents the difference between listed bond spread and unlisted bond spread.  Significance is 
determined using t-stats.  Significance is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels using ***, **, and *. 
 All Bonds Listed Bonds Unlisted Bonds Difference T Stat 
 Panel A:  Dollar Spreads by Trade Size 
All Trade Sizes 
Less than $100,000 
$100,000 - $999,999 
Greater than $1,000,000 
$1.24 
$1.33 
$1.10 
$0.81 
$1.12 
$1.17 
$1.02 
$0.90 
$1.36 
$1.49 
$1.22 
$0.74 
-$0.25*** 
-$0.32*** 
-$0.20*** 
$0.16*** 
-7.83 
-9.52 
-5.76 
5.11 
Panel B:  Dollar Spreads by Trading Activity 
Q1 (most active) 
Q2 
Q3 
Q4 (least active) 
$1.01 
$1.10 
$1.33 
$1.51 
$0.98 
$0.95 
$1.20 
$1.43 
$0.95 
$1.36 
$1.40 
$1.56 
$0.03 
-$0.42*** 
-$0.20 
-$0.13 
0.28 
-3.60 
-1.41 
-0.59 
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APPENDIX 14:  MATCHED SAMPLE BOND VOLATILITY REGRESSIONS 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 14:  Matched Sample Bond Volatility Regressions 
Volatility is calculated as  
100
Pricet
(Pricet
Max − Pricet
Min) (Downing and Zhang, 2004).   Models 1, 2, and 3 estimate volatility for the full 
sample of matched bonds, listed bonds, and TRACE bonds.  Models 4, 5, and 6 estimate volatility for all top bonds, listed top bonds, and 
unlisted top bonds.  Dollar volume is the daily bond dollar volume, and the number of trades is the daily number of trades per bond.  Trade 
size is the dollar amount of each trade.  The Top Bond is equal to one for the bond with the most institutional trading each day.  A trade is 
categorized as institutional if it is greater than $500,000 (Ronen and Zhou, 2013).  Years to maturity is the number of years to maturity as 
of the trade date.  Firm size is the daily stock price multiplied times daily shares outstanding.  Investment Grade is equal to one for an 
investment grade bond, as designated in the TRACE master file.  TRACE Execution is equal to one if a trade occurs on a TRACE reporting 
venue.  Listed is equal to one if the bond is listed.  T stats are in parentheses, and significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by 
***, **, and *.  Standard errors are clustered at the bond level. 
 Matched Sample of Bonds  Matched Sample of Top Bonds 
Model Matched  
(1) 
Listed  
(2) 
Unlisted  
(3) 
P Value   Matched  
(4) 
Listed  
(5) 
Unlisted  
(6) 
P Value 
Intercept 
 
$Vol 
 
Trades 
 
Trade 
Size 
 
Top Bond 
 
Maturity 
 
Firm Size 
 
InvtGrade  
 
TRACE  
 
Listed 
 
RSquared 
F Statistic 
3.1464*** 
(10.22) 
0.0000 
(0.32) 
0.0185*** 
(4.14) 
-0.0000*** 
(-8.03) 
0.1985*** 
(2.79) 
0.1135*** 
(12.42) 
-0.0000*** 
(-4.47) 
-1.5523*** 
(-9.16) 
-0.1431 
(-0.52) 
0.3870*** 
(3.78) 
 
20.54% 
82.13*** 
3.4480*** 
(9.92) 
0.0000 
(0.59) 
0.0224*** 
(4.13) 
-0.0000*** 
(-6.86) 
0.2266** 
(2.46) 
0.1155*** 
(9.22) 
-0.0000*** 
(-4.18) 
-1.6686*** 
(-7.65) 
-0.0959 
(-0.34) 
 
 
 
22.30% 
62.09*** 
3.1068*** 
(19.91) 
0.0000*** 
(3.03) 
0.0029 
(1.52) 
-0.0000*** 
(-10.65) 
0.0116 
(0.16) 
0.0962*** 
(12.18) 
-0.0000 
(-1.27) 
-1.1977*** 
(-6.98) 
 
 
 
 
 
14.22% 
61.10*** 
0.3113 
 
0.3713 
 
0.4004 
 
0.4159 
 
0.4434 
 
0.5058 
 
0.5981 
 
0.3161 
 
 3.7922*** 
(9.77) 
0.0000 
(0.72) 
0.0164*** 
(3.79) 
-0.0000*** 
(-8.55) 
 
 
0.1084*** 
(7.71) 
-0.0000*** 
(-2.88) 
-1.6649*** 
(-7.36) 
-0.6069* 
(-1.75) 
0.6126*** 
(4.06) 
 
18.65% 
67.18*** 
4.2791*** 
(9.29) 
0.0000 
(0.68) 
0.0212*** 
(3.86) 
-0.0000*** 
(-7.56) 
 
 
0.1153*** 
(5.88) 
-0.0000** 
(-2.39) 
-1.8042*** 
(-5.88) 
-0.6062* 
(-1.78) 
 
 
 
20.11% 
49.99*** 
3.3987*** 
(18.38) 
0.0000*** 
(3.82) 
0.0013 
(0.98) 
-0.0000*** 
(-10.64) 
 
 
0.0770*** 
(6.59) 
-0.0000** 
(-2.03) 
-1.3171*** 
(-6.54) 
 
 
 
 
 
14.01% 
47.35*** 
0.8435 
 
0.4306 
 
0.9683 
 
0.2431 
 
 
 
0.9025 
 
0.6967 
 
0.3175 
6
1
 
62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURES 
  
63 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Intraday Average Number of Bond Trades. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Average Intraday Bond Trade Size. 
 
  
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
All Bonds Listed Bonds Unlisted Bonds
 $-
 $100,000
 $200,000
 $300,000
 $400,000
 $500,000
 $600,000
 $700,000
 $800,000
 $900,000
All Bonds Listed Bonds Unlisted Bonds
64 
 
 
Figure 3.  Average Intraday Bond Dollar Volume. 
 
  
 
Figure 4.  Average Intraday Bond Bid-Ask Spread. 
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Figure 5.  Average Intraday Bond Volatility. 
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PART 2:  MUNICIPAL BOND TRADING, INFORMATION RELATEDNESS, AND 
NATURAL DISASTERS  
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INTRODUCTION 
Natural disasters and the costs associated with the ensuing damage can be extensive.  The 
damages linked to Hurricane Sandy exceed $20 billion, and Hurricane Katrina damages are 
estimated to be at least $125 billion.  In 2011, a tornado devastated Joplin, Missouri, directly 
causing $3 billion in damages (Hamilton, 2012).  Natural disasters carry information in the form 
of damages for geographic areas and the firms tied to these areas (Loughran and Schultz, 2004).  
Generally, the information is not known until the amount of damage is realized.   
Some corporations are able to shift production or operations to areas of the country not 
damaged by a disaster, but the viability of municipalities, and hence municipal bonds, is directly 
tied to the damaged area.  For example, the cash flows of revenue bonds are funded from the 
income earned by the bond projects (toll road, stadium, etc).  If a structure is damaged in a storm 
or natural disaster, then the bond funding that project potentially loses its payoff source.  
Additionally, tax revenues may be affected if citizens leave an area after a natural disaster.  
Trading of municipal bonds can be affected by natural disasters as well; local investors may be 
too distracted preparing for and recovering from the storm to balance their bond portfolios in the 
days leading up to and following a natural disaster.  Using firms headquartered in areas struck by 
blizzards, Loughran and Schultz (2004) show that equity trading volume declines on both the 
day of the blizzard and the subsequent trading day.  The authors contribute the decline in trading 
volume to the storm serving as a source of distraction for traders.         
Studying the municipal bond market and its reaction to natural disasters allows us to 
examine the bond market’s ability to absorb information.  Prior bond market research implies 
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that both the municipal and corporate bond markets are inherently slow incorporating 
information into bond prices.  Kwan (1996) shows that stocks react to information faster than 
corporate bonds, and Downing, Underwood, and Xing (2009) document that non-investment 
grade corporate bonds lag equities in their ability to incorporate information.  Green, Li, and 
Schurhoff (2010) show that municipal bonds are quick to include information that pushes prices 
up, but are slow to include information that pulls prices down.   Given that natural disasters 
likely carry negative information, we believe that local traders may be distracted by the natural 
disaster, and hence, alter trading activity leading up to and following the event (Loughran and 
Schultz, 2004), leading to slower incorporation of the association information in municipal bond 
prices. 
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RELATED LITERATURE 
Loughran and Schultz (2004) study local trading of NASDAQ stocks.  The authors focus 
on the effect cloud cover and blizzards have on trading.  The authors examine trading around 
forty-eight blizzards from 1984 to 1997.   While they find little relation between cloud cover and 
stock returns, Loughran and Schultz document a reduction in trading volume for the firms 
headquartered in cities struck by a blizzard.  The reduction in trading volume is substantial; 
volume falls by 17% on the day the storm hits and by 15% on the subsequent day.  Loughran and 
Schultz blame the decline in trading volume on local investor distraction and claim that local 
traders may be too busy preparing for and recovering from the blizzard to participate in trading.  
 Shive (2012) conducts a study that indirectly examines trading activity and natural 
disasters.  Shive focuses on power outages and the market quality of firms headquartered in areas 
affected by the outage.  Of the 114 blackouts that occur in her sample from 2002 to 2010, all but 
two are caused by events such as ice storms and hurricanes.  Shive states that the blackout 
constrains local trading activity and finds that the blackout influences several aspects of trading.  
First, both total volatility and idiosyncratic volatility decline during the power outage.  Second, 
quoted spreads fall by 2.5% during the blackout, which the author credits to a reduction in 
adverse selection.  Third, both volume and turnover decline during the blackout.  The author 
conjectures the changes in trading are due to local traders’ inability to participate in the market 
during the blackout.  
While previously mentioned research focuses on equity markets, there is potential for 
natural disasters to affect other security types.  We focus on the municipal bond market and 
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natural disasters.  Municipal bonds are unique in that their claims and payoffs are often tied 
directly to funded projects, such as toll roads, bridges, and stadiums, which may be damaged by 
a natural disaster.  Unlike firms that have the ability to shift operations or production schedules 
to other locations, municipalities do not possess this flexibility.  Damage to or loss of a funded 
structure can severely affect the municipality’s ability to meet its debt obligations.  Additionally, 
the potential loss of population (and subsequent tax revenues) can detrimentally influence a 
municipality’s viability.  As such, the damages that result from the natural disaster provide 
information as to the well-being of the municipality and its surrounding areas. 
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HYPOTHESES 
We study the efficiency of the municipal bond market and establish if contagion exists 
following natural disasters.  The commonality literature suggests market wide shocks may link 
individual security liquidity and market liquidity.  Cabelle and Krishman (1994) propose the 
following variables as measures of information relatedness:  trading volume, number of trades, 
volatility, spreads, and returns.  Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000) document 
commonality in liquidity and spreads, and Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) show commonality exists 
in stock trading volume.  In this study, we utilize the previously mentioned variables to 
determine if contagion exists among municipal bonds.  Studying the municipal bond market’s 
reaction to natural disasters allows us to examine the bond market’s ability to absorb information 
and also to describe the behavior of bond traders following a disaster.        
First, we focus on spreads.  Spreads in the municipal bond market may increase following 
a natural disaster as a way for dealers to compensate for additional risk.  In the days following a 
natural disaster, the amount of damage (the information) caused by the storm is revealed and this 
information is disseminated into the municipal bond market.  It is also possible that spreads will 
fall following the natural disaster; Loughran and Schultz (2004) and Shive (2012) detail that 
local traders are often constrained following a natural disaster.  If local traders are unable to 
access municipal bond markets after the natural disaster occurs, then a reduction in asymmetric 
information may occur as local, perhaps more informed, traders are distracted.  Shive (2012) 
documents a reduction in spread following electricity blackouts.  She theorizes the reduction in 
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spreads result from local trader’s inability to access the market, which in turn results in less 
information asymmetry in the market following the blackout.   
Common factors, such as economic fundamentals or liquidity demands, are also shown to 
influence the trading environment (Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001).  Areas adjacent to the 
municipality where the natural disaster occurs may also be impacted following the storm.  It is 
possible that adjacent areas are economically linked to the damaged area or that investors in 
surrounding areas are distracted (perhaps by news reports or relief efforts), leading to 
surrounding investors participating less in their own local municipal bond market following the 
disaster.  Jiang, McInish, and Upson (2009) measure information relatedness using firm SIC 
codes and study the trading activity of stocks that continue trading during a trading halt.  Even 
though the halt is unrelated to the other firms in the industry (identified by SIC code), they find 
that spreads increase during the halt for related firms.  Using the above literature, we form the 
following hypotheses:                
H1A: There is a relation between municipal bond spreads and local natural disasters.   
H1B: There is a relation between informationally-related municipal bond spreads and natural 
disasters. 
Second, we examine volume and number of trades.  Loughran and Schultz (2004) study 
local trading of NASDAQ stocks, focusing on cities struck by a blizzard.  They find a substantial 
17% reduction in trading volume on the day the storm strikes the city, and they document a 15% 
reduction in trading volume on the trading day after the blizzard.  Loughran and Schultz claim 
that local investors may be too busy preparing for and recovering from the blizzard to participate 
in trading, thus influencing the reduction in trading volume.  Shive (2012) also documents a 
reduction in trading volume following electricity blackouts and finds that stock turnover falls 
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following an electricity blackout.  Loughran and Schultz study trading volume of stocks 
headquartered in cities unaffected by a blizzard and find no effect on trading volume.  Yet, Jiang, 
McInish, and Upson (2009) find that the number of trades increases for informationally-linked 
firms during a trading halt.  Using the above literature, we present the following hypotheses:       
H2A: Volume decreases for municipal bonds in the days following a local natural disaster. 
H2B:  Volume decreases for informationally-linked municipal bonds following a natural 
disaster. 
 
H3A:  The number of trades decreases for municipal bonds in the days following a local natural 
disaster. 
H3B:  The number of trades decreases for informationally-linked municipal bonds following a 
natural disaster. 
 Third, we focus on bond market efficiency.  The municipal bond market is generally 
inefficient and opaque due to its operating as a decentralized dealer market.  A natural disaster 
provides information to a geographic area, often in the form of damages.  There is a lag between 
the natural disaster occurring and the amount/level of damages becoming known.  During this 
time of information gathering and dissemination, the municipal bond market is filled with 
uncertainty.  The uncertainty may result in increased bond market volatility.  Jiang, McInish, and 
Upson (2009) propose volatility as a measure of information relatedness.  In contrast, local 
investors may be distracted or constrained both during and following the disaster.  Shive (2012) 
uses volatility as a measure of price discovery and shows that total volatility and idiosyncratic 
volatility fall during an electricity blackout.  The reduction in total volatility is stronger for small 
cities, high income areas, and during pre-earnings/merger announcement periods.  The reduction 
in idiosyncratic volatility is more pronounced for small firms with no analyst following.  If local 
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investors play an information-based role in municipal bond markets (as both Shive, 2012, and 
Loughran and Schultz, 2004, show they play in equities), then it is possible that volatility will 
fall during and following a local natural disaster.  The natural disaster may also distract investors 
in neighboring locations, thus influencing their participation in their own municipal bond 
markets. Using the above information, we propose the following hypotheses:          
H4A:  There is a relation between municipal bond volatility and local natural disasters. 
H4B:  There is a relation between informationally related municipal bond volatility and natural 
disasters. 
Another test of market efficiency is to determine if abnormal returns are earned following 
a natural disaster.  If markets are efficient, the occurrence of a natural disaster that does not 
interrupt the operations of a funded project should not influence bond returns.  However, prior 
literature shows that natural disasters can influence stock returns.  Cabelle and Krishman (1994) 
identify returns as a measure of firm relatedness.  Lamb (1998) focuses on hurricanes and their 
impact on stock price.  In Lamb’s study, firms with hurricane risk exposure experience negative 
excess returns around a hurricane.  Firms without hurricane exposure are unaffected by both 
Hurricane Andrew and Hurricane Hugo.  Shelor, Anderson, and Cross (1990) focus on an 
October 17, 1989 California earthquake.  Specifically, they investigate the impact that the 
property damage from the earthquake has on California real estate firms.  Their results show 
negative excess returns for real estate firms on the day of the earthquake, but do not show any 
evidence of significant negative returns for other California-based firms not involved in real 
estate.  Jiang, McInish, and Upson (2009) use industry to classify related firms.  Based on the 
above mentioned literature, we present the following hypotheses:    
H5A:  Municipal bonds have negative abnormal returns following a local natural disaster. 
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H5B:  Informationally related municipal bonds have negative abnormal returns following a 
natural disaster. 
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SAMPLE AND DATA 
We use municipal bond transaction data for January 2010 through December 2013 from the 
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB).  The MSRB municipal bond database includes 
all trades by registered broker-dealers.  Each trade is identified as a dealer purchase from a 
customer, dealer sale to a customer, or interdealer trade, and each trade record includes the 
CUSIP, security information, coupon, yield, par value traded, and price. The data initially 
includes 35,834,399 bond transactions.  We require bonds in the sample to trade nine times each 
year (Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar, 2007)1, which reduces our sample to 33,250,257 trades.  
We also require bonds in the sample to trade at prices above 25% of par in order to remove 
municipalities close to bankruptcy or default, and we remove transactions with data entry 
errors/missing values.  These two deletions further reduce our sample to 32,571,012 trades.  
After constructing both the weekly volatility measures and the weekly spread measures, our final 
data sample includes 20,553,922 trades in 331,429 municipal bonds issued by the municipalities 
in all fifty states in the United States.  We obtain each bond’s issuing state and whether a bond is 
general obligation or revenue from the MSRB’s Electronic Municipal Market Access (EMMA) 
website.  Appendix A provides information on the number of bonds outstanding by state during 
our time period.   
 
                                                          
1 Harris and Piwowar (2006) study transactions costs in the municipal bond market and require bonds in their 
sample to trade at least six times.  We follow Edwards et al (2007) and use a slightly more restrictive requirement 
(nine times each year) to control for potential nonsynchronous trading, given the illiquidity of the municipal bond 
market and the four year length of our trade sample.  We replicate each appendix using the Harris and Piwowar 
restriction, and the results are qualitatively similar.   
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We also utilize natural disaster data from the National Climactic Data Center.  We 
include three types of natural disasters in the sample:  tornados (1,173 events), wildfires (1,877 
events), and hurricanes/tropical storms (46 events). The National Climactic Data Center provides 
information regarding the disaster start date/time, end date/time, and states affected.  We match 
municipal bonds affected by natural disasters based on the bond’s issuer.  Appendix B includes 
information on the number of natural disasters in our sample. 
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THE MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET DESCRIPTION 
Municipal bonds are issued by city, county, and state governments, and also by entities 
such as electric companies, schools, and hospitals.  Municipal bonds are unique in that they are 
excluded from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and are not subject to oversight by the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission.  The MSRB governs the municipal bond market.  The 
municipal bond market is a highly fragmented market, and the bonds trade in a decentralized 
over-the-counter market.  Municipal bonds are typically issued in deals, where several different 
securities are issued at the same time.  The various bonds in the deal, all designed to fund the 
same project, have different maturities, coupons, yields, and offer prices. 
 The municipal bond market is historically fragmented and opaque (Harris and Piwowar, 
2007, and Green, Li, and Schurhoff, 2010).  One way that the MSRB seeks to improve 
transparency in the municipal bond market is through the implementation of its website, EMMA, 
and real time trade reporting.  EMMA provides information about the municipal bond market, 
municipal bond disclosure statements, and post-trade transparency information for municipal 
bonds.  Municipal bond trades are reported to the MSRB’s real-time transaction reporting system 
(RTRS) within 15 minutes of the trade execution, and the trades then are posted publicly to the 
EMMA website.  Real time trade reporting includes real-time prices for most trades occurring 
after January 31, 2005.            
 Appendix 1 provides a description of the trade executions in our sample.  Panel A 
includes information on all bond trades in the sample.  7.82% of bond trades involve a taxable 
municipal bond.  The majority of bond trading appears to take place in bonds with at least 10 
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years to maturity.  Additionally, small trades make up a large portion of the trade sample.  Trades 
of less than $25,000 account for over 50% of the transactions from 2010 to 2013, while trades 
greater than $100,000 account for just 16% of transactions.   
The majority of bonds in the sample trade above par.  Dealer sales to customers make up 
a large portion of trades at 44.46% of transactions, while dealer purchases (interdealer trades) 
make up 25.09% (30.45%).  California, Texas, New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois bonds 
account for nearly 50% of all transactions in the sample (henceforth referred to collectively as 
the top five bond issuing states).  Generally, the trading activity in dealer purchases, dealer sales, 
and interdealer trades is similar to that shown for the full sample.  Additionally, the trading 
activity in the top five bond issuing states is similar to the full sample (Panel B).     
Appendix 2 provides bond level summary statistics for all bonds in the sample and also 
for the top five bond issuing states.  Panel A includes the full sample of trades, and Panels B, C, 
and D are for interdealer trades, dealer purchases, and dealer sales.  The average bond in our 
sample trades roughly 2.94 times per day with an average trade size of over $275,000 and an 
average price of 103.25% of par.  The average daily dollar volume for municipal bonds is nearly 
$730,000.  On average, municipal bonds have a 1.5% spread.  There appears to be slight 
differences between the full sample of bonds and the top five issuing states’ bonds, but we do not 
test for statistical differences in Appendix 2.  The average price for a “top five” bond is 101.90% 
of par.  The average number of trades, the average daily volume, and the average trade size for 
top five bond issuing states are all similar to those for the full sample.  Bonds issued by the top 
five bond issuing states in the sample have an average trade size of $300,000 and transact over 
$770,000 in average daily volume.  Additionally, the average spread for a top five bond is 
1.62%.    
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In Panel B, we provide summary statistics for interdealer trades, both for the full sample 
and for the top five bond issuing states.  Interdealer trades have an average price of 103.18% of 
par, and are nearly $160,000 in dollar size on average.  Interdealer trades make up roughly 
$320,000 of daily dollar volume.  Dealer purchases (Panel C) have an average price of 102.43% 
of par and an average trade size of about $342,000.  On average, interdealer purchases occur 1.11 
times per bond per day, and the average daily dealer purchase volume is almost $400,000.  
Dealer sales (Panel D) have an average price of 103.93%.  The average dealer sale size is 
roughly $266,000, and dealer sales account for nearly $377,000 in average daily volume.  
Interestingly, dealer sales have a positive return (on average), whereas interdealer trades and 
dealer purchases have negative average returns. 
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RESULTS 
First, we focus on municipal bond trading activity on the natural disaster event day 
compared to non-event days.  An event day is any trading day on which a natural disaster occurs, 
and non-event days are all trading days on which no natural disaster occurs.  We detail our first 
analysis of municipal bond trading and natural disasters in Appendix 3.  Panel A includes 
tornados, Panel B includes wildfires, and Panel C includes hurricanes/tropical storms.  Overall, 
we find significant differences between event days and non-event days.  For tornados, we find 
that the dollar volume is roughly $40,000 higher on the event days compared to all other trading 
days, which is in contrast to the previous literature showing a reduction in volume on disaster 
event days (Loughran and Schultz, 2004, and Shive, 2012).  The number of trades is marginally 
higher on tornado event days.  Tornado event days’ trade sizes are nearly $6,000 larger than non-
event days’ trade sizes.  Both spreads and volatility are lower on event days than on non-event 
days, which is consistent with Shive’s findings of lower volatility and lower spreads during 
electricity blackout periods.  Specifically, spreads are 0.02% lower on tornado event days, and 
volatility is 0.05% lower.  Lastly, we show that bond returns are lower on tornado event days 
than on non-event days.   
 Panel B provides the event days and non-event days comparison for wildfires.  We show 
that daily volume is roughly $57,000 higher, and that the average trade size is nearly $11,000 
larger on the event days than on the non-event days.  This finding of increasing activity in the 
event period is, again, the opposite of what Shive (2012) shows for equities.  Similar to Panel A, 
we document marginal differences in the number trades between the two time periods, and we 
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also show that both spreads and volatility are lower on the event days (similar to tornado events 
in Panel A and also consistent with previous findings).  We detail hurricane/tropical storm event 
days compared to non-event days in Panel C.    Unlike the findings in Panels A and B, we find 
no significant difference in daily volume on hurricane event and non-event days.  However, we 
find that both spreads and volatility are lower on the hurricane event days, which is a consistent 
finding across all three disaster types analyzed in the paper.    
 We document significant differences between event days and non-event days for 
municipal bonds and natural disasters in Appendix 3.  We attempt to isolate where these 
differences might be coming from by separating the trade sample into small (less than $25,000), 
medium ($25,001 – $100,000), and large (greater than $100,001) trades.  These statistics are 
located in Appendix 4.  Panel A details the event days, and Panel B details the non-event days in 
Appendix 4.  We focus on the percentage volume, percentage trades, and bid-ask spreads in 
Appendix 4.  Examining what trade size changes, if any, occur during natural disasters can also 
shed some insight on who is trading in the municipal bond market.  Trade size is used to measure 
retail versus institutional trading in the bond market; typically, trades exceeding either $100,000 
(Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar, 2007) or $500,000 (Ronen and Zhou, 2013) are considered 
institutional.  We designate trades as “large” or institutional if the trade size exceeds $100,001 in 
our paper.2   
 In Appendix 4, Panel A, we focus on the natural disaster event days, which are defined as 
the day a natural disaster occurs.  We find that small trades account for the largest portion of 
both dollar volume and the number of trades on both the event days and the non-event days 
(regardless of disaster types).  Consistent with previous literature, we document an inverse 
                                                          
2 We replicate any results involving trade size designations using $500,000 to designate large trades.  We utilize 
$100,000 in our main tests because only a small percentage of trades exceed $500,000. 
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relation between trading costs and trade size in the bond market.3  Large trades account for the 
smallest portion of both volume and number of trades in both time periods for all disaster types.     
 The first three columns provide information for tornados.  Medium trades account for a 
slightly smaller portion of volume on tornado event days (compared to non-event days), while 
large trades account for a slightly greater portion of volume on event days than non-event days.  
We do not document any significant differences in spreads between the two time periods for 
medium and large trades (for tornados).  We find that small trades have a 0.02% lower spread on 
tornado event days than on non-event days.  For wildfires, we find that small trades have 
significantly lower spreads on wildfire event days than on the non-event days.  The magnitude of 
the difference in spreads, however, is only 0.01% for wildfire events. 
 The last columns in Appendix 4 provide results for hurricanes/tropical storms.  We 
document significant differences in bond spreads for small and medium trades on hurricane 
event days and non-event days.  We find that small and medium trades have lower spreads on 
hurricane event days compared to non-event days.  Small trade spreads are 0.05% lower in the 
event period, and medium trade spreads are 0.03% lower in the event period.  We do not show 
any significant differences in large trade spreads between hurricane/tropical storm event days 
and non-event days.   
Despite finding some significant differences in trade sizes between event days and non-
event days, the differences between the two time periods do not appear to come from one single 
trade size group.  We make a second attempt to isolate the origin of the differences on natural 
disaster event days by separating interdealer trades, dealer purchases, and dealer sales.  We 
present the relevant statistics results in Appendix 5.  The left-side columns provide results for 
                                                          
3 See Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri, 2007; Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar, 2007; and Harris and Piwowar, 2006. 
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tornado event days and non-event days.  We find a significant difference in spreads for both 
interdealer trades and dealer purchases.  Both interdealer trades and dealer sales account for a 
smaller portion of volume (trades) on tornado event days than on non-event days, but dealer 
purchases account for a larger proportion of both volume and trades on tornado event days 
compared to non-event days. 
The results for both wildfire and hurricane events are similar to, if not more pronounced, 
than the results for tornado events.  Both interdealer trades and dealer sales account for a smaller 
portion of volume and trades on event days than non-event days for wildfires and hurricanes, 
while dealer purchases account for a larger portion of volume and trades during event periods.  
Dealer purchases increase by 0.77% (0.70%) for dollar volume (number of trades) on wildfire 
event days compared to non-event days.  For hurricane events, dealer purchases increase by 
1.55% (1.59%) for dollar volume (number of trades) on event days compared to non-event days 
for hurricanes.  With the exception of interdealer trades during hurricanes/tropical storms, the 
differences in spreads between event and non-event days are small in magnitude for both 
wildfires and hurricanes.     
 In previous appendices, we focus on comparing event days and non-event days.  We now 
further our analysis by studying the pre-event week, the event day(s), and the post-event week.  
The pre-event week is the five trading days prior to the natural disaster, and the post-event week 
is the five trading days following the natural disaster.  The event days are the actual day(s) of the 
natural disaster.  Appendix 6 presents the comparison for the tornado pre, during, and post event 
periods.  We also test for the following differences between the three time periods:  the pre-event 
week and the event day(s); the event day(s) and the post event week; and the pre-event week and 
the post-event week.  Dollar volume is slightly higher in the tornado pre-event week than the 
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post event week – roughly $727,000 compared to $708,000.  We find marginal (but significant) 
differences in the average number of trades in all three time periods; trades generally fall during 
both the tornado event days and the post-event weeks, as compared to the pre-event weeks.   
 Panel B provides results for wildfires.  We find no significant difference in volume in the 
pre-event weeks and event days, but we find that volume decreases following the natural 
disaster.  The volume decline following a wildfire is similar to Loughran and Schultz (2004), 
who document a reduction in trading volume on the trading day following a blizzard.  Volume is 
roughly $688,000 during the wildfire event days, and around $672,000 in the week following the 
wildfire.  We find marginal differences in both the number of trades and spreads in the three time 
periods, and we show that volatility is highest during the event period for wildfires.  In contrast, 
Shive (2012) finds that volatility declines during electricity blackouts.  Additionally, we find that 
returns fall significantly from the pre-event week to the post-event week for wildfires.  The 
results for hurricanes (Panel C) are somewhat weaker than those shown in Panels A and B.  
Returns fall drastically from the pre-event week to the post-event week, falling from 0.02% to -
0.03%.  The drop in returns is consistent with Lamb’s (1998) finding that firms with hurricane 
risk exposure experience negative returns following a hurricane.  
  Previous financial literature documents the existence of commonality, or relatedness, 
among securities.  Specifically, the literature points out that both market and industry wide 
liquidity influence the liquidity of individual securities (Chordia et al, 2000).  Commonality (or 
relatedness) has potential implications for trading activity and liquidity, particularly when we 
consider the impact of natural disasters.  Chordia et al. point out that certain market-wide shocks 
have the potential to influence wide-spread liquidity, and as such, influence if metrics such as 
spreads, volatility, and volume (as well as other liquidity measures) change in similar ways.  
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Natural disasters, and the subsequent damages they cause, can interrupt trading in the municipal 
bond market.  Given that the physical and monetary damage of a natural disaster is not 
immediately known, the potential liquidity shock following the disaster may have long-term 
effects in the municipal bond market.  The question remains of whether or not natural disasters 
influence the activity of related municipal bonds as well. 
In this section, we further our analysis of municipal bond trading around natural disasters 
by focusing on potential commonality between the bonds.  We follow Chordia, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam (2000) in designating informationally related securities, municipal bonds in our 
case, as similar securities (all other bonds) issued by the same state.  Appendix 7 provides the 
results from our first examination into commonality among municipal bonds for tornados.  Panel 
A includes spread estimations.  Overall, we find significant differences in spreads for bonds 
affected by a tornado and for the related bonds.  Spreads are, on average, about 0.18% higher for 
the related bonds during the tornado pre-event weeks, event days, and post-event weeks.  
Spreads are 1.66% in all three time periods for the bonds affected by tornados, and roughly 
1.84% for the related bonds in all three time periods.  We conduct an F test to determine 
differences in distributions across spreads, and we find no differences for the distributions of 
bonds affected by tornados.  However, we find significant differences in the distribution for the 
group of informationally related bonds.     
 Panel B provides statistics for average daily dollar volume.  Average dollar volume is 
significantly higher in the informationally related bonds across all time periods for tornados.  
Daily volume is about $734,000 for the bonds affected by tornados, while volume is roughly 
$840,000 for the informationally related bonds – a difference of about $100,000.  In the tornado 
pre and post event periods, volume is around $130,000 higher for the related bonds compared to 
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the bonds affected by the disaster.  As in Panel A, we test for differences in daily volume 
distribution and document a difference only for the informationally related bonds. 
 Similar to Panels A and B, we find lower daily trading activity for bonds affected by 
tornados compared to the informationally related bonds in Panel C.  However, the difference in 
the number of trades per day is marginal during all three time periods, hovering around 0.15 
trade.  We document significant differences in the number of trades distribution for related bonds 
and those bonds influenced by tornados.  The results in Panel D for volatility somewhat contrast 
those shown in the previous three panels.  We find that volatility is higher during all three time 
periods (by roughly 0.08%) for tornados.  Consistent with Panels A and B, we find no difference 
in distribution for bonds affected by tornados.  However, we document a significant difference in 
volatility distribution for the informationally related bonds.  Lastly, we find that returns are 
significantly lower for the bonds influenced by tornados compared to the informationally related 
bonds.  The returns are substantially lower in the tornado post-event week, with a negative 
difference of 0.21%.  We find significant differences in distribution in returns for both the bonds 
affected by tornados and the related bonds. 
 We continue our focus on municipal bonds and relatedness in Appendix 8.  Appendix 8 
provides our analysis for wildfires.  Spreads and volume are lower for the bonds affected by the 
wildfires (compared to the informationally related bonds) in the pre-event week, event week, and 
post-event weeks.  Significantly more trading occurs in the related-bonds compared to the bonds 
influenced by the wildfires.  Volatility is higher (by roughly 0.07%) for the bonds directly related 
to the wildfires.  Lastly, we find significant differences in returns in the wildfire pre-event weeks 
and event weeks between the two groups of bonds.  The informationally related bonds 
outperform the bonds affected by the wildfires by 0.53% in the pre-event weeks, and continue to 
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outperform them on the event days (by 0.10%).  We find no significant difference in returns 
during the post-event weeks.   
 Appendix 9 provides our analysis of the bonds affected by hurricanes/tropical storms.  In 
contrast to the previous two appendices (Appendices 7 and 8), spreads are higher for the bonds 
affected by hurricanes during both hurricane pre-event weeks and event days.  Spreads are 0.04% 
higher in the hurricane pre-event weeks and 0.06% higher during the actual hurricane.  We find 
no significant difference in spreads for the hurricane post-event weeks.  Also in contrast to the 
previous results, dollar volume is higher for the bonds affected by hurricanes/tropical storms than 
for the related bonds.  Specifically, bond volume is nearly $400,000 higher during hurricane pre-
event and post-event weeks, and volume is roughly $340,000 higher on event days.  Volatility 
(Panel D) is significantly greater for bonds affected by hurricanes/tropical storms, with volatility 
being between 0.65% – 0.67% higher for affected bonds.  We also find significant differences in 
returns between the two groups of bonds.  Returns for both groups of bonds are positive in the 
hurricane pre-event weeks, but the returns for the bonds affected by natural disasters fall to 
0.00% on the event days.  Returns continue to fall in the post-event week, reaching -0.03%. 
 We further our analysis of municipal bonds, relatedness, and natural disasters by 
estimating weekly spread regressions for 3,461,639 bond-week observations.  We control for 
variables shown to influence spreads, including weekly dollar volume, weekly number of trades, 
average weekly trade size, weekly volatility, and the average years to maturity (Edwards, Harris, 
and Piwowar, 2007).  We also control for the bond being a revenue bond, taxable, and issued by 
one of the top five bond issuing states (in terms of the number of bonds).  Lastly, we control for 
state-specific variables.  We use annual population from the U.S. Census Bureau to control for 
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state size, and we control for potential state wealth effects by controlling for the median annual 
income and the annual general fund revenue for each state (Ang, Green, and Xing, 2015). 
 The event period dummy variable is equal to one during the days of the natural disaster, 
and zero otherwise.  The post-event period dummy variable is equal to one the five trading days 
following the natural disaster, and zero otherwise.  Both the event period and post-event period 
dummies allow us to compare spreads to the pre-event period (the five trading days prior to the 
natural disaster), as we hold out the pre-event variable for comparison.  We also control for 
potential commonality or relatedness among securities with a related security variable.  The 
related security variable is the average weekly spread of bonds issued by the same state.  The 
interaction terms between event (post-event) period and related security variable are of particular 
interest because the two variable allow us to determine if natural disasters influence both 
municipal bonds and related municipal bonds. 
 We present the spread regression estimations in Appendix 10.  We divide the regressions 
based on events.  Model 1 is for tornados, and Models 2 and 3 are for wildfires and 
hurricanes/tropical storms.  Spreads fall significantly on the event days for both tornados and 
wildfires.  Specifically, spreads are 0.03% lower during the tornado event days and 0.05% lower 
during the wildfire event days.  We find no significant relation between spreads and the event 
days for hurricanes/tropical storms.  Spreads are lower in the post-event days compared to the 
pre-event weeks for tornados and hurricanes.  Post-event spreads are 0.04% lower than pre-event 
levels for tornados, and 0.11% lower in the post-event weeks for hurricanes.   
In addition to the event and post-event weeks, we are also interested in the relation 
between spreads and informationally-related bonds.  We find a positive relation for related bonds 
in both the event period and the post-event weeks for tornados.  Related security spreads increase 
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by 0.02% during the event days, and by 0.03% during the post-event weeks.  For wildfires, we 
find a significant relation for related security spreads during the event days only.  Related 
security spreads increase by 0.02% during the event days for wildfires.  We find no relation for 
informationally-related bonds during the event days for hurricanes, but we document a 
significant positive relation during the post-event weeks.  Specifically, related bond spreads 
increase by $0.08 during the hurricane post-event weeks compared to the pre-event weeks.   
We find that volatility positively influences spreads.  We also find that bonds with longer 
times to maturity have larger spreads.  The positive relation between time to maturity and 
spreads is likely due to increased interest rate exposure/risk over the life of the bond.  
Additionally, we find that both revenue bonds and taxable bonds have significantly higher 
spreads than general obligation bonds and non-taxable bonds.  Lastly, bonds issued by the top 
five bond issuing states appear to have slightly lower spreads than bonds issued by other states. 
We also control for the size and potential wealth of states.  While we do not find 
economically significant relations in terms of population, income, and fund revenue, we can 
draw a few generalities from the coefficients.  States with higher incomes and higher populations 
appear to also have higher spreads.  These states may be frequent issuers of municipal bonds (to 
fund projects to support the larger population), which could lead to the bonds being perceived as 
more risky than other bonds.  General fund revenue serves as a direct measure of state income.  
We find a negative relation between spreads and fund revenue, indicating that bonds issued by 
states with higher revenues are less costly to trade. 
In addition to spreads, we are also interested in potential commonality in municipal bond 
volatility.  We provide further evidence about the market quality of municipal bonds around 
natural disasters in Appendix 11.  Appendix 11 presents the estimated coefficients from bond 
91 
 
volatility regressions.  We estimate volatility weekly for 3,461,639 bond-week observations.  
Model 1 is for tornados, and Models 2 and 3 are for wildfires and hurricanes/tropical storms.  We 
follow Downing and Zhang (2004) in estimating municipal bond market volatility with the 
following price range measure: 
100
Pricet
(Pricet
max − Pricet
min).  We control for dollar volume, 
trading activity, and average trade size in the volatility regressions, and also for bond time to 
maturity.  Additionally, we control for a bond being a revenue bond, taxable, and issued by a top 
five bond issuing state.  Lastly, we control for state specific variables, including annual 
population and median income.   
First, we are interested in the relation between the event period (and post event period) 
and volatility.  We find that volatility is 0.19% lower during the event days for tornados, but we 
find no significant relation between volatility and the event days for either wildfires or 
hurricanes/tropical storms.  We find a significant relation between wildfire post-event weeks and 
volatility, documenting a 0.10% reduction in volatility in the week following the wildfire 
(compared to pre-event weeks).  In contrast, we find a 0.19% increase in volatility during the 
post-event weeks for hurricanes.   
We are also interested in the relation between volatility and the informationally-related 
bonds in the sample.  The related security variable is the average weekly volatility of municipal 
bonds issued by the same state.  We interact the event days and post-event week dummy 
variables with the related security to determine what influence, if any, natural disasters have on 
related bond volatility.  We find a 0.09% increase in volatility for related bonds during the 
tornado event days, but we find no significant relation for wildfires or hurricanes.  We do not 
find a significant relation between volatility and the post-event weeks for any of the disasters in 
the sample – tornados, wildfires, or hurricanes.  Consistent with Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar 
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(2007), we document a positive relation between volatility and time to maturity.  The positive 
relation is likely a result of the increased interest rate risk in the longer maturity bonds. 
Lastly, we determine the relation between municipal bond volume and natural disasters.  
The municipal bond market is fairly illiquid in terms of the number of trades, but there is still a 
large amount of dollar volume traded in the market.  Some bonds trade much more frequently 
and more, in terms of dollar volume, than others.  To explore the potential differences in volume, 
we focus on the most active (top quartile) and the least active (bottom quartile) bonds in terms of 
dollar volume in Appendix 12.  We also divide the sample by events—tornados, wildfires, and 
hurricanes (similar to the previous appendices).  We control for several bond specific factors.  
We control for bond time to maturity, and for whether a bond is a revenue bond, is taxable, and 
is issued by one of the top issuers in the sample.  Lastly, we control for state specific variables, 
including annual state population and state median income. 
The event days dummy variable is equal to one during the natural disaster, and zero 
otherwise.  The post-event week dummy variable is equal to one the five days following the 
natural disaster, and zero otherwise.  Both the event days and post-event week dummies allow us 
to compare volume to the pre-event week (the five trading days prior to the natural disaster), as 
we hold out the pre-event variable for comparison.  We also control for potential commonality or 
relatedness among securities with the related security variable.  The related security variable is 
the average weekly volume of related bonds.  The interaction terms between event (post-event) 
weeks and related security variable are of particular interest because the two variable allow us to 
determine whether natural disasters influence both municipal bonds and related municipal bonds. 
We find that weekly dollar volume increases during the post-event week for all three 
types of natural disasters.  The magnitude of the increase ranges from $12 billion (hurricanes) to 
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roughly $13.5 billion (tornados).  Only bonds affected by hurricanes experience an increase in 
volume during the event week.  For the least active bonds, the results are slightly different.  We 
find no evidence of significant volume changes during the event days or post-event week for 
bonds affected by tornados.  We document a significant reduction in volume during post-event 
weeks for bonds affected by wildfires.  However, hurricane/tropical storm affected bonds have a 
significant increase in volume by nearly $2,000 during the post-event weeks.     
Similar to previous analyses, we are interested in the potential commonality effects in 
municipal bond volume, and therefore, we interact the event (post-event) dummy with the related 
security variable.  We document a significant drop in weekly bond volume for informationally-
related bonds in the tornado post-event week for the most active bonds.  The least active bonds 
appear to experience a marginal increase activity in tornado post-event weeks.  The magnitude of 
the volume increase is roughly $1,200 for the most active bonds, while the magnitude of the 
volume decrease is consistently marginal, at best, for the least active bonds.   
There are some additional differences between the most active and least active bonds.  
Regardless of activity level, time to maturity negatively influences bond volume.  The negative 
relation is consistent with bonds being purchased and held long-term by investors.  Whether a 
bond is a revenue bond or not appears to reduce volume in the thinly traded bonds (by roughly 
$600).  However, being a revenue bond increases volume in the most active bonds.  Taxable 
bonds have lower volume than non-taxable bonds across all regression models, regardless of 
bond activity level.  Intuitively, the lower volume for taxable bonds make sense, especially given 
the number of securities to choose from in the municipal bond market.  Investors will likely 
choose to capitalize on the tax benefits municipal bonds offer and choose to trade the non-
taxable securities over the taxable securities.   
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Unexpectedly, bonds issued by the top five bond issuing states in the sample have significantly 
lower volume than the bonds issued by municipalities in the other 45 states.  The negative 
relation is likely due to the fact that we are comparing the volume for bonds issued by only five 
states to the volume of bonds issued by the other 45 states combined.  In terms of state 
characteristics, we show that bonds from more populated states and states with higher incomes 
trade more dollar volume.  The positive relation between population (income) and dollar volume 
is consistent regardless of bond activity level. 
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CONCLUSION 
Natural disasters can cause extensive damage to municipalities.  Previous research by 
both Loughran and Schultz (2004) and Shive (2012) shows that natural disasters influence 
trading activity and market quality.  We seek to study what effects, if any, natural disasters have 
on municipal bond trading.  Studying the municipal bond market is valuable.  Municipalities are 
constrained in that they cannot shift productions or operations following natural disasters, 
whereas some corporations have the ability to do so when facilities are damaged.  Additionally, 
municipal bond viability is directly tied to the area(s) damaged by a natural disaster. 
 We use a sample of municipal bond trades from 2010 to 2013, and we find that natural 
disasters influence municipal bond trading.  Spreads are lower on not only tornado event days 
but also wildfire event days.  Additionally, spreads remain lower during the five trading days 
following the event compared to pre-event spreads.  We do not find evidence that spreads change 
on hurricane event days; however, spreads fall during the five trading days following the 
hurricane.  For tornados, wildfires, and hurricanes, dollar volume increases the five trading days 
after the natural disaster.    
We further our analysis of the municipal bond market by studying both the bonds 
affected by natural disasters and related bonds.  Specifically, we find that spreads are higher for 
related bonds than for the bonds affected by both tornados and hurricanes.  Both dollar volume 
and number of trades are higher for the related bonds compared to the bonds affected by both 
tornados and wildfires.  The finds are different for hurricanes, though.  Spreads for bonds 
affected by hurricanes are higher during the event than spreads for the related bonds.  Dollar 
96 
 
volume is also higher for bonds affected by hurricanes than for related bonds during the 
hurricane event.  Overall, our results document links between the municipal bond market and 
natural disasters and provide evidence about the overall market quality and efficiency of the 
municipal bond market following natural disasters. 
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APPENDIX 1:  MUNICIPAL BOND TRANSACTION CHARACTERISTICS 
  
  
Appendix 1:  Municipal Bond Transaction Characteristics 
Appendix 1 provides transaction summary characteristics of all municipal bonds that trade more than nine times from 2010 – 2013.  The sample 
includes 331,429 individual securities issued by the 50 states and 20,553,922 trades.  Panel A provides information for the full sample of bonds, 
and Panel B provides information for the top five bond issuing states in the sample (California, Texas, New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois).  The 
second column represents all trades.  The third column represents interdealer trades.  The fourth column represents dealer purchases, and the fifth 
column represents dealer sales.   
 All Transactions Interdealer Trades Dealer Purchases Dealer Sales 
Panel A:  All Bond Trades 
% trades in taxable bonds 
% trades, bonds less than 1 year to maturity 
% trades, bonds with 1 – 5  years to maturity 
% trades, bonds with 5 – 10 years to maturity 
% trades, bonds with 10 – 20 years maturity 
% trades, bonds with 20+ years maturity 
% trades less than $10,000 
% trades $10,001 – $25,000 
% trades $25,001 – $50,000 
% trades $50,001 – $100,000 
% trades $100,001 – $250,000 
% trades greater than $250,000 
% trades of premium bonds 
% trades of discount bonds 
% trades at par 
% trades in Top 5 Issuers 
% Interdealer Trades 
% Dealer Sales 
% Dealer Purchases 
7.82% 
2.65% 
10.96% 
16.41% 
34.60% 
35.38% 
23.88% 
29.37% 
19.27% 
11.76% 
7.21% 
8.51% 
64.89% 
29.28% 
5.84% 
46.41% 
30.45% 
44.46% 
25.09% 
6.93% 
2.14% 
11.56% 
17.80% 
35.49% 
33.01% 
19.31% 
29.62% 
20.74% 
13.32% 
8.73% 
8.27% 
64.26% 
34.32% 
1.41% 
47.69% 
7.05% 
3.55% 
13.01% 
18.24% 
34.14% 
31.07% 
21.80% 
26.15% 
18.93% 
12.94% 
8.35% 
11.84% 
62.01% 
31.64% 
6.35% 
45.85% 
8.86% 
2.50% 
9.39% 
14.42% 
34.26% 
39.43% 
28.19% 
31.02% 
18.45% 
10.02% 
5.53% 
6.79% 
66.94% 
24.49% 
8.57% 
45.84% 
Panel B:  Trades in Top Five Bond Issuing States 
% trades in taxable bonds 
% trades, bonds less than 1 year to maturity 
% trades, bonds with 1 – 5  years to maturity 
% trades, bonds with 5 – 10 years to maturity 
% trades, bonds 10 – 20 years to maturity 
% trades in bonds with 20+ years maturity 
% trades less than $10,000 
% trades $10,001 – $25,000 
% trades $25,001 – $50,000 
9.42% 
2.82% 
10.93% 
16.16% 
33.78% 
36.31% 
21.45% 
28.89% 
 19.74%  
8.67% 
2.29% 
11.54% 
17.33% 
34.47% 
34.37% 
17.88% 
28.80% 
20.82% 
8.20% 
3.58% 
12.87% 
17.88% 
33.56% 
32.12% 
19.47% 
25.44% 
19.24% 
10.63% 
2.78% 
9.39% 
14.36% 
33.41% 
40.06% 
25.12% 
30.91% 
19.25% 
1
0
2
 
  
% trades $50,001 – $100,000 
% trades $100,001 – $250,000 
% trades greater than $250,001 
% trades of premium bonds 
% trades of discount bonds 
% trades at par 
% Interdealer Trades 
% Dealer Sales 
% Dealer Purchases 
12.66% 
7.85% 
9.41% 
64.22% 
30.12% 
5.66% 
31.30% 
43.91% 
24.79% 
14.00% 
9.24% 
9.25% 
63.81% 
34.67% 
1.52% 
13.85% 
9.04% 
12.96% 
61.11% 
32.14% 
6.75% 
 
11.03% 
6.18% 
7.52% 
66.26% 
25.74% 
8.00% 
 
 
  
1
0
3
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APPENDIX 2:  SAMPLE SUMMARY STATISTICS, BOND LEVEL 
  
 Appendix 2:  Sample Summary Statistics, Bond Level 
Appendix 2 provides summary characteristics of all municipal bonds that trade more than nine times from 2010 – 2013.  The sample includes 
331,429 individual securities issued by the 50 states and 20,553,922 trades.  Panel A provides information for the full sample of bond trades for all 
bonds and for bonds issued by the top five municipal bond issuing states in the sample (California, Texas, New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois).  
Panel B includes interdealer trades, Panel C includes dealer purchases, and Panel D includes dealer sales (for all municipal bond trades and also for 
bonds issued by the top five issuers).  Price is the average daily price for each bond.  Dollar volume is the average daily dollar volume for each bond.  
Number of trades is the average daily trades for each bond.  Trade size is the average daily par value traded.  Volatility is calculated weekly following 
Downing and Zhang (2004):  
100
Pricet
(Pricet
Max − Pricet
Min).  Bid-ask spread is calculated weekly for each bond by taking the weekly average buy 
price – weekly average sell price.  The return is the trade-to-trade return.  
 All Municipal Bonds Top Five Municipal Bond Issuing States 
 N Mean Minimum Maximum N Mean Minimum Maximum 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Price 
$Vol 
Trades 
TSize 
Volatility 
Spread 
Return 
331,159 
331,159 
331,159 
331,159 
331,159 
331,159 
331,159 
103.25% 
$729,893.75 
2.94 
$277,288.89 
1.84% 
1.58% 
0.08% 
25.00% 
$1,979.47 
1.00 
$484.10 
0.00% 
0.00% 
-22.72% 
155.29% 
$993,255,000.00 
157.00 
$153,333,333.00 
102.83% 
18.05% 
1,308.64% 
142,254 
142,254 
142,254 
142,254 
142,254 
142,254 
142,254 
101.90% 
$771,291.97 
2.94 
$297,126.43 
1.94% 
1.62% 
0.09% 
25.00% 
$2,000.00 
1.00 
$1,000.00 
0.00% 
0.00% 
-15.45% 
155.29% 
$541,162,162.00 
132.07 
$153,333,333.00 
51.82% 
18.05% 
124.12% 
Panel B:  Interdealer Trades 
Price 
$Vol 
Trades 
TSize 
Volatility 
Spread 
Return 
293,932 
293,932 
293,932 
293,932 
293,932 
293,932 
293,932 
103.18% 
$319,723.25 
1.94 
$159,494.25 
2.06% 
1.71% 
-0.12% 
25.00% 
$440.75 
1.00 
$300.25 
0.00 
0.00% 
-62.38% 
156.74% 
$991,085,000.00 
98.00 
$99,000,000.00 
165.58% 
18.05% 
495.09% 
126,971 
126,971 
126,971 
126,971 
126,971 
126,971 
126,971 
101.82% 
$339,547.83 
1.97 
$167,814.31 
2.14% 
1.75% 
-0.09% 
25.00% 
$1,000.00 
1.00 
$484.71 
0.00% 
0.00% 
-54.02% 
156.74% 
$110,146,667.00 
46.00 
$98,100,000.00 
51.82% 
18.05% 
495.09% 
Panel C:  Dealer Purchases 
Price 
$Vol 
Trades 
TSize 
Volatility 
Spread 
Return 
324,616 
324,616 
324,616 
324,616 
324,616 
324,616 
324,616 
102.43% 
$393,357.79 
1.11 
$342,465.67 
1.79% 
1.52% 
-0.86% 
25.00% 
$212.00 
1.00 
$212.00 
0.00% 
0.00% 
-49.34% 
156.19% 
$717,256,216.00 
45.00 
$358,634,775.00 
102.83% 
18.05% 
5,137.10% 
139,511 
139,511 
139,511 
139,511 
139,511 
139,511 
139,511 
101.10% 
$429,278.16 
1.11 
$371,894.89 
1.88% 
1.57% 
-0.88% 
25.00% 
$212.00 
1.00 
$212.00 
0.00 
0.00% 
-29.26% 
156.19% 
$717,256,216.00 
45.00 
$358,634,775.00 
51.82% 
18.05% 
156.36% 
Panel D:  Dealer Sales 
Price 
$Vol 
Trades 
331,145 
331,145 
331,145 
103.93% 
$376,947.15 
1.62 
25.00% 
$705.80 
1.00 
155.45% 
$576,400,000.00 
155.00 
142,250 
142,250 
142,250 
102.60% 
$399,125.07 
1.62 
25.00% 
$1,000.00 
1.00 
155.45% 
$200,990,000.00 
98.84 
1
0
5
 
  
  
TSize 
Volatility 
Spread 
Return 
331,145 
331,145 
331,145 
331,145 
$266,598.26 
1.81% 
1.53% 
0.96% 
$705.80 
0.00% 
0.00% 
-14.37% 
$140,000,000.00 
102.83% 
18.05% 
175.47% 
142,250 
142,250 
142,250 
142,250 
$286,300.91 
1.90% 
1.58% 
1.00% 
$1,000.00 
0.00% 
0.00% 
-9.40% 
$140,000,000.00 
51.82% 
18.05% 
25.91% 
1
0
6
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APPENDIX 3:  EVENT DAY DIFFERENCES 
  
 Appendix 3:  Event Day Differences 
Appendix 3 provides a comparison between event period and non-event periods in the sample (2010 – 2013).  The event period is the week of the 
event, and the non-event period is all other trading days.  Panel A includes tornados, Panel B includes wildfires, and Panel C includes 
hurricanes/tropical storms.  Price is the average daily price for each bond.  Dollar volume is the average daily dollar volume for each bond.  
Number of trades is the average daily trades for each bond.  Trade size is the average daily par value traded.  Volatility is calculated weekly 
following Downing and Zhang (2004):  
100
Pricet
(Pricet
Max − Pricet
Min).  Bid-ask spread is calculated weekly for each bond by taking the weekly 
average buy price – weekly average sell price.  The return is the trade-to-trade return.  Significance is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
with ***, ***, and *.   
 Event Days Non-Event Days Difference 
Panel A:  Tornadoes 
Price 
Dollar Volume 
Number of Trades 
Trade Size 
Volatility 
Bid-Ask Spread 
Return 
103.20% 
$705,058.14 
2.78 
$285,057.95 
1.88% 
1.61% 
0.05% 
103.20% 
663,925.86 
2.74 
$279,196.21 
1.94% 
1.63% 
0.07% 
0.00 
$41,132.28*** 
0.04*** 
$5,861.74** 
-0.05%*** 
-0.02%*** 
-0.02%*** 
Panel B:  Wildfires 
Price 
Dollar Volume 
Number of Trades 
Trade Size 
Volatility 
Bid-Ask Spread 
Return 
102.80% 
$685,520.42 
2.75 
$273,875.25 
1.95% 
1.65% 
0.11% 
102.61% 
$626,466.59 
2.70 
$262,897.19 
1.99% 
1.66% 
0.09% 
0.20%*** 
$57,053.83*** 
0.06*** 
$10,978.06*** 
-0.04%*** 
-0.01%*** 
0.02%*** 
Panel C:  Hurricanes/Tropical Storms 
Price 
Dollar Volume 
Number of Trades 
Trade Size 
Volatility 
Bid-Ask Spread 
Return 
104.45% 
$768,732.45 
2.78 
$333,257.95 
1.99% 
1.69% 
0.14% 
103.60% 
$757,811.55 
2.79 
$329,400.94 
2.18% 
1.76% 
0.04% 
0.83%*** 
$10,920.91 
-0.01 
$3,857.01 
-0.19%*** 
-0.07%*** 
0.10%* 
 
  
1
0
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APPENDIX 4:  EVENT DAYS AND NON-EVENT DAYS TRADE SIZE DIFFERENCES 
  
  
Appendix 4:  Event Days and Non-Event Days Trade Size Differences 
Appendix 4 provides event period and non-event period statistics, as well as differences between the two time periods, for small trades, medium trades, 
and large trades.  Small trades are less than $25,000 in size.  Medium trades are $25,001 – $100,000 in size.  Large trades are greater than $100,001 in 
size.  Summary information is calculated using 20,553,922 bond trades in 331,429 municipal bonds.  Price is the average price (by trade size).  
Percentage volume is the portion of volume for which each trade size accounts, and percentage trades is the portion of trades for which each trade size 
accounts.  The bid-ask spread is the weekly spread for each trade size.  Significance is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels with ***, ***, and *.   
 Tornados Wildfires Hurricanes/Tropical Storms 
 Small Medium Large  Small Medium Large  Small Medium Large  
Panel A:  Event Days 
% Vol 
% Trades 
Spread 
48.67% 
51.11% 
1.91% 
33.17% 
32.52% 
1.64% 
18.17% 
16.37% 
1.21% 
 48.05% 
50.50% 
1.95% 
33.91% 
33.25% 
1.67% 
18.04% 
16.25% 
1.26% 
 50.25% 
52.92% 
2.04% 
32.68% 
31.73% 
1.78% 
17.07% 
15.35% 
1.22% 
 
Panel B:  Non-Event Days 
% Vol 
% Trades 
Spread 
48.48% 
50.99% 
1.93% 
33.50% 
32.80% 
1.64% 
18.02% 
16.21% 
1.22% 
 48.05% 
50.48% 
1.96% 
34.02% 
33.37% 
1.68% 
17.93% 
16.15% 
1.26% 
 50.28% 
53.21% 
2.09% 
32.76% 
31.73% 
1.81% 
16.97% 
15.06% 
1.23% 
 
Panel C:  Differences 
% Vol 
% Trades 
Spread 
0.19%* 
0.13% 
-0.02%*** 
-0.34%*** 
-0.29%*** 
0.00% 
0.15%** 
0.16%** 
0.01% 
 0.00% 
0.02% 
-0.01%** 
-0.11% 
-0.11% 
-0.01% 
0.11% 
0.10% 
0.00% 
 -0.03% 
-0.29% 
-0.05%*** 
-0.08% 
0.00% 
-0.03%*** 
0.11% 
0.29% 
-0.01% 
 
 
  
1
1
0
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APPENDIX 5:  EVENT DAYS AND NON-EVENT DAYS TRADE TYPE DIFFERENCES 
  
  
Appendix 5:  Event Days and Non-Event Days Trade Type Differences 
Appendix 5 provides event period and non-event period statistics, as well as differences between the two time periods, for interdealer trades, dealer purchases, and dealer sales.  
Summary information is calculated using 20,553,922 bond trades in 331,429 municipal bonds.  Price is the average price (by trade type).  Percentage volume is the portion of 
volume for which each trade type accounts, and percentage trades is the portion of trades for which each trade type accounts.  The bid-ask spread is the weekly spread for each 
trade type.  Significance is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels with ***, ***, and *.   
 Tornados Wildfires Hurricanes/Tropical Storms 
 InTrades DBuys DSales  InTrades DBuys DSales  InTrades DBuys DSales  
Panel A:  Event Days 
% Vol 
% Tds 
Spread 
22.90% 
22.50% 
1.83% 
36.12% 
34.94% 
1.58% 
40.99% 
42.56% 
1.58% 
 23.34% 
22.95% 
1.86% 
35.99% 
34.82% 
1.63% 
40.68% 
42.23% 
1.62% 
 22.12% 
21.82% 
1.93% 
37.49% 
36.46% 
1.69% 
40.38% 
41.72% 
1.69% 
 
Panel B:  Non-Event Days 
% Vol 
% Tds 
Spread 
23.43% 
23.06% 
1.84% 
35.45% 
34.33% 
1.57% 
41.11% 
42.61% 
1.57% 
 23.67% 
23.31% 
1.87% 
35.22% 
34.12% 
1.61% 
41.12% 
42.57% 
1.62% 
 22.95% 
22.64% 
1.98% 
35.94% 
34.87% 
1.68% 
41.10% 
42.49% 
1.70% 
 
Panel C:  Differences 
% Vol 
% Tds 
Spread 
-0.53%*** 
-0.56%*** 
-0.01%** 
0.66%*** 
0.60%*** 
0.01%*** 
-0.13%*** 
-0.05% 
0.01%*** 
 -0.33%*** 
-0.36%*** 
-0.01% 
0.77%*** 
0.70%*** 
0.02%*** 
-0.44%*** 
-0.34%*** 
0.00% 
 -0.83% 
-0.81%*** 
-0.06%*** 
1.55%*** 
1.59%*** 
0.01% 
-0.72%*** 
-0.77%*** 
-0.01%** 
 
 
  
1
1
2
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APPENDIX 6:  EVENT PERIOD SUMMARY STATISTICS 
  
  
Appendix 6:  Event Period Summary Statistics 
Appendix 6 provides a comparison of trading activity in the pre-event period (one week before), the event week, and the post event period (one week after).  
Columns 2, 3, and 4 represent weekly averages.  Columns 5, 6, and 7 represent the differences in pre-event and event, event and post-event, and the pre-event 
and post-event, respectively.  Panel A includes tornados, Panel B includes wildfires, and Panel C includes hurricanes/tropical storms.  Price is the average 
daily price for each bond.  Dollar volume is the average daily dollar volume for each bond.  Number of trades is the average daily trades for each bond.  Trade 
size is the average daily par value traded.  Volatility is calculated weekly following Downing and Zhang (2004):  
100
Pricet
(Pricet
Max − Pricet
Min).  Bid-ask spread 
is calculated weekly for each bond by taking the weekly average buy price – weekly average sell price.  The return is the trade-to-trade return.  Significance is 
indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels with ***, ***, and *.   
 Pre-Event 
Weeks 
Event Days 
 
Post-Event 
Weeks 
Pre-Event minus 
Event 
Event minus Post-
Event 
Pre-Event minus 
Post-Event 
 Panel A:  Tornadoes  
Dollar Volume 
Number of Trades 
Trade Size 
Volatility 
Bid-Ask Spread 
Return 
$726,875.46 
2.81 
$297,770.58 
1.99% 
1.66% 
0.06% 
$734,246.51 
2.79 
$297,885.97 
1.99% 
1.66% 
0.05% 
$708,036.36 
2.78 
$296,174.77 
1.99% 
1.66% 
0.04% 
$7,371.06 
-0.02* 
$115.39 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00** 
$26,210.15 
0.01* 
$1,711.21 
0.00% 
0.00% 
0.00 
$18,839.10* 
0.03*** 
$1,595.82 
0.01%* 
0.00% 
0.00 
 Panel B:  Wildfires  
Dollar Volume 
Number of Trades 
Trade Size 
Volatility 
Bid-Ask Spread 
Return 
$699,504.15 
2.78 
$279,559.10 
2.04% 
1.70% 
0.13% 
$688,341.71 
2.76 
$276,645.64 
2.05% 
1.70% 
0.12% 
$672,315.06 
2.77 
$276,352.72 
2.03% 
1.70% 
0.11% 
-$11,162.44 
-0.02*** 
-$2,913.47 
0.01%*** 
0.00% 
0.01** 
$16,026.65* 
-0.01 
$292.93 
0.03%*** 
0.01%** 
0.01** 
$27,189.09** 
0.02** 
$3,206.38 
0.01% 
0.01%** 
0.02%** 
 Panel C:  Hurricanes/Tropical Storms  
Dollar Volume 
Number of Trades 
Trade Size 
Volatility 
Bid-Ask Spread 
Return 
$1,069,149.64 
3.13 
$435,239.22 
2.53% 
1.94% 
0.02% 
$1,009,331.19 
3.14 
$412,455.15 
2.51% 
1.97% 
0.00% 
$1,063,322.22 
3.16 
$449,592.50 
2.51% 
1.96% 
-0.03% 
-$59,818.45 
0.01 
-$22,784.08 
-0.02% 
0.02% 
-0.01% 
-$53,991.03 
-0.02 
-$37,137.36 
0.00% 
-0.01% 
0.03%** 
$5,827.42 
-0.03 
-$14,353.28 
0.02% 
-0.02% 
0.04%*** 
 
  
1
1
4
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APPENDIX 7:  EVENT PERIOD STATISTICS FOR RELATED SECURITIES 
(TORNADOES) 
  
  
Appendix 7:  Event Period Statistics for Related Securities (Tornadoes) 
Appendix 7 presents tornado event period statistics for informationally-related securities.  We follow a methodology similar to Chorida, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam (2000) in designating informationally-related securities.  A bond’s informational-related match is all other bonds issued by its issuing state.  
Bid-ask spread is calculated weekly for each bond by taking the weekly average buy price – weekly average sell price. Volume is the average daily dollar 
volume for each bond.  Number of trades is the average daily trades for each bond.  Trade size is the average daily par value traded.  Volatility is calculated 
weekly following Downing and Zhang (2004):  
100
Pricet
(Pricet
Max − Pricet
Min).    The return is the trade-to-trade return.  The pre-event period is one week before 
the actual event, and the post event period is one week after the event.  The event period is the week of the event.  Significance is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels with ***, ***, and *.    
 Security Average Related Security Average Difference 
Panel A:  Spreads 
Pre-Event Week  
Event Day(s) 
Post-Event Week  
F Test 
1.66% 
1.66% 
1.66% 
0.20 
1.85% 
1.84% 
1.84% 
8.13*** 
-0.18%*** 
-0.18%*** 
-0.19%*** 
 
Panel B:  Volume 
Pre-Event Week  
Event Day(s) 
Post-Event Week  
F Test 
$726,875.46 
$734,246.51 
$708,036.36 
1.46 
$851,411.22 
$842,028.41 
$841,069.40 
11.38*** 
-$124,535.77*** 
-$107,781.89*** 
-$133,033.04*** 
Panel C:  Number of Trades 
Pre-Event Week  
Event Day(s) 
Post-Event Week  
F Test 
2.81 
2.79 
2.78 
3.08** 
2.93 
2.94 
2.93 
11.36*** 
-0.12*** 
-0.15*** 
-0.15*** 
 
Panel D:  Volatility 
Pre-Event Week  
Event Day(s) 
Post-Event Week  
F Test 
1.99% 
1.99% 
1.99% 
0.46 
1.91% 
1.91% 
1.90% 
26.32*** 
0.08%*** 
0.08%*** 
0.08%*** 
Panel E:  Returns 
Pre-Event Week  
Event Day(s) 
Post-Event Week  
F Test 
0.06% 
0.05% 
0.04% 
4.16** 
0.22% 
0.05% 
0.26% 
3.18** 
-0.16%*** 
-0.14%*** 
-0.21%*** 
  
1
1
6
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APPENDIX 8:  EVENT PERIOD STATISTICS FOR RELATED SECURITIES (WILDFIRES) 
  
  
Appendix 8:  Event Period Statistics for Related Securities (Wildfires) 
Appendix 8 presents wildfire event period statistics for informationally-related securities.  We follow a methodology similar to Chorida, Roll, and 
Subrahmanyam (2000) in designating informationally-related securities.  A bond’s informational-related match is all other bonds issued by its issuing state.  
Bid-ask spread is calculated weekly for each bond by taking the weekly average buy price – weekly average sell price. Volume is the average daily dollar 
volume for each bond.  Number of trades is the average daily trades for each bond.  Trade size is the average daily par value traded.  Volatility is calculated 
weekly following Downing and Zhang (2004):  
100
Pricet
(Pricet
Max − Pricet
Min).    The return is the trade-to-trade return.  The pre-event period is one week before 
the actual event, and the post event period is one week after the event.  The event period is the week of the event.  Significance is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels with ***, ***, and *.     
 Security Average Informationally-Related  
Security Average 
Difference 
Panel A:  Spreads 
Pre-Event Week  
Event Day(s) 
Post-Event Week  
F Test 
1.70% 
1.70% 
1.70% 
0.73 
1.90% 
1.89% 
1.89% 
15.92*** 
-0.19%*** 
-0.19%*** 
-0.19%*** 
Panel B:  Volume 
Pre-Event Week  
Event Day(s) 
Post-Event Week  
F Test 
$699,504.15 
$688,341.71 
$672,315.06 
0.75 
$783,932.41 
$800,197.52 
$807,149.83 
69.01*** 
-$84,428.26*** 
-$111,855.81*** 
-$134,834.76*** 
Panel C:  Number of Trades 
Pre-Event Week  
Event Day(s) 
Post-Event Week  
F Test 
2.78 
2.76 
2.77 
1.83 
2.91 
2.91 
2.91 
2.22 
-0.12*** 
-0.15*** 
-0.14*** 
Panel D:  Volatility 
Pre-Event Week  
Event Day(s) 
Post-Event Week  
F Test 
2.04% 
2.05% 
2.03% 
4.74*** 
1.98% 
1.98% 
1.96% 
56.55*** 
0.07%*** 
0.08%*** 
0.07%*** 
Panel E:  Returns 
Pre-Event Week  
Event Day(s) 
Post-Event Week  
F Test 
0.13% 
0.12% 
0.11% 
2.28 
0.66% 
0.11% 
0.11% 
466.16*** 
-0.53%*** 
0.01%*** 
0.00 
  
1
1
8
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APPENDIX 9:  EVENT PERIOD STATISTICS FOR RELATED SECURITIES 
(HURRICANES/TROPICAL STORMS) 
  
  
Appendix 9:  Event Period Statistics for Related Securities (Hurricanes/Tropical Storms) 
Appendix 9 presents hurricane/tropical storm event period statistics for informationally-related securities.  We follow a methodology similar to Chorida, Roll, 
and Subrahmanyam (2000) in designating informationally-related securities.  A bond’s informational-related match is all other bonds issued by its issuing 
state.  Bid-ask spread is calculated weekly for each bond by taking the weekly average buy price – weekly average sell price. Volume is the average daily 
dollar volume for each bond.  Number of trades is the average daily trades for each bond.  Trade size is the average daily par value traded.  Volatility is 
calculated weekly following Downing and Zhang (2004):  
100
Pricet
(Pricet
Max − Pricet
Min).    The return is the trade-to-trade return.  The pre-event period is one 
week before the actual event, and the post event period is one week after the event.  The event period is the week of the event.  Significance is indicated at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels with ***, ***, and *.     
 Security Average Informationally-Related  
Security Average 
Difference 
Panel A:  Spreads 
Pre-Event Week  
Event Day(s) 
Post-Event Week  
F Test 
1.94% 
1.96% 
1.96% 
0.36 
1.90% 
1.90% 
1.94% 
47.01*** 
0.04%* 
0.06%** 
0.02% 
Panel B:  Volume 
Pre-Event Week  
Event Day(s) 
Post-Event Week  
F Test 
$1,069,149.64 
$1,009,331.19 
$1,063,322.22 
0.22 
$665,079.18 
$671,973.14 
$663,985.11 
0.33 
$404,070.46*** 
$337,358.05*** 
$399,337.11*** 
Panel C:  Number of Trades 
Pre-Event Week  
Event Day(s) 
Post-Event Week  
F Test 
3.13 
3.14 
3.16 
0.06 
2.80 
2.82 
2.89 
123.01*** 
0.34*** 
0.32*** 
0.27*** 
Panel D:  Volatility 
Pre-Event Week  
Event Day(s) 
Post-Event Week  
F Test 
2.53% 
2.51% 
2.51% 
0.11 
1.87% 
1.84% 
1.85% 
19.84*** 
0.65%*** 
0.67%*** 
0.66%*** 
Panel E:  Returns 
Pre-Event Week  
Event Day(s) 
Post-Event Week  
F Test 
0.01% 
0.00% 
-0.03% 
4.94*** 
0.06% 
0.07% 
0.02% 
45.44*** 
-0.05%*** 
-0.07%*** 
-0.05%*** 
  
1
2
0
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APPENDIX 10:  SPREAD REGRESSIONS 
  
  
Appendix 10:  Spread Regressions 
Appendix 10 provides spread regression estimations for 331,429 municipal bonds with 20,553,922 trades from January 2010 – December 2013 for tornados, 
wildfires, and hurricanes/tropical storms.  Regressions are estimated weekly using 3,461,639 bond-week observations.  The event period is the week of the 
event, and the post-event period is the week following the event.  The related security is the average bid-ask spread of all other municipal bonds from the same 
issuing state.  The Event Period*Related Security is an interaction term between the event and the related security, and the Post-Event*Related Security is an 
interaction term between the post-event period and the related security.  Dollar volume is the weekly dollar volume for each, and the number of trades is the 
weekly trades for each bond.  Trade size is the average weekly par value traded for each bond.  Volatility is calculated following Downing and Zhang (2004):  
100
Pricet
(Pricet
Max − Pricet
Min).  Years to maturity is the time to maturity for each bond.  Revenue Bond is equal to 1 if the bond is a revenue bond, and zero 
otherwise.  Taxable is equal to 1 if the bond is taxable, and zero otherwise.  Top 5 Issuer is equal to 1 if the bond is issued by California, Texas, Pennsylvania, 
New York, or Illinois.  Population is the yearly population for each state provided by the U.S. Census Bureau.  The median income is the annual median 
income of each state, and general fund revenue is the general fund revenue for each state.  All regression models are estimated using robust standard errors.  
Significance is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels with ***, ***, and *.   
 Tornados 
(1) 
Wildfires 
(2) 
Hurricanes/Tropical Storms 
(3) 
Intercept 
 
Variables of Interest 
Event Day(s) 
 
Post-Event Week 
 
Related Security 
 
Event Day(s)*Related Security 
 
Post-Event*Related Security 
 
Bond/Trading Traits 
Dollar Volume 
 
Number of Trades 
 
Trade Size 
 
Volatility 
 
Years to Maturity 
-0.0401*** 
(-6.35) 
 
-0.0290*** 
(-3.04) 
-0.0445*** 
(-4.81) 
0.2155*** 
(41.50) 
0.0181*** 
(3.46) 
0.0264*** 
(5.23) 
 
0.0000 
(0.96) 
-0.0000 
(-1.02) 
-0.0000*** 
(-40.82) 
0.5457*** 
(113.89) 
0.0137*** 
-0.0447*** 
(-7.11) 
 
-0.0473*** 
(-4.33) 
0.0233* 
(1.89) 
0.2187*** 
(41.98) 
0.0247*** 
(4.19) 
-0.0103 
(-1.57) 
 
0.0000 
(0.96) 
-0.0000 
(-1.02) 
-0.0000*** 
(-40.82) 
0.5457*** 
(113.88) 
0.0137*** 
-0.0477*** 
(-7.74) 
 
0.0713 
(1.56) 
-0.1115** 
(-2.54) 
0.2201*** 
(42.73) 
-0.0200 
(-0.78) 
0.0788*** 
(3.44) 
 
0.0000 
(0.96) 
-0.0000 
(-1.02) 
-0.0000*** 
(-40.82) 
0.5457*** 
(113.88) 
0.0137*** 
1
2
2
 
  
 
Revenue Bond 
 
Taxable 
 
Top 5 Issuer 
 
State Characteristics 
Population 
 
Median Income 
 
General Fund Revenue 
 
R-Squared 
(29.29) 
0.0073*** 
(6.60) 
0.0690*** 
(27.98) 
-0.0060*** 
(-4.50) 
 
0.0000*** 
(2.77) 
0.0000*** 
(18.29) 
-0.0000*** 
(-15.60) 
68.12% 
(29.29) 
0.0074*** 
(6.70) 
0.0690*** 
(27.97) 
-0.0056*** 
(-4.20) 
 
0.0000*** 
(3.22) 
0.0000*** 
(18.27) 
-0.0000*** 
(-16.60) 
68.12% 
(29.29) 
0.0075*** 
(6.74) 
0.0690*** 
(27.99) 
-0.0056*** 
(-4.18) 
 
0.0000*** 
(3.06) 
0.0000*** 
(18.29) 
-0.0000*** 
(-16.40) 
68.12% 
 
  
1
2
3
 
124 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 11:  VOLATILITY REGRESSIONS 
  
  
Appendix 11:  Volatility Regressions 
Appendix 11 provides volatility regression estimations for 331,429 municipal bonds with 20,553,922 trades from January 2010 – December 2013 for tornados, 
wildfires, and hurricanes/tropical storms.  Regressions are estimated weekly using 3,461,639 bond-week observations.  The event period is the week of the 
event, and the post-event period is the week following the event.  The related security is the average volatility of all other municipal bonds from the same 
issuing state.  The Event Period*Related Security is an interaction term between the event and the related security, and the Post-Event*Related Security is an 
interaction term between the post-event period and the related security.  Dollar volume is the weekly dollar volume for each, and the number of trades is the 
weekly trades for each bond.  Trade size is the average weekly par value traded for each bond.  Volatility is calculated following Downing and Zhang (2004):  
100
Pricet
(Pricet
Max − Pricet
Min).  Years to maturity is the time to maturity for each bond.  Revenue Bond is equal to 1 if the bond is a revenue bond, and zero 
otherwise.  Taxable is equal to 1 if the bond is taxable, and zero otherwise.  Top 5 Issuer is equal to 1 if the bond is issued by California, Texas, Pennsylvania, 
New York, or Illinois.  Population is the yearly population for each state provided by the U.S. Census Bureau.  The median income is the annual median 
income of each state.  All regression models are estimated using bond-clustered standard errors.  Significance is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels with 
***, ***, and *.   
 Tornados 
(1) 
Wildfires 
(2) 
Hurricanes/Tropical Storms 
(3) 
Intercept 
 
Variables of Interest 
Event Day(s) 
 
Post-Event Week 
 
Related Security 
 
Event Day(s)*Related Security 
 
Post-Event*Related Security 
 
Bond/Trading Traits 
Dollar Volume 
 
Number of Trades 
 
Trade Size 
 
Years to Maturity 
 
Revenue Bond 
-0.3850*** 
(-3.40) 
 
-0.1937*** 
(-4.10) 
-0.0595 
(-1.20) 
0.7571*** 
(27.14) 
0.0924*** 
(3.91) 
0.0241 
(0.89) 
 
-0.0000 
(-1.09) 
0.0000 
(1.08) 
-0.0000*** 
(-22.27) 
0.0974*** 
(53.83) 
-0.0410 
-0.4028*** 
(-3.49) 
 
-0.0925 
(-1.02) 
-0.0967** 
(-2.11) 
0.7624*** 
(26.74) 
0.0419 
(0.83) 
0.0380 
(1.59) 
 
-0.0000 
(-1.09) 
0.0000 
(1.08) 
-0.0000*** 
(-22.29) 
0.0974*** 
(53.78) 
-0.0409 
-0.4182*** 
(-3.58) 
 
-0.1976 
(-1.08) 
0.1948* 
(1.69) 
0.7693*** 
(27.66) 
0.1092 
(1.07) 
-0.0963 
(-1.61) 
 
-0.0000 
(-1.09) 
0.0000 
(1.08) 
-0.0000*** 
(-22.27) 
0.0974*** 
(53.69) 
-0.0414 
1
2
5
 
  
 
Taxable 
 
Top 5 Issuer 
 
State Characteristics 
Population 
 
Median Income 
 
R-Squared 
(-1.29) 
0.2457*** 
(4.32) 
0.0171 
(0.54) 
 
0.0000 
(1.42) 
-0.0000* 
(-1.86) 
23.19% 
(-1.29) 
0.2458*** 
(4.33) 
0.0138 
(0.41) 
 
0.0000 
(1.31) 
-0.0000* 
(-1.77) 
23.19% 
(-1.32) 
0.2458*** 
(4.33) 
0.0153 
(0.45) 
 
0.0000 
(1.30) 
-0.0000* 
(-1.72) 
23.18% 
 
  
1
2
6
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APPENDIX 12:  MOST ACTIVE AND LEAST ACTIVE BONDS 
  
  
Appendix 12:  Most Active and Least Active Bonds 
Appendix 12 models dollar volume for the most active quartile of bonds and the least active quartile of bonds.  The analysis uses 865,628 bond-week 
observations for the most active bonds, and 875,118 bond-week observations for the least active bonds.  The event period is the week of the event, and the 
post-event period is the week following the event.  The related security is the average dollar volume of all other municipal bonds from the same issuing state.  
The Event Period*Related Security is an interaction term between the event and the related security, and the Post-Event*Related Security is an interaction 
term between the post-event period and the related security.  Years to maturity is the time to maturity for each bond.  Revenue Bond is equal to 1 if the bond is 
a revenue bond, and zero otherwise.  Taxable is equal to 1 if the bond is taxable, and zero otherwise.  Top 5 Issuer is equal to 1 if the bond is issued by 
California, Texas, Pennsylvania, New York, or Illinois.  Population is the yearly population for each state provided by the U.S. Census Bureau.  The median 
income is the annual median income of each state.  All regression models are estimated using bond-clustered standard errors.  Significance is indicated at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels with ***, ***, and *.   
 Tornados Wildfires Hurricanes/Tropical Storms 
 Most Active Least 
Active 
Most Active Least Active Most Active Least Active 
Intercept 
 
Variables of Interest 
Event Day(s) 
 
Post-Event Week 
 
Related Security 
 
Event Day(s)*Related 
Security 
 
Post-Event*Related Security 
 
Bond/Trading Traits 
Years to Maturity 
 
Revenue Bond 
 
Taxable 
 
Top 5 Issuer 
 
State Characteristics 
0.00*** 
(22.03) 
 
511,610,345 
(0.54) 
13,466,422,678*** 
(31.93) 
1,261.96*** 
(29.12) 
-42.84 
(-0.50) 
-1,195.18*** 
(-31.30) 
 
-507,631,660*** 
(-26.91) 
121,564,835 
(0.64) 
-4,748,091,818*** 
(-15.88) 
-4,412,711,678*** 
(-23.61) 
 
82.48*** 
51,122*** 
(181.59) 
 
-145.48 
(-0.68) 
271.00 
(0.99) 
0.0023*** 
(42.72) 
0.00 
(0.27) 
0.0002* 
(-1.73) 
 
-456.80*** 
(-114.81) 
-586.02*** 
(-7.42) 
-
5,275.37*** 
(-42.55) 
-
1,735.22*** 
(-17.28) 
0.00*** 
(20.03) 
 
$750,231,335 
(1.13) 
12,986,073,335*** 
(38.49) 
1,257.65*** 
(26.73) 
-4.78 
(-0.07) 
-1,192.17*** 
(-37.87) 
 
-534,565,101*** 
(-25.23) 
421,592,760** 
(2.17) 
-528,577,6185*** 
(-15.57) 
-4,419,877,833*** 
(-20.82) 
 
89.64*** 
51,292*** 
(183.77) 
 
-332.08 
(-1.59) 
-1,170.64*** 
(-5.28) 
0.0023*** 
(44.45) 
0.0004*** 
(3.97) 
0.0008*** 
(8.11) 
 
-457.87*** 
(-115.16) 
-589.70*** 
(-7.47) 
-5,278.20*** 
(-42.57) 
-1,725.37*** 
(-17.16) 
 
0.00*** 
0.00*** 
(-20.69) 
 
12,030,119,470*** 
(25.49) 
11,812,405,815*** 
(25.06) 
1,255.98*** 
(26.92) 
-1,171.66*** 
(-25.32) 
-1,154.03*** 
(-24.83) 
 
-579,497,057*** 
(-24.25) 
394,313,548** 
(2.06) 
-566,800,6097*** 
(-15.89) 
-5,010,897,536*** 
(-21.85) 
 
106.61*** 
51,054*** 
(185.24) 
 
833.75 
(1.28) 
1,939.71*** 
(-2.80) 
0.0024*** 
(48.86) 
0.0007** 
(2.33) 
0.0016*** 
(5.07) 
 
-457.10*** 
(-114.89) 
-585.96*** 
(-7.43) 
-5,273.66*** 
(-42.52) 
-1,735.26*** 
(-17.25) 
 
0.0001*** 
1
2
8
 
  
Population 
 
Median Income 
 
R-Squared 
(10.80) 
113,664*** 
(16.29) 
 
96.91% 
0.0001*** 
(22.15) 
0.0932*** 
(18.67) 
3.79% 
(9.64) 
125,498*** 
(15.90) 
 
96.70% 
(19.26) 
0.0944*** 
(18.96) 
 
3.82% 
(12.70) 
133,292*** 
(16.31) 
 
96.58% 
(22.10) 
0.0950*** 
(19.09) 
 
3.80% 
 
  
1
2
9
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APPENDIX A:  INDIVIDUAL BONDS TRADED, BY YEAR 
  
131 
 
Appendix A:  Individual Bonds Traded, By Year 
Each column includes the unique number of bonds traded each year for each state in the sample period 2010 – 
2013.  The last column is the number of unique bonds traded over the course of the full sample for each state.   
State 2010 2011 2012 2013 Full Sample 
AK 
AL 
AR 
AZ 
CA 
CO 
CT 
DC 
DE 
FL 
GA 
HI 
IA 
ID 
IL 
IN 
KS 
KY 
LA 
MA 
MD 
ME 
MI 
MN 
MO 
MS 
MT 
NC 
ND 
NE 
NH 
NJ 
NM 
NV 
NY 
OH 
OK 
OR 
PA 
RI 
SC 
SD 
TN 
TX 
UT 
VA 
VT 
WA 
WI 
WV 
WY 
579 
1,391 
806 
2,801 
24,692 
2,643 
2,626 
353 
1,188 
8,548 
3,323 
812 
674 
401 
9,504 
4,883 
1,544 
1,078 
922 
3,812 
1,868 
628 
4,884 
2,340 
2,232 
1,414 
280 
4,498 
188 
753 
589 
6,642 
674 
926 
13,871 
5,274 
968 
2,517 
9,087 
603 
2,708 
206 
1,405 
12,408 
895 
3,377 
70 
4,285 
1,774 
209 
86 
579 
1,454 
747 
2,995 
24,888 
2,706 
2,606 
402 
1,201 
8,649 
3,721 
866 
736 
416 
9,406 
4,951 
1,508 
1,109 
884 
3,900 
2,056 
600 
4,659 
2,318 
2,166 
1,392 
254 
4,658 
200 
770 
594 
6,951 
669 
913 
14,337 
5,488 
1,034 
2,730 
9,088 
661 
2,904 
221 
1,333 
12,856 
946 
3,517 
92 
4,528 
1,762 
200 
95 
553 
1,516 
891 
2,690 
25,683 
2,564 
2,405 
438 
1,096 
7,700 
3,423 
809 
701 
372 
8,831 
4,478 
1,410 
1,108 
937 
3,557 
1,958 
633 
4,126 
2,153 
1,981 
1,334 
291 
4,334 
210 
792 
593 
6,251 
632 
804 
13,505 
4,959 
912 
2,458 
8,290 
544 
2,740 
222 
1,361 
12,516 
832 
3,428 
98 
4,254 
1,655 
179 
102 
621 
1,763 
937 
3,033 
25,791 
2,954 
2,846 
547 
1,198 
7,962 
3,722 
887 
840 
444 
9,453 
4,834 
1,709 
1,244 
1,085 
3,870 
2,228 
748 
4,338 
2,333 
2,315 
1,522 
345 
5,081 
283 
861 
651 
6,652 
774 
871 
14,758 
5,720 
1,108 
2,932 
9,130 
648 
2,970 
264 
1,429 
14,358 
1,034 
4,054 
64 
4,929 
1,909 
212 
157 
1,253 
3,270 
2,067 
5,380 
49,234 
5,650 
5,646 
753 
2,063 
15,011 
6,809 
1,521 
1,761 
877 
18,576 
10,287 
3,489 
2,546 
2,038 
7,711 
3,901 
1,511 
9,398 
5,196 
4,732 
2,902 
711 
9,524 
566 
1,717 
1,324 
13,840 
1,475 
1,560 
27,550 
11,281 
2,212 
5,613 
18,877 
1,399 
5,728 
540 
2,884 
28,017 
1,939 
7,184 
175 
8,845 
3,929 
420 
266 
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Appendix B:  Natural Disaster Events, By Year 
Appendix B includes information on the number of natural disasters and the types of natural disasters that occur 
each year in the sample period 2010 – 2013.  Natural disaster information is obtained from the National Climactic 
Data Center’s website. 
Disaster Type 2010 2011 2012 2013 All Years 
Tornados 
Wildfires 
Hurricanes/Tropical 
Storms 
308 
273 
7 
328 
836 
21 
268 
565 
13 
268 
203 
5 
1,172 
1,877 
46 
Total 588 1,185 846 476 3,095 
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PART 3:  MUNICIPAL BOND TRADING AND POLITICAL SCANDALS 
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INTRODUCTION 
Research details that investors profit from local investment choices; for example, Ivkovic 
and Weisbenner (2005) show that local investments outperform non-local investments by 3.2%.  
Ivkovic and Weisbenner conclude the performance of local investments is driven by superior 
knowledge of local firms.  Local investors may choose to invest not only in equities, but also in 
municipal bonds.  One reason the municipal bond market is attractive to local investors is the tax 
advantages it offers.  The knowledge base of local investors may not be limited to surrounding 
firms; it may also extend to local governments.  Scott (2006) details that 69% of residents 
interact with their local mayor and 78% interact with their local city council.  Scott also shows 
that 63% of local residents have access to city budgets and financial reports.  Investors are able 
to garner information about local governments through these interactions. 
Documenting the municipal bond market’s reaction to government misconduct provides 
information as to how and when the bond market incorporates information.  There are three 
reasons why studying the municipal bond market provides value.  First, focusing on the 
municipal bond market allows us to study a market dominated by local retail investors, as 
documented by Green, Hollifield, and Schurhoff (2007).  Retail traders may be both the traders 
most affected by the wrongdoing and the traders with the most information about the misconduct 
itself.  Scott (2006) details that local residents often interact with local officials and have access 
to city financial reports.  Retail trades may aid in price discovery both during and after 
announcements of government misconduct, and we are able to determine what type(s) of trades 
contribute to price discovery by dividing our sample into small trades and large trades.   
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Second, the municipal bond market does not offer the same transparency or information 
availability as the equity market.  Municipalities do not release quarterly earnings reports like 
public firms, and many municipalities that issue bonds are small.  Information is not always 
readily available about municipalities given the lack of transparency in the market, and it is 
possible that news of government officials’ wrongdoing may serve as one of the only sources of 
information about the quality of government in municipalities.  Additionally, information about 
municipal securities may be hard to disseminate and absorb; each municipality can have multiple 
issues of bonds outstanding.  For example, municipal bonds tend to be issued in a series, and 
some of the larger issues contain as many as thirty bonds of various maturities and coupon rates 
(Green, Hollified, and Schurhoff, 2007).  It may be difficult to decipher information about such a 
large amount of securities, especially compared to the equities market where investors need to be 
informed about only one class or type of stock per firm.   
Third, the municipal bond market is different from the equities market.  There is no 
exchange fostering pre-trade transparency in the municipal bond market, and there is also no 
quote or order book that traders can use to guarantee fair prices on municipal bonds.  In fact, 
previous literature documents that large amounts of price dispersion exist in the municipal bond 
market, even after post trade transparency is implemented (Schultz, 2012).  Bond markets in 
general are also less efficient than the equities market.  We provide evidence regarding the 
municipal bond market’s efficiency and quality by studying bond trading activity before, during, 
and after announcements regarding government officials and their misconduct. 
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RELATED LITERATURE 
Research exists on the overall market quality of the municipal bond market.  For 
example, Harris and Piwowar (2007) show that trading costs are inversely related to trade size 
and that the municipal bond market is illiquid.  Green, Li, and Schurhoff (2010) provide 
evidence regarding municipal bond pricing efficiency and focus on profit-motivated dealers and 
their behavior.  The authors detail that municipal bond dealers are quick to incorporate 
information that results in price increases, but are slow to react to information that negatively 
influences bond prices.  While Green, Li, and Schurhoff focus on how dealers react to 
macroeconomic news, this paper focuses on how individual municipal bond traders react to 
news.  Specifically, this paper focuses on how (and if) municipal bond traders react to 
wrongdoing by local political officials.       
  Local traders, in general, not only invest locally but also make informed local investment 
decisions.  Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) find that local investors allocate roughly 30% of their 
investment portfolio to local firms.  The local investments chosen outperform non-local 
investments by 3.2%.  Based on the outperformance, the authors conclude that local traders 
choose their investments based on knowledge of local firms.  The tendency to invest locally also 
extends to mutual fund managers.  Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001) show mutual fund 
managers invest in companies geographically close to the manager’s location and the local 
investments earn a positive 2.67% abnormal return per year.  Again, the return on the investment 
implies superior knowledge of local firms.   
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Butler, Fauver, and Mortal (2009) provide a study of political integrity in the municipal 
bond underwriting market.  While Butler, Fauver, and Mortal do not focus on government 
misbehavior, the authors focus on a related topic.  Specifically, they focus on the effect of 
political integrity and corruption on the issuance of municipal bonds.  Butler, Fauver, and Mortal 
study the municipal bond underwriting market and describe how it is historically fraught with 
corruption due to a pay-to-play practice; basically, investment banks bid on underwriting 
business through their campaign contributions to local government officials.  The authors use 
per-capita federal convictions as a proxy for local corruption.  In general, they find that credit 
risk and corruption are correlated. Specifically, states with higher corruption tend to issue, on 
average, riskier bonds (based on credit ratings) and corrupt states tend to pay higher yields to 
maturity.  The authors do not provide any evidence regarding corruption and local bond trader 
behavior, however.  This paper adds to the Butler, Fauver, and Mortal paper by showing how 
municipal bond traders react to wrongdoing by local government officials. 
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HYPOTHESES 
Butler, Fauver, and Mortal (2009) establish a link between municipal bonds and state 
corruption.  Butler, Fauver, and Mortal do not provide evidence regarding investor reaction to 
political wrongdoing, nor do they examine municipal bond trading.  In this paper, we focus on 
municipal bond trading activity and its relation to governmental misconduct.  First, we focus on 
the municipal bond spread.  Butler, Fauver, and Mortal detail that corrupt states tend to issue 
riskier bonds, which could lead to higher spreads for traders.  In addition, dealers may adjust the 
bond spread following a political scandal to compensate for informed traders.  We present the 
following hypothesis: 
H1:  Municipal bond spread increases following a local scandal. 
  Second, we focus on trading activity following the disclosure of government misconduct.  
Information will disseminate into the market following a scandal.  McInish and Wood (1992) 
utilize volume as a measure of information.  As information flows into the market, we expect 
both trading volume and the number of trades will increase.  We present the following 
hypotheses:      
H2:  Municipal bond volume increases following a local political scandal. 
H3:  The number of trades in municipal bond issues increases following a local political 
scandal. 
 Third, we focus on the activity following a political scandal.  In the bond market, trade 
size is an indicator of whether a trade is an institutional or a retail trade.  Ronen and Tavy (2013) 
detail that small bond trades are almost always retail trades, whereas larger trades are 
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institutions.  Due to the tax advantages offered to municipal bond holders, municipal bond retail 
trades are likely local investors (Green, Hollifield, and Schurhoff, 2007).  State residents are 
offered tax advantages on municipal bonds, but only for bonds issued in the state in which they 
reside.   Focusing on how (or if) trade size changes as traders share their information following a 
political scandal enables us to determine whether institutions, local retail investors, or perhaps 
both are changing their trading activity following a scandal.  We present the following 
hypothesis: 
H4:  There is a direct relation between the average municipal bond trade size and the 
occurrence of a political scandal.   
Research supports both institutions and local traders as informed traders.  Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner (2005) determine that local investments tend to outperform non-local investments by 
over 3%, leading the authors to conclude that local investors possess superior knowledge of local 
firms.  Mutual fund managers are shown to invest in local companies and to earn abnormal 
returns on local investments (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999, 2001).  Institutions are also shown to 
provide information to the market.  Chakravarty (2001) details that institutions make up a 
majority of the price impact of medium-sized equity trades. It is possible that both retail 
investors and institutions provide information to the municipal bond market following a political 
scandal.  Ivkovic and Weisbenner and Coval and Moskowitz utilize abnormal returns as a 
measure of information, while Chakravarty uses price impact to determine that institutions 
provide information to the market.  By using both returns and price impact, we are able to show 
which size investors earns abnormal returns following government wrongdoing, and also which 
size investors contributes to price contribution.  We propose the following hypotheses: 
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H5A: There is a direct relation between abnormal returns in the municipal bond market and the 
occurrence of a local political scandal. 
H5B:  There is a direction relation between weighted price contribution in the municipal bond 
market and the occurrence of a local political scandal. 
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DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
We use municipal bond transaction data for January 2006 through December 2013 from 
the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB).  The MSRB municipal bond database 
includes all trades by registered broker-dealers.  Each trade is identified as a dealer purchase 
from a customer, dealer sale to a customer, or interdealer trade, and each trade record includes 
the CUSIP, security information, coupon, yield, par value traded, and price. The data initially 
includes 78,640,003 bond transactions.  We require bonds in the sample to trade nine times each 
year (Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar, 2007)1, which removes 10,372,314 trades from the sample.  
We also require bonds in the sample to trade at prices above 25% of par in order to remove 
municipalities close to bankruptcy or default, and we remove transactions with data entry 
errors/missing values.  These two deletions further reduce our sample by 217,332 trades.   
After constructing weekly spread measures, we lose an additional 28,948,700 
observations.  Our final data sample includes 39,105,657 trades in 481,365 municipal bonds 
issued by the municipalities in all fifty states in the United States.  We obtain each bond’s issuing 
state and whether a bond is general obligation or revenue from the MSRB’s Electronic Municipal 
Market Access (EMMA) website.  We collect data on state population and income from the 
United States Census Burea, and we obtain information on individual state financials from the 
Fiscal Survey of the States compiled by the State Governor’s Association.  
                                                          
1 Harris and Piwowar (2006) study transactions costs in the municipal bond market and require bonds in their 
sample to trade at least six times.  We follow Edwards et al (2007) and use a more restrictive requirement (nine 
times each year) to control for potential nonsynchronous trading, given the illiquidity of the municipal bond market.  
We replicate each table using the Harris and Piwowar restriction, and the results are qualitatively similar.   
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We are interested in the way announcements regarding state and local government 
officials’ wrongdoing influence municipal bond trading.  We utilize the Department of Justice’s 
Criminal Division reports on the illegal activity of government officials as well as an internet 
based search to find news reports of officials and their wrongdoing.  We acquire both 
announcement of Justice Department investigations, indictments and trial verdict outcomes from 
the Justice Department reports, and we utilize an internet search to find the first news date of the 
illegal or questionable activity.  In our analysis, we focus on three types of events:  first reported 
news days, indictment announcement days, and trial verdict announcement days.  We collect 115 
individual events of government officials’ misconduct, illegal activity, or in some cases, 
scandal.2       
  
                                                          
2 The types of misconduct in our sample include bribery, money laundering, domestic/sexual abuse, assault, illegal 
wire tampering, and child pornography charges.  The officials in the sample are state legislature members, state 
governors, state lieutenant governors, state secretaries, and members of US Congress.   
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THE MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET DESCRIPTION 
Several types of government entities issue municipal bonds, including state and local 
governments, electric companies, schools, and hospitals.  Municipal bonds are not regulated by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission and instead are governed by the MSRB.  The market 
itself is highly fragmented and opaque (Harris and Piwowar, 2007; and Green, Li, and Schurhoff, 
2010), and trading occurs in an over the counter setting through dealers.  The MSRB website 
EMMA provides information about the municipal bond market, including post-trade information 
for municipal bonds.  Trades are reported to the MSRB’s real-time transaction reporting system 
(RTRS) within 15 minutes of the trade execution, and the trades then are posted publicly to the 
EMMA website.  Real time trade reporting includes real-time prices for most trades occurring 
after January 31, 2005.            
 Appendix 1 supplies information about the sample of municipal bond trades.  Overall, the 
majority of trading occurs in bonds with more than ten years to maturity (71.34%), regardless of 
whether or not any type of announcement occurs about government officials and their 
misconduct.  The municipal bond market is dominated by small trades.  Roughly 72% of trades 
are less than $100,000 in size.  The majority of bond trades execute at prices above par (53.59%) 
and occur in bonds issued by the top five bond issuing states (California, Texas, New York, 
Florida, and Pennsylvania) during our sample period.  Dealer sales account for the largest portion 
of trading as compared to both interdealer trades and dealer purchases.   
 In Panel B, we separate the event days into three categories:  news days, indictment 
announcement days, and trial verdict announcement days.  News days appear to have the most 
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large trades (29.57%), while indictment announcement days appear to have the largest portion of 
small trades (74.17%).  Small trades are trades less than $100,000, and large trades are trades 
greater than $100,000.3  We detail general summary statistics about the sample in Appendix 2.  
Panel A shows a summary of all bonds in the sample.  The average municipal bond trade size is 
around $333,000, and the average daily dollar volume for municipal bonds is over $904,000.  
Municipal bonds trade an average of three times per day with an average bid-ask spread of 
1.45%.  The bonds in the sample have an average of nearly ten years to maturity.  Panel B details 
the bonds issued by the top five bond issuing states:  California, Texas, New York, Florida, and 
Pennsylvania.  Overall, the summary statistics for the bonds issued by the top five issuing states 
are quite similar to those for the full sample of 481,365 bonds.   
  
                                                          
3 We follow Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007) in classifying our trade sizes.  We replicate all tables using 
various trade size values in determining large and small trade sizes.  The results are qualitatively similar regardless 
of the method used. 
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RESULTS 
First, we are interested in what effect, if any, announcements regarding state officials and 
their misconduct have on municipal bond trading.  We test for differences in event days and non-
event days.  We initially define an event day as the day when either a news report announcement, 
indictment announcement, or a trial verdict announcement is made.  The announcement must 
relate to the government officials’ misconduct, wrongdoing, or scandal, and it is the first report 
of its kind (ie, first news day, report day, etc).  Non-event days are all trading days without any 
such announcement.  We present results for our initial analysis in Appendix 3.  We find the 
average municipal bond trade size is larger on event days than non-event days.  The difference in 
trade size between the event and non-event is nearly $60,000.  We also find that dollar volume is 
greater on event days than all other trading days.  Event days influence spreads, leading to a 
0.02% increase in trading costs (1.72% on event days compared to 1.70% on other trading days).  
There are no differences in the number of trades or returns between event days and non-event 
days.   
 We graph the relation between event days and non-event days in Figure 1.  Figure 1 
shows total dollar volume as well as both large trade dollar volume and small trade dollar 
volume during the five trading days leading up to the announcement, the day of the 
announcement, and the five trading days following the announcement.  Between days negative 
three and three, it appears that total volume and large trade dollar volume peak on the event day 
and then decline over the next few trading days.  Small trade volume appears unaffected by the 
announcements about misconduct.  
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Figure 2 shows the relation between event days, non-event days, and the bid-ask spread.  
In Figure 2, we see a steep increase in spreads beginning on day negative four.  The increase in 
spreads continues through the event day and the following trading days.  Spreads appear to 
decline and level off around day four following the event.  Overall, the evidence in Appendix 3, 
Figure 1, and Figure 2 gives an indication that announcements about government officials and 
their wrongdoing influence municipal bond trading.   
We further our analysis by dividing the sample of trades in based on the type of 
announcement that occurs (news days, indictment announcement days, and trial verdict 
announcement days) in Appendix 4.  Panel A includes news announcement days.  The average 
municipal bond trade size is about $107,000 larger on news announcement days than other 
trading days.  The corresponding average daily dollar volume is higher on news announcement 
days as well.  Dollar volume is around $1,700,000 on news announcement days, but dollar 
volume is roughly $1,500,000 on other trading days.  The difference in volume is nearly 
$200,000.  However, we find no differences in returns, the number of trades, or spreads between 
news announcement days and non-announcement days.   
Panel B provides the analysis of indictment days.  Spreads are higher on indictment 
announcement days than non-announcement days.  Specifically, spreads are 1.81% the day 
indictments are announced compared to 1.78% on other trading days.  Municipal bonds trade 
more often on indictment announcement days as well, about 3.25 trades execute on indictment 
days compared to 3.05 trades on other trading days.  Panel C provides statistics for trial verdict 
announcement days.  The only different in trading activity on trial verdict days relates to spreads.  
We find that spreads are 0.05% higher on trial verdict days than on days when no announcement 
occurs regarding government official misconduct.    
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 In the previous appendices, our analysis focuses on the differences in all trading on the 
various event days (and non-event days) that relate to announcements of government official 
misconduct.  Now, we attempt to isolate the type of trading activity based on trade size.  We 
follow Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007) in classifying trades.  We categorize trades as 
“large” if they exceed $100,000, and we classify trades as small if they are less than $100,000 in 
size.  Small trades are generally viewed as retail trades in the bond market, and large trades are 
labeled institutions (Ronen and Zhou, 2013; and Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar, 2007).  We 
attempt to isolate “who” changes trading activity when announcements about government 
misconduct or scandal occur by dividing our sample by trade size.   
Appendix 5 provides our first analysis based on trade size.  Panel A includes small trades, 
and Panel B includes large trades.  Both the average trade size and dollar volume are larger on 
event days than other trading days for small trades.  Small trades are about $300 larger on event 
days, whereas dollar volume is nearly $3,000 higher on event days.  We also find that slightly 
more small trades occur on event days than non-event days; however, small trades account for 
similar proportions of volume and trades on both event day and other trading days. 
 The results for larger trades are shown in Panel B.  Large trades earn positive returns on 
event days, while non-event day returns for large trades are negative.  Large trade dollar volume 
increases by roughly $180,000 when an announcement about government officials’ wrongdoing 
is made.  The average large trade is roughly $1,400,000 on event days, which is around $115,000 
larger than the average large trade on other trading days.  We also find that spreads are 0.04% 
higher on event days for large trades.  We find no differences in either the number of trades or 
the proportion of volume (trades) for which large trades account between event and non-event 
days.   
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 We continue our trade size analysis in Appendix 6.  We divide the sample based on three 
types of events (news announcement days, indictment announcement days, and trial verdict 
announcement days) and based on trade size (large trades versus small trades).  Panel A provides 
statistics regarding event days (divided by type of event) and trade sizes, while Panel B provides 
information regarding non-event days and trade sizes.  Panel C shows difference estimates 
between the two trading days and between trade sizes.  Small trades are trades less than 
$100,000, and large trades are trades greater than $100,000.  Generally, it appears that small 
trades on news announcement days and small trades on non-news days are qualitatively similar.   
Trade sizes hover around $30,000 on both days, and dollar volume is about $60,000 on 
both news and non-news days.  Spreads, the number of trades, and returns are also similar for 
small trades on news announcement and non-announcement days.  Small trades account for 
similar proportions of dollar volume and trading, regardless of it being an event day.  There are 
differences between large trades on news and large trades on non-news days.  Large trades earn 
positive returns on news event days; the returns to large trades are 0.0012% higher on news 
event days.  Large trades are also roughly $200,000 greater in size on news event days and large 
trade volume is about $312,000 higher.  
 We document several differences between indictment announcement days and days 
without indictment announcements.  Small trade dollar volume is roughly $72,000 on indictment 
announcement days, but small trade volume is only around $65,500 on non-event days.  The 
difference is nearly $7,000.  Small trades occur slightly more often on indictment announcement 
days than other trading days, and make up 0.76% more of the total number of trades.  Large 
trades are more expensive to trade on indictment announcement days.  Specifically, large trade 
spreads are 1.10% on the days indictments are announced, but only 1.04% on other trading days.  
150 
 
We also find that large trades account for a smaller portion of volume and a smaller portion of 
trades on indictment announcement days. 
 Lastly, we analyze trading activity on trial verdict announcement days and non-
announcement days.  The majority of trading activity (for both small and large trades) is similar 
on trial verdict announcement days and non-announcement days.  Trade sizes for small trades are 
around $30,000 on both verdict days and non-verdict days, and large trades are roughly 
$1,200,000 to $1,400,000 on both types of days.  Returns and the number of trades are similar 
for both large and small trades regardless of whether it is a verdict announcement day or not.  
Spreads, however, are larger on trial verdict days than other trading days.  The average spread 
for small trades is 2.03% on non-verdict days, but spreads increase to 2.07% on verdict 
announcement days (a difference of 0.04%).  The same is true for large trades; spreads are 0.07% 
larger on trial verdict announcement days than other trading days.     
In the previous appendices, we document the influence that announcements about 
government officials and their wrongdoing have on municipal bonds’ trading activity.  We 
attempt to further isolate the influence these announcements have on trading activity in this 
section.  Our first regression models estimate the bid-ask spread.  We follow Harris, Edwards, 
and Piwowar (2007) in our regression model.  Our main variables of interest are the event day 
and the post event day variables.  The event day variable is equal to one when news, indictment, 
or verdict announcements are made regarding misconduct.  The post-event day variable is equal 
to one during the five trading days following the announcement about misconduct.  We control 
for the overall quality of each state’s government with the number of Justice Department 
convictions (of state officials) from the previous year.  We also control for other factors shown to 
influence spreads:  dollar volume, number of trades, trade size, volatility, and years to maturity.  
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We control for whether a bond is taxable, and whether it is a revenue or general obligation bond.  
Lastly, we control for the general financial environment in each state with the median population 
income and general fund revenue.   
We find a positive relation between spreads and news event announcements, indictment 
announcements, and trial verdict announcements.  Spreads are 0.06% higher on event days than 
the five days prior to the news announcement of wrongdoing.  Spreads continue to remain 
elevated the five days following the announcement/news event.  On news event days, spreads are 
0.04% higher than spreads during the prior five trading days.  Spreads continue to remain high 
the five days following the news announcement and are 0.05% higher than the pre-event period.  
The results are similar for indictment announcements.  Spreads are about 0.04% higher on 
indictment announcement days than spreads during the five days leading up to the announcement 
(which is similar to the news announcement results).  After the indictment announcement, 
spreads are still higher by 0.03% (compared to the week before the indictment is announced).  
Trial verdict announcements appear to influence spreads more than news days or indictment 
announcements.  Spreads are 0.13% higher on trial verdict announcement days than prior to the 
announcement.  Following the announcements, spreads are still higher than the pre-
announcement period (by about 0.07%).  A negative relation exists between spreads and the 
lagged government officials’ convictions measure.  It is possible that convictions serve a positive 
purpose for municipal bonds (and municipalities).  Convictions in one year could serve as a 
“house cleaning” mechanism for governments that leads to less corruption in state governments 
in general.   
Next, we consider the relation between municipal bond dollar volume and events related 
to government officials’ misconduct.  We divide dollar volume into two categories in our 
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analysis:  small trade dollar volume and large trade dollar volume.  Small trade dollar volume is 
the sum of all trades less than $100,000 in size, while large trade dollar volume includes trades 
over $100,000 in size.  Given that small trades are likely retail investors and that small municipal 
bond trades are likely local investors (Green, Hollifield, and Schurhoff, 2010), examining 
volume in these two group provides insight as to whether local traders or institutions respond to 
political scandal or misconduct.   
Appendix 8 presents the municipal bond volume regression estimations.  We estimate 
separate regression models based on news event days, indictment announcement days, and trial 
verdict announcement days.  We find that volume generally declines on the day of the event and 
the five trading days following the event for all three types of announcements.  Small trade dollar 
volume falls by roughly $1,200,000 for news announcement days,.  Small trade volume 
continues to fall during the five trading days following the announcement day and is nearly 
$1,000,000 lower after the news of government officials’ misconduct.  Large dollar volume 
declines in a similar manner on news announcement days and the post announcement period.  
Specifically, large trade dollar volume falls by around $64,000,000 on the news announcement 
days and continues to be lower the five subsequent trading days. 
 We also find a negative relation between small (and large) dollar volume and indictment 
announcement days.  Small dollar volume is nearly $700,000 lower on the days indictments are 
announced compared to the five trading days leading up to the indictment.  Small dollar volume 
continues to be lower after the indictment is announced (as compared to pre-announcement 
levels).  We find the same results for large trade dollar volume both on and following indictment 
announcements, albeit the results appear to be larger in magnitude.  Lastly, we document a 
relation between trial verdict announcements and small (large) dollar volume.  On verdict 
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announcement days, small trade dollar volume falls by over $145,000.  Small trade dollar 
volume continues to decline the week following the trial verdict announcement.  Large trade 
volume also falls on the verdict announcement days and the subsequent five trading days. 
Small trades in the bond market are typically classified as retail trades, and large trades in 
the bond market are labeled institutions (Ronen and Zhou, 2013; and Edwards, Harris, and 
Piwowar, 2007).  Other research also discusses whether small or large trades (in general) provide 
information to the market.4  We seek to determine which trade sizes and which trade types 
provide information to the municipal bond market.  We do so by calculating the weighted price 
contribution of trades following Barclay and Warner (1993).5  The results for WPC are shown in 
Appendix 9.  Panel A provides estimates divided by trade size, and Panel B divides the sample 
by trade type (dealer purchases, dealer sales, and interdealer trades).   
Large trades account for the majority of price contribution on event days.  Specifically, large 
trades provide 61% of price contribution on event days, and small trades provide the 
corresponding 39%.  The price contribution is different on non-event days.  Small trades provide 
the majority of price contribution on days no announcement is made regarding government 
officials and their wrongdoing.  We further our analysis of price contribution by dividing the 
sample by trader types.  Overall, we find that dealer purchases account for 53% of price 
contribution on event days, 18% more than on non-event days.  Dealer sales account for less 
WPC on event days than non-event days (35% compared to 49%).  Interdealer trades provide the 
smallest amount of price contribution, regardless of whether it is an event day or a non-event 
                                                          
4 Studies exist supporting both small and large trades, both retail and institutional investors, and local traders as 
providing information to the market.  Examples include Barclay and Warner (1993); Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 
2001); Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005); Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2009); and Boehmer and Kelley (2009).   
5 We follow Barclay and Warner (1993) in calculating weighted price contribution.  Other studies also utilize the 
weighted price contribution metric and provide a thorough discussion of the methodology.  Other studies include 
Barclay and Warner (1993); Barclay and Hendershott (2003); Jiang, Likitapiwat, and McInish (2013); and O’Hara 
and Yao (2014). 
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day.  Interdealer trades contribute 16% to price discovery on non-event days, but their 
contribution falls to 12% on event days. 
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CONCLUSION 
We document how municipal bond traders react to wrongdoing by government officials.  
We use 115 individual events of government officials’ misconduct to test the efficiency of the 
municipal bond market, and our study specifically focuses on the municipal bond market’s 
reaction to information using news announcements, indictment announcements, and trial verdict 
announcements.  First, we focus on documenting differences in event days and non-event days.  
Event days are any day on which a news announcement, indictment announcement, or trial 
verdict announcement occurs; non-event days are all other trading days.  Our results indicate 
there are differences in municipal bond trading between event days and non-event days.  Trade 
sizes, dollar volume, and spreads are larger on event days compared to non-event days.  We 
divide the sample by types of events (news announcements, indictment announcements, and trial 
verdict announcements), and we continue to find differences between event and non-event days. 
For both indictment announcement days and trial verdict announcement days, spreads are higher 
on the announcement day than on other trading days.  We further our analysis by dividing the 
sample by small and large trades; both large and small trade volume increases on event days.   
 Second, we model both spreads and bond volume in an effort isolate the effect 
announcements of wrongdoing have on both event days and the five trading days following the 
event.  Spreads are 0.06% higher during event days than during the five preceding trading days, 
and spreads remain elevated following the event.  We also use regression analysis to determine 
what effect events have on small trade and large trade volume.  Overall, we find that both small 
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and large trade volume declines on event days and the following five trading days (compared to 
the five days leading up to the announcement).   
 Third, we study price discovery in the municipal bond market in an effort to document 
what type(s) of trades provide information to the municipal bond market on event days and also 
how price discovery may differ on event days compared to non-event days.  Large trades provide 
61% of price contribution on event days, while small trades account for the largest portion of 
price discovery on other trading days.  Overall, our study provides valuable information 
regarding the effect government officials and their misconduct can have on both the quality and 
the trading activity in the municipal bond market. 
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APPENDIX 1:  MUNICIPAL BOND TRANSACTIONS CHARACTERISTICS 
  
  
Appendix 1:  Municipal Bond Transaction Characteristics 
Appendix 1 provides transaction summary characteristics for all municipal bond trades that trade more than nine times each year from 2006 to 2013.  The 
sample includes 481,365 bonds issued by municipalities in the United States and 39,105,657 executed trades.  Panel A provides information for the full sample 
of bonds.  Event days are any trading day when an announcement (news, indictment, or trial verdict) is first reported regarding state and government official’s 
misconduct, and non-event days are all other trading days.  Panel B divides the event days by type of event.  News day is the first day that news of a 
government officials’ misconduct is reported.  Indictment days are the days that indictment announcements are made and reported in the press for government 
officials’ misconduct.  Trial verdict days are the days that news of the trial’s outcome for officials’ wrongdoing is reported.   
 All Trading Days Event Days Non-Event Days  
Panel A:  All Bond Trades 
% trades in taxable bonds 
% trades in bonds with less than 1 year to maturity 
% trades in bonds with 1 to 10 years to maturity 
% trades in bonds with more than 10 years to maturity 
% trades less than or equal to $100,000 
% trades greater than $100,000 
% trades of premium bonds 
% trades of discount bonds 
% trades at par 
% trades in Top Five Issuers 
% Interdealer Trades 
% Dealer Sales 
% Dealer Purchases 
5.85% 
2.58% 
26.08% 
71.34% 
72.19% 
27.81% 
53.59% 
29.19% 
17.22% 
46.28% 
28.08% 
45.74% 
26.18% 
5.69% 
2.60% 
25.59% 
71.81% 
72.47% 
27.53% 
49.44% 
35.55% 
15.01% 
79.47% 
28.61% 
44.79% 
26.60% 
5.85% 
2.57% 
26.08% 
71.34% 
72.18% 
27.82% 
53.60% 
29.17% 
17.22% 
46.22% 
28.08% 
45.74% 
26.18% 
 
Panel B:  Bond Trades by Type of Event Day 
 News Days Indictment Days Trail Verdict Days  
% trades in taxable bonds 
% trades in bonds with less than 1 year to maturity 
% trades in bonds with 1 to 10 years to maturity 
% trades in bonds with more than 10 years to maturity 
% trades less than or equal to $100,000 
% trades greater than $100,000 
% trades of premium bonds 
% trades of discount bonds 
% trades at par 
% trades in Top Five Issuers 
% Interdealer Trades 
% Dealer Sales 
% Dealer Purchases 
6.12% 
2.46% 
25.98% 
71.56% 
70.43% 
29.57% 
50.91% 
32.15% 
16.94% 
86.46% 
29.49% 
42.15% 
28.36% 
4.89% 
2.76% 
26.22% 
71.01% 
74.17% 
25.83% 
48.62% 
38.70% 
12.68% 
81.65% 
28.66% 
46.25% 
25.09% 
6.51% 
2.57% 
23.13% 
74.30% 
73.55% 
26.45% 
47.69% 
36.56% 
15.74% 
56.75% 
26.31% 
47.93% 
25.76% 
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APPENDIX 2:  SUMMARY STATISTICS, BOND LEVEL 
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Appendix 2:  Summary Statistics, Bond Level 
Appendix 2 provides summary statistics of all municipal bonds that trade more than nine times each year from 
2006 to 2013.  The sample of bonds includes 481,365 bonds with 39,105,657 trades.  Panel A provides summary 
statistics for all bonds in the sample, and Panel B provides summary statistics for the top five bond issuing states 
(California, Texas, New York, Florida, and Pennsylvania).  Trade size is the average dollar trade size.  Dollar 
volume is the average daily bond trading volume, and the number of trades is the average times a bond trades 
each day.  The return is the percentage abnormal return.  The bid-ask spread is the weekly average buy price 
minus the weekly average selling price.  Years to maturity is the number of years until the bond reaches maturity. 
 N Mean Median 
Panel A:  All Bonds 
Trade Size 
Dollar Volume 
Number Trades 
Return 
Bid-Ask Spread 
Years to Maturity 
481,365 
481,365 
481,365 
481,365 
481,365 
481,365 
$333,166.66 
$904,203.53 
3.00 
0.0006% 
1.45% 
9.60 
$66,954.16 
$180,784.08 
2.45 
0.0003% 
1.33% 
8.15 
Panel B:  Top Five Bond Issuing States 
Trade Size 
Dollar Volume 
Number of Trades 
Return 
Bid-Ask Spread 
Years to Maturity 
198,795 
198,795 
198,795 
198,795 
198,795 
198,795 
$334,022.18 
$901,046.58 
2.99 
0.0007% 
1.51% 
9.94 
$67,505.44 
$180,652.86 
2.45 
0.0003% 
1.41% 
8.59 
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Appendix 3:  Event Day Differences 
Appendix 3 provides a comparison between event days and non-event days for the sample period 2006 to 2013.  
Event days are any trading day when an announcement (news, indictment, or trial verdict) is first reported 
regarding state and government official’s misconduct, and non-event days are all other trading days.  Trade size is 
the average dollar trade size.  Dollar volume is the average daily bond trading volume, and the number of trades is 
the average times a bond trades each day.  The return is the percentage abnormal return.  The bid-ask spread is the 
weekly average buy price minus the weekly average selling price.  Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% is 
indicated by ***, **, and *.   
 Event Days Non-Event Days Difference 
Trade Size 
Dollar Volume 
Number of Trades 
Return 
Bid-Ask Spread 
$541,793.68 
$1,474,672.58 
3.05 
0.0002% 
1.72% 
$482,174.88 
$1,356,531.65 
2.96 
0.0004% 
1.70% 
$59,618.79*** 
$118,140.93** 
0.08 
-0.0002% 
0.02%** 
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Appendix 4:  Event Day Differences by Event Type 
Appendix 4 provides a comparison between event days and non-event days for the sample period 2006 to 2013.  
Non-event days are all trading days that are not news, indictment, or trial verdict announcement days.  We divide 
the sample by the types of events. News day is the first day that news of a government officials’ misconduct is 
reported.  Indictment days are the days that indictment announcements are made and reported in the press for 
government officials’ misconduct.  Trial verdict days are the days that news of the trial’s outcome for officials’ 
wrongdoing is reported. Trade size is the average dollar trade size.  Dollar volume is the average daily bond 
trading volume, and the number of trades is the average times a bond trades each day.  The return is the 
percentage abnormal return.  The bid-ask spread is the weekly average buy price minus the weekly average 
selling price.  Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *.   
 Event Days Non-Event Days Difference 
Panel A:  News Days 
Return 
Trade Size 
Total Trades 
Bid-Ask Spread 
Total Dollar Volume 
0.0005% 
$663,813.71 
2.96 
1.69% 
$1,776,256.64 
0.0003% 
$556,349.89 
3.01 
1.68% 
$1,577,230.26 
0.0001% 
$107,463.82*** 
-0.06 
0.01% 
$199,026.38*** 
Panel B:  Indictment Days 
Return 
Trade Size 
Total Trades 
Bid-Ask Spread 
Total Dollar Volume 
0.0001% 
$485,182.52 
3.25 
1.81% 
$1,442,277.70 
0.0003% 
$453,294.18 
3.05 
1.78% 
$1,317,453.83 
-0.0002% 
$31,888.34 
0.20** 
0.03%*** 
$124,823.87 
Panel C:  Trial Verdict Days 
Return 
Trade Size 
Total Trades 
Bid-Ask Spread 
Total Dollar Volume 
0.0004% 
$465,200.04 
3.25 
1.79% 
$1,338,582.81 
0.0004% 
$471,257.23 
3.19 
1.75% 
$1,484,612.77 
0.0000 
-$6,057.19 
0.05 
0.05%*** 
-$146,029.96 
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Appendix 5:  Trade Size Differences 
Appendix 5 provides a comparison between event days and non-event days and also for trade sizes for the sample 
period 2006 to 2013.  We divide the sample by trade size.  Small trades are trades less than $100,000, and large 
trades are trades greater than $100,000 (Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar, 2007).  Event days are any trading day 
when an announcement (news, indictment, or trial verdict) is first reported regarding state and government 
official’s misconduct, and non-event days are all other trading days.  All variables are calculated by trade size.  
The return is the percentage abnormal return.  Trade size is the average dollar trade size.  Dollar volume is the 
average daily bond trading volume, and the number of trades is the average times a bond trades each day.  The 
bid-ask spread is the weekly average buy price minus the weekly average selling price.  % Trades is the portion of 
trading for which each trade size accounts.  % Volume is the portion of volume for which each trade size 
accounts.  Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *.   
 Event Days Non-Event Days Differences 
Panel A:  Small Trades 
Return 
Trade Size 
Dollar Volume 
Bid-Ask Spread 
Number of Trades 
% Trades 
% Volume 
0.0004% 
$29,965.79 
$65,682.67 
1.98% 
2.18 
74.55% 
71.47% 
0.0006% 
$29,645.95 
$62,757.03 
1.97% 
2.09 
74.29% 
71.35% 
-0.0002% 
$319.83** 
$2,925.64** 
0.01% 
0.10* 
0.26% 
0.13% 
Panel B:  Large Trades 
Return 
Trade Size 
Dollar Volume 
Bid-Ask Spread 
Number of Trades 
% Trades 
% Volume 
0.0002% 
$1,408,989.91 
$1,714,352.39 
1.04% 
0.82 
25.44% 
28.53% 
-0.0002% 
$1,293,774.62 
$1,531,802.79 
1.00% 
0.83 
25.71% 
28.65% 
0.0004%** 
$115,215.29** 
$182,549.60*** 
0.04%*** 
-0.01 
-0.26% 
-0.13% 
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Appendix 6:  Trade Size Differences by Event Type 
Appendix 6 provides a comparison between event days and non-event days for the sample period 2006 to 2013.  We divide the sample by the types of events. 
News day is the first day that news of a government officials’ misconduct is reported.  Indictment days are the days that indictment announcements are made 
and reported in the press for government officials’ misconduct.  Trial verdict days are the days that news of the trial’s outcome for officials’ wrongdoing is 
reported.  Non-event days are all trading days that are not news, indictment, or trial verdict announcement days.  The return is the percentage abnormal return.  
Trade size is the average dollar trade size.  Dollar volume is the average daily bond trading volume, and the number of trades is the average times a bond 
trades each day.  The bid-ask spread is the weekly average buy price minus the weekly average selling price.  % Trades is the portion of trading for which each 
trade size accounts.  % Volume is the portion of volume for which each trade size accounts.  Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and 
*.   
 News Days Indictment Days Trial Verdict Days 
 Small Trades Large Trades Small Trades Large Trades Small Trades Large Trades 
Panel A:  Event Days 
Returns 
Trade Size 
Dollar Volume 
Bid-Ask Spread 
Number of Trades 
% Trades 
% Volume 
0.0005% 
$30,015.28 
$61,317.11 
2.00% 
2.04 
72.35% 
69.20% 
0.0010% 
$1,714,939.53 
$2,007,979.07 
0.94% 
0.89 
27.65% 
30.81% 
0.0004% 
$29,798.23 
$72,435.66 
2.05% 
2.39 
76.32% 
72.78% 
-0.0001% 
$1,369,842.04 
$1,670,680.44 
1.10% 
0.83 
23.68% 
27.22% 
0.0006% 
$29,179.48 
$68,819.92 
2.07% 
2.36 
75.03% 
71.74% 
0.0004% 
$1,269,762.89 
$1,565,566.54 
1.02% 
0.84 
24.97% 
28.26% 
Panel B:  Non-Event Days 
Returns 
Trade Size 
Dollar Volume 
Bid-Ask Spread 
Number of Trades 
% Trades 
% Volume 
0.0006% 
$29,743.80 
$62,763.94 
1.99% 
2.07 
72.40% 
69.28% 
-0.0001% 
$1,514,466.32 
$1,696,252.61 
0.95% 
0.91 
27.60% 
30.72% 
0.0005% 
$29,473.63 
$65,555.51 
2.04% 
2.18 
75.56% 
72.42% 
-0.0003% 
$1,251,898.31 
$1,543,255.90 
1.04% 
0.82 
24.44% 
27.58% 
0.0006% 
$29,049.63 
$67,000.46 
2.03% 
2.27 
74.86% 
71.64% 
0.0001% 
$1,417,612.31 
$1,607,264.27 
0.95% 
0.89 
25.14% 
28.36% 
Panel C:  Differences 
Returns 
Trade Size 
Dollar Volume 
Bid-Ask Spread 
Number of Trades 
% Trades 
% Volume 
-0.0001% 
$271.48 
-$1,446.83 
0.01% 
-0.03 
-0.06% 
-0.09% 
0.0012%*** 
$200,473.21*** 
$311,726.45*** 
-0.01% 
-0.02 
0.06% 
0.09% 
-0.0001% 
$324.60 
$6,880.15*** 
0.02% 
0.20*** 
0.76%** 
0.36% 
-0.0002 
$117,943.73 
$127,424.53 
0.06%*** 
0.01 
-0.76%** 
-0.36%** 
0.0000% 
$129.85 
$1,819.47 
0.04%** 
0.10 
0.17% 
0.09% 
0.0003% 
-$147,849.42 
-$41,697.74 
0.07%*** 
-0.05 
-0.17% 
-0.09% 
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APPENDIX 7:  SPREAD REGRESSIONS 
  
  
Appendix 7:  Spread Regressions 
Appendix 7 provides spread regression estimations for 481,365 municipal bonds with 39,105,657 trades from 2006 to 2013.  The bid-ask spread is the weekly 
average buy price minus the weekly average selling price.  Model 1 includes all events.  Event days are any trading day when an announcement (news, 
indictment, or trial verdict) is first reported regarding state and government official’s misconduct, and non-event days are all other trading days.  Model 2 
provides results for news days.  Model 3 provides estimations for indictment announcement days.  Model 4 provides regression estimates for trial verdict 
announcement days.  News day is the first day that news of a government officials’ misconduct is reported.  Indictment days are the days that indictment 
announcements are made and reported in the press for government officials’ misconduct.  Trial verdict days are the days that news of the trial’s outcome for 
officials’ wrongdoing is reported.  Event day is equal to one on the day of an event relating to government officials’ misconduct and zero otherwise.  Post-
Event Days is equal to one the five days following the event and zero otherwise.  Govt Official Convictions is the previous year’s government officials’ 
convictions (by the justice department) for each state.  Dollar volume is the average daily bond trading volume, and the number of trades is the average times a 
bond trades each day.  Trade size is the average dollar trade size.  Volatility is calculated following Downing and Zhang (2004):  
100
Pricet
(Pricet
Max − Pricet
Min).  
Years to maturity is the time until a bond reaches maturity.  Revenue Bond is equal to one if the bond is a revenue bond and zero otherwise.  Taxable is equal 
to one if the bond is a taxable bond and zero otherwise.  Top Five Issuer is equal to one if the bond is issued by California, Texas, New York, Florida, or 
Pennsylvania.  Median income is the average median income of households in each state.  General Fund Revenue is the revenue earned by each state’s general 
fund.  Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *.   
 All Events News Events Indictment Events Trial Verdict Events 
Intercept 
 
Variables of Interest 
Event Day 
 
Post-Event Days [+1,+5] 
 
Govt Official Convictions 
 
Bond/Trading Traits 
Dollar Volume 
 
Number of Trades 
 
Trade Size 
 
Volatility 
 
Years to Maturity 
 
Revenue Bond 
0.6336*** 
(23.97) 
 
0.0557*** 
(15.17) 
0.0480*** 
(22.27) 
-0.0004*** 
(-44.32) 
 
0.0000*** 
(55.84) 
-0.0003*** 
(-14.15) 
-0.0000*** 
(-11.68) 
0.4179*** 
(50.93) 
0.0017*** 
(16.49) 
-0.0004 
0.6338*** 
(24.00) 
 
0.0434*** 
(7.33) 
0.0548*** 
(17.13) 
-0.0004*** 
(-44.13) 
 
0.0000*** 
(55.82) 
-0.0003*** 
(-14.61) 
-0.0000*** 
(-11.68) 
0.4179*** 
(51.92) 
0.0017*** 
(16.48) 
-0.0004 
0.6341*** 
(24.08) 
 
0.0356*** 
(6.41) 
0.0276*** 
(7.97) 
-0.0004*** 
(-44.55) 
 
0.0000*** 
(55.81) 
-0.0003*** 
(-14.61) 
-0.0000*** 
(-11.68) 
0.4179*** 
(56.30) 
0.0017*** 
(16.48) 
-0.0004 
0.6340*** 
(24.02) 
 
0.1288*** 
(15.11) 
0.0737*** 
(14.12) 
-0.0004*** 
(-45.11) 
 
0.0000*** 
(55.81) 
-0.0003*** 
(-14.61) 
-0.0000*** 
(11.68) 
0.4179*** 
(56.29) 
0.0017*** 
(16.48) 
-0.0004 
1
7
4
 
  
 
Taxable 
 
Top 5 Issuer 
 
State Characteristics 
Median Income 
 
General Fund Revenue 
 
R-Squared 
(-0.97) 
-0.1065*** 
(-12.76) 
0.0403*** 
(3.18) 
 
-0.0000*** 
(-5.50) 
-0.0000*** 
(-13.85) 
51.37% 
(-0.93) 
-0.1065*** 
(-12.76) 
0.0404*** 
(3.34) 
 
-0.0000*** 
(-5.59) 
-0.0000*** 
(-13.76) 
51.37% 
(-0.94) 
-0.1065*** 
(-12.76) 
0.0404*** 
(3.30) 
 
-0.0000*** 
(-5.81) 
-0.0000*** 
(-13.70) 
51.37% 
(-0.88) 
-0.1065*** 
(-12.73) 
0.0406*** 
(3.58) 
 
-0.0000*** 
(-5.76) 
-0.0000*** 
(-13.67) 
51.37% 
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APPENDIX 8:  SMALL VERSUS LARGE DOLLAR VOLUME 
  
  
Appendix 8:  Small versus Large Dollar Volume  
Appendix 8 provides volume regression estimations for 481,365 municipal bonds with 39,105,657 trades from 2006 to 2013.  The dependent variable is the 
small trade (large trade) dollar volume for each day.  News day is the first day that news of a government officials’ misconduct is reported.  Indictment days 
are the days that indictment announcements are made and reported in the press for government officials’ misconduct.  Trial verdict days are the days that news 
of the trial’s outcome for officials’ wrongdoing is reported.  Event day is equal to one on the day of an event relating to government officials’ misconduct and 
zero otherwise.  Post-Event Days is equal to one the five days following the event and zero otherwise.  Govt Official Convictions is the previous year’s 
government officials’ convictions (by the justice department) for each state.  Years to maturity is the time until a bond reaches maturity.  Revenue Bond is 
equal to one if the bond is a revenue bond and zero otherwise.  Taxable is equal to one if the bond is a taxable bond and zero otherwise.  Top Five Issuer is 
equal to one if the bond is issued by California, Texas, New York, Florida, or Pennsylvania.  Population is the annual Census Bureau estimate of population 
for each state.  Median income is the average median income of households in each state.  General Fund Revenue is the revenue earned by each state’s general 
fund.  Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *.   
 News Days Indictment Days Verdict Days 
 Small $ Volume Large $ Volume Small $ Volume Large $ Volume Small $ Volume Large $ Volume 
Intercept 
 
Variables of Interest 
Event Day 
 
Post-Event Days 
[+1,+5] 
 
Govt Convictions 
 
Bond/Trading Traits 
Years to Maturity 
 
Revenue Bond 
 
Taxable 
 
Top 5 Issuer 
 
State Characteristics 
Population 
 
Median Income 
 
-485,902*** 
(-9.36) 
 
-1,225,336*** 
(-15.40) 
-965,271*** 
(-11.86) 
 
-15,024*** 
(-18.29) 
 
-36,692*** 
(-12.93) 
1,688,456*** 
(20.19) 
103,302*** 
(6.85) 
-619,466*** 
(-18.68) 
 
0.1436* 
(1.90) 
14.4560 
(1.21) 
-27,103,649*** 
(-11.11) 
 
-64,544,254*** 
(-13.86) 
-62,717,128*** 
(-17.78) 
-905,295*** 
(-20.20) 
 
-2,953,711*** 
(-19.71) 
98,189,160*** 
(22.29) 
2,779,571*** 
(35.32) 
-34,951,779*** 
(-20.40) 
 
7.5990** 
(2.06) 
796.3939*** 
(14.47) 
-759.7013*** 
-490,781*** 
(-9.98) 
 
-694,864*** 
(-6.53) 
-725,653*** 
(-10.54) 
-14,955*** 
(-18.28) 
 
-36,707*** 
(-12.93) 
1,688,683*** 
(20.91) 
102,959*** 
(6.83) 
-618,457*** 
(-18.68) 
 
0.1436* 
(1.91) 
14.5790 
(1.21) 
-18.9345*** 
-27,405,503*** 
(-11.01) 
 
-49,443,823*** 
(-11.81) 
-47,725,148*** 
(-16.16) 
-901,147*** 
(-20.21) 
 
-2,954,631*** 
(-19.71) 
98,203,433*** 
(22.12) 
2,754,750*** 
(34.99) 
-34,887,812*** 
(-20.23) 
 
7.5990** 
(2.06) 
803.4074*** 
(14.18) 
-768.0565*** 
-491,316*** 
(-9.90) 
 
-145,815*** 
(-4.99) 
-484,395*** 
(-7.72) 
-14,909*** 
(-18.27) 
 
-36,701*** 
(-12.93) 
1,688,437*** 
(20.19) 
103,399*** 
(6.86) 
-619,858*** 
(-18.68) 
 
0.1430* 
(1.91) 
14.5667 
(1.21) 
-18.9219*** 
-27,445,983*** 
(-11.14) 
 
-20,652,997*** 
(-3.74) 
-22,767,430*** 
(-6.48) 
-898,123*** 
(-20.19) 
 
-2,954,175*** 
(-19.71) 
98,185,736*** 
(22.13) 
2,784,720*** 
(35.40) 
-34,985,314*** 
(-20.24) 
 
7.5877** 
(2.16) 
803.2922*** 
(14.11) 
-767.2752*** 
1
7
7
 
  
General Fund Revenue 
 
R-Squared 
-18.8018*** 
(-16.18) 
11.30% 
(-13.95) 
25.20% 
(-16.21) 
11.30% 
(-14.04) 
25.20% 
(-16.20) 
11.30% 
(-14.03) 
25.20% 
 
  
1
7
8
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Appendix 9:  Weighted Price Contribution for Event and Non-Event Days 
Appendix 9 provides estimations of weighted price contribution for small trades, large trades, and trade types 
(dealer purchases, dealer sales, and interdealer trades) on event days and non-event days.  Small trades are less 
than $100,000, and large trades are greater than $100,000 (Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar, 2007).  Event days are 
any trading day when an announcement (news, indictment, or trial verdict) is first reported regarding state and 
government official’s misconduct, and non-event days are all other trading days.  We calculate weighted price 
contribution following Barclay and Warner (1993).  Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by ***, **, 
and *.     
 Event Days Non-Event Days Difference 
Panel A:  Trade Sizes 
Small Trades 
Large Trades 
All Trades 
39% 
61% 
100% 
58% 
42% 
100% 
19%*** 
19%*** 
Panel B:  Trader Types 
Dealer Purchases 
Dealer Sales 
Interdealer Trades 
All Trades 
53% 
35% 
12% 
100% 
35% 
49% 
16% 
100% 
18%*** 
14%*** 
-4%*** 
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Figure 1.  Average Municipal Bond Dollar Volume Before, During, and After Wrongdoing Events. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Average Municipal Bond Bid-Ask Spreads Before, During, and After Wrongdoing Events. 
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